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In the following Fssay J have sought to trace the
process by which Hegel'a Logic came to assume its present
form. I have thought that by an analysis of the steps by
which he was leu. to adopt his final conception of the
principle and method of Logic, some light might be sup¬
plied not merely for understanding the work, but for
determining its ultimate philosophical significance. The
essay is from one point of view an introduction to Ilegel's
Logic and his system generally, and thus no more than the
beginnings of a large undertaking; from another point of
view it is a chapter in the history of philosophy. It was
therefore not open to me to enter any criticisms on Hegel'
views; and I have as nearly as possible avoided all sug¬
gestion of objections and difficulties. For similar rea¬
sons I have only indirectly had in view the many criticism
and interpretations that have from time to time been
passed on the work. examination of these in detail is an
undertaking by itself, and I have refrained from any
uirect polemics against views not substantiated by the
resuits of 111 e enquiry.
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THE GROWTH OF HEGEL'S LOGIC.
INTRODUCTION.
The enquiry into the origin and development of Hegel's conception of
Logic is from the start carried on under considerable difficulties. JJherfc
<L
is scarcity of the material necessary for the purpose, more especially
of material bearing on the earliest period: andthereis thA entire absence
of any explicit statement by Hegel himself of the steps by which he passed
from his earlier views on the nature of Logic to that conception of it
which he ultimately adopted. Prior to the appearance of the first
extended statements regarding logic and philosophy generally, which he
gave expression to about 1709, we have only slight indications of the
direction which his work and his thinking had hitherto taken, and hardly
any direct knowledge of the books he had read. Some years later the
influence of his immediate precursors, and more especially of his
companion Schelling,is decidedly manifest. But too much Importance cannot
be placed on this fact. To begin with^in no case is Hegel the professed
follower of any of those with whom he may agree vary closely; opinions
which he expresses are held and uttered as his own. We cannot attribute
to others the origination of ideas maintained by Hegel himself, by whom
indeed the results arrived at by previous philosophers were raxhor
accepted as. aids to his own development than conclusions admitted as final.
Further Hegel's very earliest expressed relation to Kant and Fichteis
essentially negative; it is one of disagreement. He admits indeed that
the principle adopted by each has in it 'speculative truth,' and is of
value for philosophy, but he argues that the conception which each took
of this principle was limited, so limited in fact as to make their
attempts to work it out merely exhibit the insufficiency and self—
contradictoriness of their conception. His relation!# to Scholling's
thinking is to all appearance much more that of agreement and acquiescence,
So much is this the case that at one period it is difficult to distinguish
S«J
Hegel's own vie?; from that of Schelling for whom he -si-mo to act as defender
CD
and expositor. Even here however the agreement is not complete, as we
shall show later on. But it i.. 11a"n*
we are not at liberty.to argue that he adopted another attitude
during his early career to Schelling than he did to Kant or Fichte, that
Schelling disagreed less with him on the whole than with the other two,
that those latter never met with acceptance from him a$ any time but only
with disagreement. The reason that we learn of this agreement is not
because Schelling was the only person with whom Hegel could agree or had
ever agreed but merely because the exigences of Hegel'3 career required
him , after his installation as lecturer in the University of Jena, and
on his entrance into the philosophical circle gathered there, to give
(X)
Werke I. 'Diff. d. Ficht u. Sch. System.'
3.
some declaration. of his position. If there had been occasion for a jawrate-
<3.tcl&.ra.tf»n earlier in his career doubtless we night have discovered
decided affinity with Kant or Fichte. ?Hien vie remember that Sahelling's
was the primary philosophical influence at Jena when Hegel went there, that
he was in fact the only considerable philosopher in the University,(Fichte
having left Jena about 1739^two years before Hegel it will
soon natural enough that Hegel should on entering express himself in
agreement with the already established and pronounced philosophical
tendency of the University. The reticence and want of emphasis with which
(-0 -h+iLiy
this agreement :i is expressed indicates even that it meanymore than
absence of disagreement. The agreement cannot^have lasted longer
than two or perhaps three years, and can(lTavg\hard1y continued after 1803,
when Schelling left Jena and the 'Critical Journal* which they had
jointly edited for about a year (1802—3) ceased to exist.
And Hegel's subsequent attitude to Schelling justifies us in
miwiTnisnig the influence exerted by Schelling no less than in the case
of Kant and Fichte. For no sooner does Hegel discover, as he must have
done by 1803, that Schelling's principle is inadequate to explain what it
professes to solve, than Hegel breaks away from him and thenceforth pursues
" *
a course entirely his own. ^ssi After the publication of the Phenomenology
See the 'Diffsas^ d. F. U. Sch. Syst.' ad fin.
Qlf -ai^o • Uf*+4u.'' /* 'Z 4* 2/fa- ;
(2) ' «f. f/tf, 33
Rosenkranz' HegelsJisben^ 198.
in 1806^7and probably for some time previous to this, Hegel seems to have
been in no appreciable degree influenced?still less assisted^ by his
contemporaries. allowing fully for the influence exerted upon him
by the philosophy of his day, and it cannot be questioned that Hegel finds
himself to be one with it in principle, still the manner in which Hegel
works cut his principle in detail exhibits hardly more than a verbal
similarity, a similarity of terminology, between his philosophy and the
systems of his immediate predecessors.
We.cannot therefore find our material for tracing the development of
the Logic simply lying to hand in those works of his three great
contemporaries which appeared while his own views were immature. If such
wert?the only material available for our purpose^ the development would
remain a sealed book, or else the discussion of it would be a tissue of
mere suggestions. The value of these works is at best merely indirect;
they assist in bringing into relief by way of contrast Hegel's own viewsf
to confine attention solely to them and their probable influence on
Hegel's thought is entirely misleading. For this leaves m I.VMirfry out of
sight the decided and unquestionable influence exerted dn Hegel by the
study of Greek philosophy, and^especially^in his earlier period^of Plato.
It is perhaps not too much to say that ho received as much help from Greek
philosophy for the solution of the problem set by the philosophy of his day
and answered as he thought so inadequately by his contemporaries, a3 from
any system of his own. time.^ His reading in Greek philosophy had been
continuous for years, and his study of it was carried on during his
orisntVfcion in and appreciation of modern philosophy. So that by the time
he came to lecture in Jena [and certainly later he seems to have had the
widest acquaintance with the history of philosophy of all the contemporary
representatives of the subject. Kant's knowledge of the history of
philosophy seems never to have been extensive, nor his interest in it
keen. Pichte's activity was wholly occupied with the completion and
development of the Kantian principle, and the satisfaction of the
philosophical m-i-nds of his own time as he understood them. Nor again had
Schelling^concerned himself to any appreciable extent with the systematic
study of "tUs. preceding philosophers. Hegel however seems undoubtedly to
have possessed a wide and thorough acquaintance with the history of
philosophy before any part of his own system.was published. The evidence
for this is found in the fact that the lectures on the history of
philosophy delivered in Jena 1805-6 (i.e. before the publication of the
"Phenomenology of Mind") were, with the exception of slight changes, and
considerable extensions, the same as those which he delivered later and
(2)which now form part of his published works. His opinions on the systems
CD
v. Rosenkranz 'Leben Hegel's' p.82.
(S)
Rosenkrans 'Hegel's Leben' p.201.
6.
of his immediate predecessors or contemporaries were therefore by this time
already formed, and his judgments regarding their principles ho never
(1)
altered. This being the case we do not seem entitled to suppose that
\
Hegel's system simply grew out(bsfoep. of his predecessors, and that the
germs of all his conceptions can be found if we go no further back than
Kant.
On the other hand it is true that Hegel himself considered that his
system completed those of his immediate and removed their
limitations and onesidedness. But then this was not because he merely
rearranged and restated their results in a more systematic, (or in
another systematic) form or considered himself simply .their truest
expositor, but rather because it was itself a part of his own scheme of
philosophy to view his system as a truer philosophy. For on the one hand
it succeeded theirs in time and was therefore the latest step in the
dialectic of the history of philosophy, and on the other hand the
principle of the philosophy of his day, as he conceived it (Spirit, Mind,
•Geist*) had become explicit, 'conscious of itself' in his system.
On the whole then we may conclude that reference to Hegel's more
immediate antecedents can only serve to bring out by contrast, rather than
by direct elucidation, the meaning of his principle or conceptions. But if
(1)
Rosenkranz 'Hegel's Leben* p.SOI.
3-
6a.
we treat their work as subsidiary, the only available material for our
purpose must be sought in the record of Hegel's early history given in
Rosenkranz "Life of Hegel," supplemented by the "Letters of Hegel"
collected by Hegel's son, and also in relevant
A Hegel's published works. To these therefore we must primarily confine
attention.
(D
Rosenkranz "Leben Hegel's" 1844: "Briefe von u-an Hegel." Hrg. v.





We shall most readily open up the subject of our enquiry if to begin
with we indicate the direction from which Hegel approached philosophy,
the attitude and interest he possessed or was led to adopt in regard to its
problems, and the dominating ideas from which his system finally arose.
Hegel's earliest work lay in theology. His merely professional
interest in the subject seems to have ceased probably a few years after
leaving the theological seminary in Stuttgart, but his emancipation from
the influence of the formal school-theology came much earlier still than
his resignation of a theological career. It was therefore through theology
that he worked his way into philosophy; it was out of the necessities of
.the former that he
became aware of the need of the latter, and the supreme importance of the
problems of theology was felt by him all through his development. We shall
see the bearing of this later on; we need only mention in passing the
repeated recurrence of theological conceptions throughout his work to
illustrate the significance which theology always possessed for him. In
addition to theology, and next after it in interest, in his earliest period,
(1)
history and law claimed his attention, and it was the problems which
suggested themselves to him in the course of his study of these subjects,
pursued apparently without any definite aim at first, that induced him to
seek in philosophy for some means of solving them. Thus we find him
engaging in a critical examination of the main facts and ideas of religion,
and seeking in. Kant's philosophy, and apparently finding there some answer
(?)
to his questions. Prom his letters to Schellingv we gather that he
either accepted Kant's results entirely or accepted them provisionally and
sought by the help of them to understand current religious conceptions.
This interest in Kant's results meant primarily an interest in Kant*s
ethical and religious conclusions; 'which is indeed what we might have
3.erf iGfGA&M# &L
anticipated. example he IJ an attempt which he proposes to
make to discover how far the conception of God derived from or based on
CD (?.)
Rosen. Leben p.45. Ros. 'Leben* 65 ff. ('Briefe,' Off.)
'moral faith* can be actually used in dealing with the physical world, in
what way the moral progressiveness can be held to nean natural (physical)
progressiveness, how a moral theology can be worked back into a physical
theology.
Too much importance cannot of course be attached to such general
statements as appear in the letters; the information conveyed is too
indefinite. All we can safely draw from them is an indication of the kind
of interest Hegel at the time possessed in regard to Kant's theories and the
attitude he adopted towards them. That interest we repeat was primarily
determined by the value or importance Kant's conclusions would have for
the elucidation of religious ideas. Hegel's attention seemed to have been
for long engaged upon the 'postulof practical ven.solely in this
connexion. Nor did the significance of Kant's fundamental principle that
the Ego is the absolute for and in escape him; though hi3 full
appreciation of it was greatly assisted and in part determined by the
efforts made by Fichte and Schelling just about that time (1794-5) to
(l)
develop its meaning. Hegel's own reflection on Kant's principle and
its execution led him in the first instance to adopt the same view of it,
to regard it in the same light as Fichte, whose development of that
principle started as is well known from the 'practical reason.* For to
Hegel as to Fiohte its primary importance was found in the spheres of
(1)
v. Third letter to Schelling.
9.
morality and religion. On the one hand the s JslgLtfve character of
moral reason, and the conception of freedom thereby enunciated once for
all/ established man not merely as that which is of supreme and highest
worth in the world, but also as a being that, as a rational end in
himself, is by his very nature of equal rank with every rational spirit.
On the other hand the determination of the object of religion according to
and in of that which is the supreme element or factor in knowledge,
the writing 'large' of the ego of finite knowledge and experience in the
form of the absolute Ego, was not a difficult step to take and was rendered
for Hegel during this period easier partly by the help of the contemporaries
named, but still more because it seemed to afford ample satisfaction to the
needs of the religious which he seems at the time to have
been more especially endeavouring to understand. Neither however in the
case of Pichte nor in that of Kant did he appear to accept more than the
principle. We have his own explicit indication that he considered pant's
(1)
view required development, and Pichte he seems never to have followed in
f The above point of view having once been gained, and its value for
E
| morality and religion to some extent appreciated, Hegel had taken up his
: first philosophical position, and obtained his earliest theoretical
I
■ conviction. Much as he deviated from his original mode of construing that
(1)
v. Third letter to Schelling.
? 10.
position, nevertheless his starting point seems to have been made here. All
that it meant to him at this time we have no means of accurately determin¬
ing, as no explicit working out of his interpretation has been recorded.
What we are quite able to determine is the general significance which in his
view it possessed.. His primary interest in the position was the value of
it for the moral and religious life, both as a means of harmonising his own
convictions and opinions on these subjects and of increasing their meaning
| for him. Its importance for science as such, or even for philosophy as
CD
I such did not seem to appeal to him. Ho acknowledged willingly enough
| the significance and use made of it in this reference by others, (Fichte
f '
[. and Schelling). His interest in it was much more restricted, and it was not
! for some years that its wider significance became of supreme moment to. him.
f
I He seems to have seen, 'for instance, in the conception of the absolute Ego
I
f
| precisely what was wanted to determine in some intelligible manner the
] religious conception of 'Spirit,' than which word (Geist) hardly any recurs
f in Hegel's utterances. We need not dwell further on this fact at
I present, and^buld not emphasise it so strongly did it not throw so much
| light on Hegel's attitude to the non-ethical and non-religious aspects of
| experience, for example on his view of Nature as a mere 'counterpart' of
j mind, as that which is in itself ' ' It indicates an attitude of
1
|
cp. "Briefe" I. p.10.
11.
moral and religious self-assertion, an intensity of emphasis on these
I
aspects of experience which was characteristic of Hegel from the beginning
\
and which he consistently sustained to the end.
Naturally enough the hold which the above principles had on Hegel
at the outset was not due tc this merely intellectual appreciation of
their intrinsic objective meaning as such and for its own sake, but was: /'V
derived from the'more or less emotionalised convictions and opinions which,
gave value to these principles, and which they helped to support. Such an
unsystematical and tuzJL adoption of principles so far-reaching in
their nature and so comprehensive in content could have only one result
mysticism. And this seems to have been Hegel's intellectual attitude at the
(]_.) ~Ha.cL
time of his leaving Switzerland for Frankfurt ij.1797). Ho^read the works
of Eekhart and Tauler, and himself made ventures in indefinite theosophical
speculation. His mysticism was the product of religious convictions
supported by an uncriticised philosophical position. The convictions seem
always to have remained with him;_his aim in their regard being simply to
understand them and systematise them. They do not seem to have been
wrung from a severe mental conflict but were the result rather of a spirit
of acquiescence. They seem simply to have been felt as ordinary necessities




their form; his appreciation of their meaning and all its hearings
gradually seems to grovr upon him. He develops a new interest in them, an
interest of a different kind. As hitherto he continues his work in history,
ethics and more particularly religion. But his increased acquaintance with
these subjects seems to have made him aware of the intimate and essential
relation which these subjects have to philosophy. He came to see that
from the indefiniteness of mysticism the caprice of mere *Schwarmerei*, and
of a religious life based on feeling, there could bo only one escape and
defence, namely to make definite and precise the ideas and concepts
employed; and this was the business of philosophy. He began to perceive
that the problems of morality and religion are really only part of a
larger problem the solution of which alone can guarantee a true apprecia¬
tion of these two aspects of experience themselves, that the answer to the
questions set by morality and religion is to be found, if our know'ledge of
them is to be sufficient as well as complete, in philosophy or metaphysic
and not elsewhere. This new and larger interest in the subjectsto which he
had hitherto confined his attention removed finally the limitations of his
view both of these subjects and of the principle which he had adopted to
raake them harmonious. We find him meeting the new problems he has to face
not by abandoning the principle which had hitherto served him in the case
of morality and religion alone but by deepening his appreciation of this
principle. And his reason for this simple transition seems not difficult
to find. Religion is the relation in which man stands to the highest
13.
reality; the object of the religious consciousness names that highest
reality, sums up the meaning of all reality into this its highest form or
expression (God, namely) and all that is real and has a meaning in itself
is contained implicitly in that Reality as such. This Highest Reality
is then in a definite sense all reality whatsoever. Consequently when
Hegel discovered that the problems of religion led him at once into
philosophy he did not feel that he stepped into an entirely new sphere,
that he would take up in philosophy an entirely different object. It was
in a sense the same object that required to be dealt with; it was indeed
gesfe because tfeswas the same object philosophy
w«5t»vwr A-
f and religion, that his whole interest/in the former for its own
4-JLJ-U.*****
sake, andydnduced to view the latter in the light of the results
thereby attained. For both philosophy and religion deal with the whole of
reality* the reality in itself is the same in both cases, but the
expression of it, and attitude towards it are different in each case. This
of object-matter it was then which made possible and
necessary for Hegel the transition to philosophy for itself* for its own
sake. Still the 'motif' for such a transition must again be emphasised;
it was primarily in the interests of and from the point of view of,
religion. Even when Hegel seems to have abandoned himself to philosophy
for its own sake without any apparent ulterior or implicit reference, a
little consideration will soon show us that he never loses sight of




this assumption to explain why religion should occupy the place it does
in his "philosophy of TJJind," which is the most 'concrete' form of reality
for Hegel. It was of the very spirit of his philosophy to assign to
religion the place which he gave to it. It is true he places philosophy
c ^
highest of all in the Encyclopaedia; but, though this does not substantial¬
ly affect our contention, at the first stages of this new transition to
the philosophical interest of which we are speaking, we note that he
maintained that religion was highest, that "philosophy must cease with
(1)
religion." Prom one point of view we may even regard his whole
philosophy as a prolonged attempt to 'reconcile philosophy and religion.'
His introductory chapter to the Philosophy of Religion seems to possess
little or no signification if it does not support the contention here
(2) *
maintained, and this work 'was one of his latest utterances.
If the above explanation of Hegel's new interest in philosophy be
accepted we can see not only how his interest came about, but why he should
have appealed to philosophy to solve his problems and not to a special
science, say the 'science of religion' in the ordinary sense. The latter
would have left unsolved precisely Hegel's problem, which was to determine
more completely and accurately the contents of the 'true' Reality, and not




Philos, d. Relig. I. p.5 (1832)
i
15.
emotions it raised in them etc. etc. And we see too that such a
| treatment and enquiry as he desires would not do injustice to religion as
such hut would put it in perspective. While not allowing that the.
f religious consciousness alone expressed what was meant by Reality, it
f would still admit that it expressed that reality truly, but would hold
that that reality was otherwise determinable, because it contained other
1
tj
| elements or aspects than those which had primarily significance for
f religion, and because there were other forms of consciousness which sought
{ to express reality as a whole. Thus his change of attitude towards
religion, and his change of interest in the object of religion did not
I lead him to a rejection of that principle which had proved of service in
J the more restricted sphere hitherto -of primary importance to him; rather
} it led him to determine more accurately the content of that principle,
i The above considerations then will sufficiently indicate the lines
•j along which Hegel approached the problem of philosophy, the motives which
t
J led him to interest himself thoroughly in it, the demands he made upon it,
1
| the needs he thought to satisfy by it, and the general point of view from
I which he set himself to the task. The new interest which he developed
■J
I about this time soon manifested itself in definite form. He made a
■i.
general but incomplete, and apparently unfinished sketch of the various
I parts of philosophy, showed this relation of the parts to each other and
1
j in part developed each. It meets us as the expression of his first
definite views on philosophy and partakes of the nature of a scheme rather
than a system. It is probable that the construction of it had occupied
him for some years, but it appears in its present form to belong more
particularly to the„years 1739-1800. As it is here that we meet with
his first utterances on Logic we must first of all briefly indicate the
general nature and content of the scheme and then determine more precisely




After what has been already said we are prepared to find that Hegel's
supreme principle is Spirit (Geist). What he is to attempt to do is to
give some more or less systematic knowledge of the supreme Reality and the
relation to that of other realities. His whole procedure therefore is
determined by a judgment of value in virtue of which he decides beforehand
what of reality is highest, or what 'highest' as applied to reality means.
*•
And the sphere of experience from which he draws this conception of highest
reality isyas we see^ primarily religion. At the very outset he names this
highest reality Spirit. Why he should have adopted such a principle, why
he should have begun there, apparently without any preliminary enquiry, with
hardly any criticism of it, seems inexplicable^on the ground suggested
namely the religious interest in the problem. For unquestionably this name
would more accurately describe or indicate the nature of highest reality as
understood and accepted in religion than any other name that could be
found. In this sense then and from this point of view we may say that,
if 'Geist' be taken as the password of Idealism, Hegel was idealist from
the start. Idealism indeed was rather an assumption or dogma held at the
outset of his philosophising than a final conclusion from it; && standpoint,
not a result of philosophical enquiry.
It is also his religious interest in the task of philosophy, it is
the dominating influence of the point of view and the claims of religion
which determines his conception of philosophy throughout this period and
13.
CD
the purpose assigned to it and its instruments, thinking and reflexion.
Thinking, reflexion requires for its activity an opposition, in part
an opposition to what does not think, in part an opposition between
thought and what is thought about. Such an opposition is not overcome in
ML
thought itself andis essential to reflexion. But in religion all
finitude (opposition of elements) is overcome; that which cannot be
obtained by thought and which yet the mind seeks to atta^in is accomplish-
( 2)
ed by religion.v Hence he maintained at this stage that "philosophy
ivOT- k c]c^Uf —
statements actually given by Hegel at this time. They are too abstract,
«motar and indefinite. But still they none the less indicate the
influence and Importance of the on which] we lay
so much stress.
It must be noted however that in the earliest stages •spirit* as
applied to the highest reality has not the same determinate meaning which
it comes to have later when the use of the term is made precise by a
careful development of its content. A similar Indefiniteness is found as
j




Because in religion the finite life shares in, is a <&,
identifies itself with the infinite life.
19.
preliminary'stagef. Not that. 'spirit V, even as found at first} is not
determinate;; it is de"i.r:it:. iv to he employed as a principle; but it is
n)r
more a conception a reality (namely highest reality, which for
Hegel is absolut. oality) without any but the most general and indefinite
meaning being attached to that conception as such. nature therefore
as it 'has - is determined not so much by reference to the character of
'spirit' as actually found in experience, as by reference to the general
character of the reality which it is intended, to designate. This character
contains such attributes as all-inclusiveness, determination of all by
itself, unity with itself, and the like. 'Spirit* perhaps even in
experience may seem to come nearest to what such a reality is; still
inasmuch as Hegel has not developed at this stage what he means by spirit
in its most fundamental nature, and has hardly done more than indicate what
'absolute* spirit means, we are forced to maintain that the term is used in
its vaguest and most general signification. This contention is still
further borne out -hen we observe the ease with which he 3lips into still
vaguer and even metaphgfical phraseology when referring to the highest
reality.
(2)
Highest or absolute reality is that in which all opposition
(1)
He uses «.'<}« the term "Life" to designate the Reality and treats




terminates and is reconciled; it is one, and is the supreme unity; it is a
self, -.which reflects or projects itself into difference, and finds itself
in this difference; it is personal in the sense of being Ego, the
'absolute Ego', and possesses therefore 'absolute self-knowledge.' Self-
knowledge in fact with all that that implies is the most determinate
characteristic of Absolute Spirit. It presents, or lays before itself
(darstellt) an other; and that other is Mature. That other is its own
other, the othe r of its self and therefore in that other it knows merely
itself. But that other is not simply presented to the mind (Absolute
Spirit), it is not simply contained in it as an idea is in the conscious¬
ness of the knower; it is a 'living' reality, is completely and entirely
real, it is the absolutely real other of absolute living spirit. This
difference between a merely ideal other, and a real other Hegel is
at pains' to emphasise. He maintains that the other which is for the
abstract simple 'Idea' of absolute spirit is not that which is the other
for the real actual 'living' absolute spirit. The former is a purely
logical other, the latter a real other; the movement, process or passing
to the other in the first case is a logical process, in the second it is
more than logical it is metaphysical. Still he doos no more than indicate
this difference; work it out ho does not at this stage. The affinity
between 'logical' and 'real' other cannot well be ignored. For nature tje&X)
has 'Ideality^with reference to Spirit, is 'ideally' la moment in it; 'the
solute unity of spirit is not real or absolute Ego in nature.' Still,
•21.
obscure as this difference is, Hegel maintained strongly that there was a
difference between the two forms of otherness and that the difference was
*
vital.
Beyond this very general statement regarding the relation of Absolute
Spirit and Nature Hegel does not at this stage go. He merely indicates in
the most abstract way that Absolute Spirit must gather up into itself all
difference^ all otherness, Nature included/and 'pass no more beyond itself.'^
Absolute spirit so regarded he speaks of as the 'absolutely simple negative
unity,' the 'absolute mere nothing.* When he attempts further to describe
Nature itself he does so both by positive and negative characteristics, but
mainly the latter. These latter are determined simply by reference to
absolute spirit, for which it is. Nature is spirit which 'does not know
itself as absolute spirit; it is absolute self-reflexion, but does not
reflect itself, does not itself project itself, which is not for its own
iiaA
self unity which reflects an other and knows in that other its self.
Nature is not the purely negative simple unity of absolute spirit as such,
which can be named the absolute Hcrw-t/w*. Positively determined on the other
hand, he calls Nature that which, because the other, (an other e.g. which
lacks the essential unity of that of which it is an other), is simply the
absolutely discrete, that which is the purely differentiate and side-b^side-
ness, pure quantitativeness, and indifference of itself to itself; hence its
. i,., i , .....I m —» . i.,
CD
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character of endlessness, endless movement and change. He also speaks of
Nature as knowledge (i.e. as distinct from self—knowledge); further as Life,
but a 'formal* life, a life which is in itself, and not a life which is for
itself.
In addition to these two problems presented to philosophy by nature and
: spirit, Hegel finds another in the abstract formal thought-determinations of
■reality as known, in the abstract characteristics of thought and being,
and 'Sein* and their relations. He says explicitly nothing at all
I '
;about the relation of the contents of this last problem to those of the
Mothers. He does seek to distinguish the logical ideal formal concepts
from the realities as found e.g. in Nature, but beyond indicating that in the
flatter the former are *sublated* nothing is said.^1^ We are left however
ito conclude in a general way that the logical determinations are the abstract
fc
r
[content of absolute spirit.
- ■ The obvious inadequacy of the above scheme thus generally stated is
^probably due to the fact that it pretended to be no more than a sketch of
Jhis general position in philosophy, that it was apparently not finished at
k;:least as regards spirit as such (which was dealt with only with reference
to morality), and that he was not as yet fully aware of what was necessary
,;in order to determine completely and systematically that Reality which he






1. That Hegel's philosophical interpretation of reality at the
earliest stage starts from, proceeds from the point of view of Absolute or
Supreme Reality, which embraces in itself the whole of reality.
2. That such a treatment of the whole of reality has its source in a
religious interest in reality as a whole; for it is only in religious
experience that reality is taken as a whole, and in its totality: and that
consequently the principle which is the assumption of the religious
consciousness, (that Absolute Reality is Spirit) must hold in philosophy
likewise for it is the same reality in both cases.
t
t 3. That philosophy is therefore with Hegel 'speculation* from the
r ' -
| outset, and his interest in the fundamental aspects of reality is of this
t (1)
rnature; and that being concerned with the whole as such it is
j necessarily System, v ^ -
4. That this absolute Reality appears, expresses itself or is
.expressible by three orders or most general and fundamental phases, or
"moments, the purely Ideal, Nature, and Spirit (or Mind) strictly; and that
(conformably with his main problem, his interest in and treatment of these
(phases is solely speculative; that therefore his conception of nature in





no sense as apart from spirit. Hence from the beginning there is
maintained a distinction between philosophical knowledge and 'ordinary'
knowledge, between the philosophical view of Nature and the 'common' view
held by 'common sense' or ordinary science.
5.. That while a fairly definite connexion is expressly indicated
between nature and absolute spirit, this is not clearly defined Hegel being
rather at pains to distinguish them than to show their inner connectedness;
that in any case no 'transition' in the strict dialectical sense is made
from one to the other; that there is no 'transition' indicated from the
Ideal (logic) to the real (nature or spirit), at most he merely indicates
that they are distinct moments of the one spirit.
6. That his metho<^ treatment and terminology employed in dealing with
tthe ultimate reality as also with nature is primarily mystical,
{metaphysical undetermined and fettered by the obscurity of mysticism.
His idealism at this stage is that of a religious mysticism not of absolute
/•
_









Such being his general position at this time we must now state in
(1)
detail his view of logic. And here at the outset we must steer clear
of an error into which it is perhaps easy to fall, and from which Hegel's
biographer seems hardly to have kept himself free, namely that of regarding
Hegel's earliest scheme of logic as «saageteBBfr identical with his final
view of its problem and content. This is certainly not the case. The mere
fact that Hegel distinguishes emphatically between Logic and Metaphysic
would itself sufficiently make this evident; and when we take note that he
distinguishes between our knowledge of the absolute spirit and the knowledge
which that spirit has of itself, and again is at pains as we have seen to
distinguish the ideal thought content of the real, or rather the ideal
presentation of the real from the real itself without exhibiting the inner
involution of the one with the other, the difference is clearly very marked
indeed between his early and later points of view. And thus it comes about,
as we shall see presently, that what is the Idea of absolute spirit or the
absolute spirit qua Idea does not form part of logic at all, but rather of
metaphysic. There is in short only the most distant resemblance between the
logic of this period and its later form.
Hegel distinguishes from the Philosophy of Nature and philosophy of





distinction, which is perhaps not happily named, seems plainly to be
that wheras the two former discuss the relations and connections of
concrete real objects as they actually exist, the last treats of the
formal, abstract general concepts as concepts of what exist not simply
as concepts but as real. It would be inaccurate to describe it as a
discussion on knowledge, for only one part of it is concerned with
knowledge; and it is not simply ontology, nor again is it merely logic;
it comprehends all these parts of philosophy.
This theoretical philosophy he divides into Logic and Metaphysic.
In the former he deals with the nature and formal character of being^/
and of thought taken abstractly and generally, and taken also as over
against and apposed to each other. The discussion of logic falls
therefore quite naturally into three parts a. the determination of the
general character of being (being i.e. in general the "real", not "pure"
being), b. of the general character of thought taken also by itself, c. of
the method by which being and thought in their separateness and distinct¬
ness may be arid are related to each other. All these three are determined
and. indeed arise by our external reflexion, we abstract and fix in formal
definiteness being and thought; not even (c.) therefore is the reflexion
of the thing by itself, it is our reflexion on the relation of (a.) and
(b.). Hence since reflexion or movement of any reality through itself and
in itself is taken to be what knowledge means, and Since this requires
not reflexion upon the reality, but the reflexion by itself of the
27.
content of reality logic is not concerned with knowledge, the latter falls
out of its province and is dealt with by metaphysic. Such disoussion by
metaphysic is however still formal, ideal, because dealing Yfith the
(1)
conceptual nature of that which reflects or relates itself to itself..
'Logic therefore,' Hegel states, 'ceases where the relation ^ (c.) (above
(2)
indicated) ceases.' It is true he suggests as an alternative name for
metaphysic 'Logic of Reason*, distinguishing it thus from 'Logic of
Understanding'.^3^ But such a terminology is quite loose and misleading.
For logic would then be the general name for the whole of theoretical
philosophy; but in that case the above statement that logic ceases at
relation of being and thought and that metaphysic succeeds to it has no
meaning, and would be unquestionably opposed to Hegel's general position.
Doubtless the term 'logic of reason* suggests a closer connexion between
his earlier and later view than the term metaphysic; none the less the
term 'logic' is clearly inaccurate and loose in this connection.
Logic then in Hegel's present sense deals with the purely abstract
and formal determinations and characterisations of being and of thought,
taken each in the definite meaning usually belonging to them as distinct
and distinguishable entities. This does not as we shall immediately see








unrelateable; all that this division of the subject matter of logic means
is that these are the ultimate<|jof That is determinable by external
reflexion. The discussion in both cases does not confine itself to a
simple statement or catalogue of the determinations of each; there is a
strenous endeavour to unite by some inner connexion these various
qualifications. And this last feature marks Hegel's plan and method of
F thinking all along; it is system# and systematic connectedness which is his
dominant 'tendance.* Not$ that ho is at first clear as to how this
? connexion is to be obtained, or what is its essential method: all we can
| claim is that it was an unhesitating presupposition that such connexion
t'
P
i must be found and that he endeavoured in some measure to realise it from
| the first.
The discussion of being (the real) deals with its categories, which
f
j fall into two groups, those which determine being taken by itself, and
5 those which determine its relations. In the first group we have at the
; outset Quality; this is the most immediate determination of being.
I Quality raises itself or gives rise to Quantity by virtue of the
< indeterminateness of its character which essentially implies limitation;
| for quality is limitation. Quantity again possesses as its forms the
fnumerical one, numerical y>lurality. and numerical allness. If further we
I
j combine the concepts of quality and quantity we shall find that they are
|'constitutive elements of Infinity. Far this last is the t«j»j(|«^^.of one
,, quality through another, and of one quantity through another, or of a '
i *
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quality through a change in its quantity or degree. Prom consideration of
these we get two kinds of infinity, that which is the result of a
quantitative determination of a quality, (the quality in this case
persistently asserting itself and uniting therefore in the form of a
«r
quantified quality both determinations i.e. quality undeterminateness
i.e. quantity), and that which results merely from the passing of one
definite quantity into another. Here "bhen^we find already the 'true' and
the'false infinity^*Xu4*+vww"^ '
Without further elaboration or analysis Hegel passes to the second
group of categories, those namely of the relations of being. These are
Substantiality, Causality, and Reciprocity. His conception and analysis
of these were at this stage for the most part the same as that found in the
later forms of his system. And we find even that here as later reciprocity
is the category which leads the way to the notion, or concept as such
(Begriff); and since Hegel at this stage takes the concept to be the
absolute form of thought, reciprocity forms the stepping-stone on which we
pass from the discussion of being to that of thought, it is the link which
unites the determinations of logic with the thought
determinations.
The elucidation of this inner connexion between the two is perhaps
the most substantial and permanent contribution of this his early logic
to his later system; and that he should have made that connexion clear to
himself thus early in his development is in itself very significant and
throws considerable light on his general point of view For it indicates .
to begin with .hat he thereby completely broke down the wall of separation
between being as such and thought as such, which was set up by Descartes
and which endured up to Hegel's own day. And it shows what for him the
'relation of thought to being' meant; the method he took to show their
inner connectedness -was not that of a critical analysis of thought, and
its capacity for knowledge, nor was it that of a deduction of the one out
of the other, the one (thought) being ct$ the ground, while the
other was wrenched from it as a Rather to Hegel both are
actual in their own right and with equal right. But they are connected
essentially because the "subject" is also "substance", because substance
jhas its truest form in spiritual substance, as 'substantia cogitans' i.e.
as subject, that consequently reprocity,which is the highest formal
fcharacterisation ofi substance will necessarily lead us to the concept or
(notion, the absolute form of thought. Hegel thus turns from the form
which this vital distinction (between being and thought) had received in
his own day, especially at the hands of Kant, and takes the distinction in
^its final most universal form which was likewise the form which it
It
f.originally received when it first appeared in the earliest stages of
modern philosophy the distinction namely between the * two substances,'
r ■
substal^ia cogitans', and 'substantia aaterialis.' This was the root of
the matter, and Hegel, we may say, made out that these were not in reality
ihei|rogerj[ous, that the former was not simply the abstract passive universal
support of properties, but was that which determined its activity as its
• ?-" *% gt
if- f
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own, was concrete and universal at once, and its content
through and by itself, and related it to itself was therefore Subject, .
which was at once all that substance could be and was more. And since
thought was the content of the subject, the direct and immediate connexion
was established between reciprocity as the completest determination of
being and the concept which was the primary form under which thought
„ (1)appeared.
We cannot however do more than give this general statement of what if
(2)
expanded might lead to a long digression. The above explanation will
; perhaps sufficiently indicate the point of view from which Hegel must have
f '
. " •
| proceeded in order to establish a relation of whatever kind between
: reciprocity or the "paralytic infinity" as he then termed it, and the
^'notion, the absolute infinite self-«dite^SSS.i unity between universal
[particular and individual. Such a relation as he sought to exhibit is
[.'merely an instanconsequence of a point of view which determined even
ifrom the start his whole conception of the content and purpose of Logic.
According to this point of view mind and object7thought and being (reality)
I
'were elements in one total reality; they existed together side by side, and
I CD
This connexion however -was not established in the same way as later
|m)nor did the significance of the position above described present it3elf
,to him at this period in the, way it did later. All we have is the general
^position. See below, /s-34 i-fJe
t • (8)
; See also below •-
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land were both realities, forms of the one comprehensive Reality. The
'business of Logie|(tho abstract general science) was simply to state the
i
^abstract content of this one Reality without limitation of that content to
}•
:the one element in the whole rather than the other. But just this
I
:exposition of this content marks off Logic in Hegel's sense from Logic as
f
:ordinarily treated. The latter is "formal", it deals with thought only and
lis opposed to being. Hegel's includes both thought and being. As opposed
^therefore to "formal logic" in its usual traditional signification, Hegel's
-logic deals from the first with what isfidnstituti&S of all Reality; it is
g Transcendental Logic.""(1)
In passing from this discussion of being to that of thought we may
t
merely note the very close similarity there is between these categories of
jbeing as given by Hegel and the 'table of categories' in the first part of
'I- (2)
Kant's 'transcendental logic.' And in view of his opinion that the
.possibility of the 'completion of science' was opened up by Kant's system,
;and would be realised by following out the principle it contained, such a
I.
'resemblance might perhaps have been expected. As in Kant we have quantity,
jquality, relation so here we have quality, quantity, relation.
ilegel omits partly because it is clearly not a category of being in his
sense, and partly for a reason which will presently appear. But whereas
i-
I See below.^'4" Ros. 10. C.V
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| for Kant the order in which the categories were stated was immaterial,
1 seeing that his purpose in the * table' was merely to make a list, a
■f
| catalogue, and to make it complete, for Hegel the order is of the first
i importance. For his aim is not simply to state all the categories, but to
\ state them in systematic connectedness with one another; and for this
■i purpose it is obviously essential that he should determine with what to
[begin. Hence Hegel starts with quality and that apparently for two
.; reasons (1) because quality is the lowest most elementary determination of
v; being we can find, and (2) simply in order that he might connect quality
• and quantity. To establish which, in the connection of these
•{should be prior could not have caused great difficulty, because the
I Impossibility of getting quality out of quantity was a fairly obvious
..{philosophical commonplace, and nothing was therefore left but to unite them
J * •
p*by starting from the side of quality. We cannot however lay too much
I stress on this similarity between the two schemes of categories, pronounced
\
{and unquestionable though' that similarity is. We have already indicated
jour reasons for not pressing too closely in Hegel's case an apparent
^dependence on his predecessors which might be discoverable in his
.terminology, and here we find, where he seems simply to borrow from Kant,
'a divergence which must not be overlooked, For Hegel does not mean by.
"for examnle^uality, what Kant included under that term. Indeed we might
say that quality in Hegel's sense was not a category at all for Kant. For









I it is in itself an abstract determination of being. But we cannot pursue
; (V
I further at present the connexion in detail between themP
^ *
i. The connexion between reciprocity and the concept or notion (Begriff)
i having been indicated we have now to learn what the nature and feature of
f
[ the concept itself is. It is in the first instance determinable from that
[relation to reciprocity. Substance as the universal differentiates itself,
fand is not merely differentiated (is not merely passively recipient). It
I therefore owns the opposites as its particulars; but relates them to itself,
| and distinguishes itself therefore from them, therby constituting itself
I subject of them, ideally ( vwwwo>) containing them, and not merely
| the substrate in which they •" But in so uniting its differences
[ in itself, distinguishing itself from them and yet relating them to itself,
f it is not a mere universal, nor a mere medley of differences, it is a self-
t
r
[relating individual. And these three are the'moments* of the concept or the
I 'notion.* They are not external to reflexion, they are themselves realised
r -
I
[in our reflexion, and accepted by it as its own moments. Our reflexion is
fe-
[their actual reflexion, it is the relation which they themselves possess
[ with one another.
The point of this reference to 'reflection' becomes obvious when we
F - .
t
jbear in mind the content of the Logic. The categories of being form one
part of the Logic, and in them we have the abstract moments of being as
e "
[these are determined by (external) reflexion upon it; they are its
c
t




is the reality in question. The reflexion of its (the notion's) moments
is the reflexion of our mind^thought proper. Our reflexion is one and the
same with the reflexion of the moments of the notion. In the categories
of being therefore we have the reflexion of being as it is; in the moments
of the notion the reflexion of our thought as _it is, "our reflexion."
Thought and being however are not absolutely severed; for the notion is
the "ideal reflexion of being." But what this further means, and how the
"reflexion" of each is related Hegel does not here indicate.
The notion further appears as definitely determinate, i.e. concretely
i as universal, particular and individual. It appears also as judgment, and
: finally as syllogism. In the form of judgment Hegel considered two cases,
rone where the subject is under the predicate, the otherwhere the
K
( predicate is under the subject; in the former case the predicate
r-
Pis first definitely^&%*AajJL , in the second the subject. He sought to
t
tconvert the purely negative character of the predicate in the infinite
< * I
judgment into a positive character to conceive the negation of being as the
I
(denial of a potentially necessary predicate. E'or this reason he did not
if
(mention modality as a qualification of judgmentJLii. "the assumption being
i
apparently that where as in this case all judgments become necessary,
t





"-relation! of opposed predicates inside a subject which holds their
(determination ideally in itself, and a relation of two opposed subjects
identified and united inside the reality of the predicates. This distinc¬
tion gave him the hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms.
These various determinations of the concept were not treated by Hegel
fat great length, and the barest outline of his meaning is the most that is
ft
indicated. We are simply led to conclude that these moments of the concept
♦have significance solely for thought, and inside the sphere of thought^as
'an actual reality
I' The separation which he at the outset makes between being and thought
#
i
'he attempts in part to overcome by his doctrine of "Proportion," which is a
kind of methodology and aims at finding how they may be connected, by what
{means or on what terms they may be brought together. As might be expected
t
- this relating of the two in the first instance from the side
of thought; for this is the reflexion of being, and its own moments there—
{fore have a relation to being as such. Hegel attempts to establish an
I.
.{'equality* between the universal and the individual; and this by three
(methods, Definition, Division and Proof. The first determines a given
I
i"subject by reference to and in+«t*ms of its universal, the second by
r
(presenting the differences which the subject in its universality can
I
{.contain and in which that subject can particularise itself. So far the
•
I





•fdialectical' treatment of it. In the case of proof however the reflexion
in by and through the reality itself; the reality 'reflects itself'; it is
the actual unity of the universal particular and individual; and proof just
^consists in this totality mediating itself through itself. This
thoroughgoing mediation can be named 'construction,' and from another point
of view, that namely of the complete Equality * of the reflexion with itself,
:•? deduction. *
, The foregoing statement of the nature of proportion, as will be seen,
■Contains no reference directly to 'being'; and indeed vie would naturally
conclude from it that proportion meant not a relation of being to thought,
b *
f '
but rather a relation among the component elements of the concept, i.e.
■between universal particular and individual. For the discussion seeks to
determine by what methods a universal is to be formally equated with an
f
individual. It vrould seem therefore more appropriate to have treated
.proportion as a subsection of the discussion of the concept. Still when it
:jts borne in mind that the elements of the concept are not taken to be
merely the moments of thought, but, as thought is the "ideal reflexion of
the real, to be moments of or have direct reference to being, the rJ».*tntq »ty
* %\
proportion between being and thought is not inappropriate. And the
peed for bringing together in some way the elements of Reality already
separated gives point to a separate discussion on the "proportion" of being
and thought. In connection with this part of the Logic it is for our
purpose necessary to note the identification of the process in proof with
I
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the process of the real itself, which as it were proves itself; this has
> clearly a suggestion of the later attempts to determine the character of
i 1 w
| the real for and in itself, of the idea as such. To this however we
shall recur immediately.
With the discussion of Proportion Logic proper ends. What we have
i
there is a somewhat systematic statement of the formal abstract determina-
t
tion of Reality furnished by reflexion. The content of the Logic is not
[ ill|>ii nii n/i'iiitif but determined by reflexion from without. It is our
■I reflective activity which constructs the Logic. When therefore an
: 'equality' or union is established between the form of reflexion and the
• content, when these are mediated through each other, when the content
5 reflects itself and furnishes its own determination, vre pass from the
t sphere where formal conceptions stand in various relations to each other,
r /
t; where^because in relation/these conceptions lie apart from each other and
i retain a character by themselves. The sphere to which we pass is named
'knowledge' (which is the 'equality* of reflexion with content). But it
•< is to be noted that the content in question is metaphysical absolute
content, and the knowledge is absolute knowledge; and hence the name given
by Hegel to this sphere is A(etaphysic. What he has to do in fact in
1 metaphysie is to discuss absolute Reality abstractly, its formal but
V self-determined, self-explicating moments; and since this self-
"p determination is only possible through its content, which is itself, the





short, absolute knowledge, the formal moments and process of absolute
( spirit.
This knowlege comprehends 1. a system of principles which form a
| complete sphere in themselves 2. objectivity 3. subjectivity. The first
contains the discussion of the principles of Identity, Contradiction,
( Excluded Middle and and Consequent. All his characteristic
| conceptions of thestprinciplesare already formulated and expressed in thfs^
i
fearly treatment of them. In particular we find him insisting on the
(necessity of contradiction as an element or factor in a concrete identity,
r;
;which develops and thereby differentiates itself into opposites. His
I mastery of this fundamental principle at the outset of his philosophical
f. . '
career is very significant. His discussion of the second feature
>(objectivity) is in itself somewhat strained and unfruitful, though as an
• indication of his present attitude suggestive. By objectivity he
f - -
j understands, the Soul (or 'Monad':), the World, and the Supreme Being. And
. these are connected with one another, demand each r.other. Objectivity is
V
I a self-sufficient self-determining reality. This qualification is
7
;fulfilled by a self-conserving individuality; the primary form of
objectivity therefore is the monad-soul, or simply the monad. Monads differ
(and various individual souls are under one raonad-genwfas their
ground. Thus we get a variety of generic monads, or monad-genera. The
.[totality of these genera make up the world. But as such the world is a
mere aggregate; this aggregate however has its unity and its ground in the
\
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Supreme Being, which contains all differences and is the creative principle
rof the various monad—genera. The Supreme Being is the genus of the
genera. But so conceived and as such it is simply the abstract universal
for which the various individual genera exist and over against which they
are placed. Consequently a completer, more inner^relation between this
universal and its elements is found when it determines them as its own
moments, posits itself as universal in their individuality, raises itself
■ in short to self-conscious Subjectivity. Here alone have we that which is
[ideality without qualification. Only when the Supreme Being is an Ego can
i,
: all the endless multiplicity of its content become transparently
jrecognised as its own. But again the Ego, as we know, is theoretical, and is
|practical. In both these cases however the subjectivity is not absolutely
|self-sufficient; for in both cases we have a limit which is not its own,
, in the former case in what is given to be known, in the latter in what is
t
jdemanded as that which should be objective. Absolute subjectivity must
[therefore be distinct from both of these, it must unite both and be
jabsoluely at one 'with itself, absolute form of subjectivity and absolute
I content at once; in which knowledge is eternal without any beyond; its
if
.
concept immediately realising itself, its reality possessing ideal existence
in itself. Such is the idea of Absolute Spirit, of the Absolute Reality.
But even when Hegel has so determined this Supreme Being, the doubleness
/Which we have noticed in Hegel's present attitude asserts itself here too.
For in re.erence to the formal character of absolute spirit he points out
that while absolute spirit relates itself to itself and so makes of itself
an 'other*, this relation is one thing to absolute spirit, another thing to
us; for absolute spirit it is that which is in-finite, that which is not,
and is not determined as, a limit; for us on the other hand, i.e. for
spirit which is in process of realising itself, that relation is an other
J to spirit, we take it in its otherness, it is over against and as contrast-
; ing with and so limiting absolute spirit.
I This earliest scheme of logic will be seen on examination to contain
j at least the germ of his later and final logic. It indicates to begin with
I- •




j: function he assigned to it in a system of philosophy. For Hegel philosophy
| has not to commence with a criticism of *the nature and limits of
; knowledge.* Here at the very start he parts company with Kant. What
1
philosophy has to do is to determine in and by thought the essential
nature of Reality, absolute and finite. Acting on the principle which he
.• later described as learning to swim by entering the water, Hegel at once
j- assumes that the knowledge philosophy proposes to furnish is possible, is
t not to be sought or justified by a preliminary enquiry, but has simply to
t.
j be expounded and exhibited. This was in the first instance due to the fact
; that Hegel started from a conception or principle (that of spirit) by which
$■ ■ ,
I reality was to be explained and interpreted, a conception which as we saw
i-
.5 agreed with the needs of religion and the general conclusions of the
philosophy of his time. What he had to do therefore was to make clear the
content and implications of this principle. And,directly connected with
this, in the second place it was due to the absence of any question
regarding the relation of thought to reality (being). Whether thought is
[. able to know or how far it can know being at all, is a problem which from
L ■ .
j the start he never seems to have considered, at any rate never discussed at
t
| length. These prima facie divided elements of experience seem never to
I have been dealt with or regarded by Hegel in absolute separateness; it was
I always as elements,factors,contents,in one total Reality that he
t considered them. This made it both possible and necessary for him to start
£ from the whole as a whole, as a unity, and thence deal with -those ultimate
t
i elements simply as different contents inside this one whole. There was
|-therefore no initiatory problem regarding knowledge, philosophical or of
I any other sort. The only problem was to state in some system the content of
|the whole.
I Now the universal conceptions, thoughts, forms constituting reality
furnished the matter for a science which had been dealt with by all Hegel's
I active and prominent contemporaries to a greater or less extent—-the
[science of Transcendental Logic. There was every reason therefore why Hegel
.who, for reasons indicated, adopted the principle common to all these
:.thinkers, and characteristic of the philosophy of his time, should also in
.^presenting his views systematically have found it necessary to state the




(Logic a necessary part of his system. And because for him there is no
43.
I ^I abrupt opposition between^tvro ultimate elements in reality, thought and bo is
| being, the Logic contains the formal universal conceptions, contents, of
I both, not of the latter only as in the case of Kant. These elements are
I I**"* i.| gsSSSh the start of a whole; are as such on the same level;
I! transcendental Logic therefore concerns itself with both, each furnishes
k
content to the Logic. The whole Logic is thus the exhaustive^ttelbment of
t the formal determining conception of his own Principle. And this general
" position on which his Logic is formed, and from which it proceeds, remains
i virtually the same throughout all the history of his Logic; it is the
u - ■ ■ ' ' • J
{ general and indeed the only permanent element determining all its history;
! it is the vital principle in all its forms, the common germ from which they
*f- all spring.
^ The Logic then is from the first transcendental. So far Kegel came
■ at once into line with his immediate predecessors, and again in dispensing
twith a preliminary criticism of knowledge he took the side of Pichte and
| Schelling against Kant. Hegel in all this must be considered if not the
* follower at any rate the independent and confessed pupilv of Pichte and
i Schelling. But the discipleship rseems«ever, even at this early stage, to




: and expounded by them. He was in fact too much bound over to Kant their
f common master to be simply a follower of Pichte or Schelling; and on the
T
•; other hand too sympathetic towards and convinced of the value of the
$ position insisted on by Pichte and Schelling to make it possible for him
A
1 to attach himself exclusively to Kant. He was in short independent of all
| and had his own reasons for adopting such positions as he shared
1
[ with them. Thus we find that the Logic of Hegel markedly differs from
| that of all these prominent contemporaries; from the start it diverges
1 into a path distinctly its own.
It the time the above logic was put into shape (between 1798 and
; 1800) Hegel must have been acquainted with the most important works of
c
( Pichte which had appeared up to at least 1796-7; and we have distinct
I
; evidence that he had carefully studied the 'Wissenschaftslabre* of 1794 as
• well as the *Kaller Offenbarung.*^ Yet there is hardly a
; trace of influence on the details of Hegel's Logic of the detailed and
it.*
peculiar construction of the principle which Pichte expounded in the "¥.
iL." And this in spite of the community of principle between Pichte and
J Hegel. Even if, then, as is most probable Hegel regarded the "W. L." as a
f form of Transcendental Logic we still find Hegel constructing a Logic
* (V
* without immediate help either as to content or method^ from Pichte.
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Again Hegel must also have become familiar with^ the earlier
fichtejnised views of Schelling as these are contained in Schelling's
first philosophical writings: "Ueber ft. Keit: uncta* Form
«mer Philosophic uberhampt" and "vom Ich als Princip# etc."
both 1795 and "Philos. Briefe uber Dog u. Krit," 1796. Probably not much
r
1 detailed help could be found in these works for his Logic as they did not
\ themselves present a system. In any case they did no more than help Hegel
t
i towards an understanding of his fundamental principle; they could hardly
f determine the course of his Logic. Even Schelling's "Philosophy of
I Nature," we j^y- note in passing, which appeared in 1799, bears little or no
J; resemblance to the content of Hegel* s "Philosophy of Nature" belonging to
| this time, so far at least as we can gather from the extracts from it
f given in the biography. It is possible however that Schelling's work
may have appeared later than the time at which Hegel's sketch was formed.
Finally close as is the resemblance, as we have already noted.between
Kant's transcendental Logic and Hegel's early Logic the differences are
x
s-- •
ftoo striking to be ignored or to be considered differences of detail. For
T indeed the initial position of Hegel (that Philosophy is concerned with
I the whole, that the opposed elements in this whole are factors in one
? unity, not radical opposites) distinguishes completely the presupposition
•"*7.
CD
v. 2nd and 3rd letters to Schelling Briefe I. 10-17.
46.
of Hegel's Logic from that of Kant's, so completely in fact that
"transcendental" "a priori" hardly means quite the same to Kant anfi Hegel,
at least in expression. For Kant "transcendental" means primarily or •>
ostensibly subject-constituted, applied to that which the subject
(thought, understanding) must have in order that the object ma$ be
necessarily constituted, if it is to be possible object of knowledge, and
it is for the sake of object that the conception must be transcendental or
that transcendental conception is required. The whole point of^idea of
'transcendental' turns for Kant on that initial distinction between
if*
thought and subject and object ttftc the consideration of which indeed
his whole view starts and which to the end remains vital to it. Ilegel,
following Fichte and Schelling, seizes upon the kernei of Kant's theory,
synthetic a priori conceptions and their "deduction," '.emphasises solely
their constitutive function and character, plants himself firmly on the .
basis of Kant's whole structure, self-consciousness in its unity, and,
casting aside Kant's presuppositions, deepens but at the same time ^
transforms the subjective-transcendental conception into all-sustaining,
all-pervading fundamental universal objective-transcendental conception.
Hegel starts from Kant's result, but escapes or avoids his conclusions
(the inferences from that result) by refusing". "to r©co£nise or be
influenced by the presuppositions from which Kant started. Hence it is
(Tor
tha^Hegel thought as well as being has also its fundamental 'transcendent¬
al* conceptions, and thesef as well as those of being fall inside the Logic.
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Thus it is that while the categories of being in Hegel's Logic show close
resemblance to Kant, the treatment of the notion which forms the second
part of Hegel's Logic above has no analogue at all in Kant and by the
nature of his view could not have. That Hegel should have taken this step
so early in his career is extremely significant, and that his Logic should
have held so closely by Kant as against Fichte or Schelling indicates very
decidedly his historical affinities.
But it must not be supposed that Hegel fully appreciated at this time
the significance and importance of transcendental Logic. The Logic is not
a complete exposition of ultimate conception^ The conceptions again are not
exhibited as determinations of his single principle; they are not shewn to
be moments of spirit, self-consciousness; they are assumed to be and
I
accepted as such moments; but how or why is not established. In this
respect his early Logic does not profess the same thoroughness as Fichte's
W. L. And again it seems that on the whole the Logic is a subordinate
preliminary discussion in his present scheme. His main interest and the
important part of "theoretical philosophy" seems to He in "mctaphysic." It
is here that content 'reflects itself*, it is here that the Idea is found
of whiesh nature is the 'other*. His idealism at this point is not at all
tlogical idealism; but rather metaphysical idealism. His principle simply
as a. concrete fact contains in its concreteness all reality. The treatment
i the formal abstract content of this principle seems to occupy a
secondary place in the scheme.
And when we pass from such general considerations to take the
'theoretical philosophy' in detail its tentative provisional character
becomes apparent. To begin with, the distinction of logic from ' ..
metaphysic shows merely a close adherence to tradition, tttt aince^Hegel
had not yet done more than named the principle of reality and viewed d ' :•
absolute reality as such in the light of it without determining completely
and explicitwkLy the nature of that principle itself, such a distinction
was perhaps also inevitable in his scheme. The treatment of the formal
conceptions as such naturally falls at this early stage apart from that
of absolute reality.
The division again of logic into a discussion of the formal aspects of
being, and of thought (thinking, Denken) shows in some respects^a closer
adherence to tradition than is found in Kant. Being is not taken in his
later sense; it is not in this early view a category at all; rather it has
iwUf
categories. And^it is the general use of the term being which makes it
unnecessary for him to have what afterwards appears as the discussion of
essence. The qualifications ascribed to being are, as we noted, taken
directly from Kant. Hegel seems to have been at no pains to amplify them;
or even closely to critise them. A possible increase to their number does
not seem, to have occurred to him. The only modifications he introduces are
primarily due to the need of systematising them, to weaving them into one
texture. Such system&tisation in fact is the sole contribution of Hegel
»
to the discussion of the categories, seems indeed to have been his only
interest in the discussion of them. And it is this same interest which
induced him to connect the determinations of being with those of thinking.
In this way being and thought, as originally separated, are viewed aad
merely distinguished inside reality; both are forms of reality; hence the
possibility of an inner connexion between their qualifications. As in
the case of being so in that of thinking the determinations related by
Hegel are those currently attributed to it; no extension or examination of
them is offered.
The doctrine of * proportion' is made necessary to his scheme because
[•of the distinction so pointedly made between thought and being; it is
necessary to complete and to round off his logic; having separated he must
; somehow bring the parts together. Beyond this significance, it seem3 in
■ itself artificial, and the forms included under it are simply
;those accepted by logic, and belong to the doctrine of thought
proper. It contains however, and this is its importance for us, Hegel's
-
u
earliest attempt to make logic objective; in it Hegel seeks to leave the
subjective as such (thinking) and to state those formal determinations
which the real for itself, and which are not simply attributed to
'.:r
it by external reflexion. This is particularly seen in his interpretation
of proof. Indeed it is difficult to see why, except on the general view
above stated that logic contains simply the formal character of the real, ai
.is constructed by means of 'external* reflexion, proof should not have been
i, *
included under metaphysic. Hegel has not yet identified the fcfcrms, laws,
modes of procedure, ways of thlnling which hold inside the real with the
CM*
f. reality; MWft yet form and content of the real are kept in some way .distinct,
f Hence under the doctrine of proportion he merely gives the formal character
■ of proof as such, as a mode of procedure.
; It is only in the metaphysic that we become acquainted with the
t content of the real. And here almost without exception , Hegel has simply
% adopted the results of his predecessors, and has merely connected them
L-
| systematically by a method and for a purpose of his own. The first part,
i the system of ground—principles of the real, contains merely those
t
i principles which philosophy up to Hegel's day had shown to be necessary
t
» to experience. They are however interpreted and expressed in the
'i characteristically Hegelian manner, i.e. they are viewed not as principles
;; \simply
j necessary^to knowledge of the real, but principles in and of the real
. t
:r* itself they are not simply forms of reality they are reality itself.
It is this conception of them in fact which seems to justify their place
# in his metaphysic; and this is significant for his whole attitude, which on
L
,1 this point at any rate he never changed. It is, for example, the content
y of the real which makes contradiction possible, as well as the solution
,{ of contradiction. Mere inconsistency of concepts in itself moans nothing,
t
for these concepts can only contradict if they possess content, and the
, contradiction they can exhibit is in virtue of that content. Contradiction
y therefore is the essence of the real. These principles however fire not
1 connected in any way with the other parts of his metaphysic; they are
51.
treated as elements of the real, and nothing further is stated of them.
Then too the second part begins quite abruptly with the essence, or
fundamental nature of the real. This part does little more than repeat
the Leibnitz—Wolf/Lan metaphysical conception of the real, and its
< h
difference from his later view of 'objectivity* is too glaring to need
comment. The real is divided in the usual way into the self, the world,
and God, and a monadistic interpretation of reality is given. That
Hegel should simply have accepted without extensive enquiry the
monadistic scheme of the world indicates the JutX character of his
idealism at this period, and of his conception of spirit.
Yet a view which like Hegel's regarded spirit as the principle of
the real could hardlyo.have done otherwise vrithout a more thoroughgoing
interpretation of spirit. As we have indicated all he was concerned about
in the first instance was to hold this conception of the real. He had
accepted the view that the selfhood of spirit is* the primary reality,
that Absolute Reality was spirit,, and the natural form which such a ^ r 01 t
conception at first could take -would be that all reality is spirit ;
difference in reality meant plurality of spirit. His idealism meant at
this stage reality is thinking beings (monadistic idealism) not as it did
later, reality is thought (logical idealism). That he should have advanced
from, one to the other is significant for the interpretation of his scheme |H
indicates the line of his development. This view of spirit which he
adopted, and his conception of reality as thereby determined, account for
52.
his early view of logic as a discipline separate from metaphysic, and also
for the need of a metaphysic as distinct from logic. Hence too it is
evident not only that they are not Systematically connected, but that on
such a view they do not require to be connected.
It is to be noted that there seems little connection betv?een his
view of "the 'world* as given in the metaphysic and his view of nature in
the. philosophy of nature. In the latter nature is the determination of
spirit, spirit in itself but not for itself; in the former the 'world' is
the totality of monad-genera. These views are perhaps compatible; but
their agreement is at least not obvious.
Again in regard to the conception of Absolute Spirit 'this early view
shows a striking and significant difference from the later. This early
conception of the Supreme Reality was Deistic. All reality is not
Absolute Reality; nor again are all finite realities 'moments' of the one
Absolute Reality. Absolute Spirit is one reality among other realities; it
is the supreme monad— . But it is distinct from is even separate
from the others; for it alone is the absolute union of objectivity with
subjectivity, that which is the other to it is itself, it.knows no other
but itself. Such a conception was perhaps natural enough on Hegel's early
view of spirit. And this conception is a metaphysical idea; but while in
some external respects it resembles the determination given to the* Absolute
Idea* it cannot be at all identified with it. Ho is careful too to point
out that this metaphysical idea of the.Supreme Reality is only idea; is
53.
1 not the reality itself a difference on which we have already
f commented <*•
^ The transmutation of this metaphysical idea into the logical, and the
14 removal of the distinction between the metaphysical determination of the
■ Supreme Reality and the formal determination of this Reality in itself in
fall its completeness, we have to trace in his firther development.
It only remains to conclude this part of our discussion by pointing
tout the unsatisfactcriness of this early attempt to frame a scheme of logic.
fIts fragmentary character, its incompleteness, its unsystematic form, its
'.uncritical treatment of its concepts, the ambiguous insistence on the dis¬
tinction between form, and content, thought and the real, a distinction which
fat one time seems abrupt at another hardly seems discoverable, the
-uncertainty and indefiniteness in statement, the merely relative indepen¬
dence of his point of view and even of his treatment, all this is quite
manifest from the foregoing. He seems in fact hardly to have been aware
of the real nature of the problem he had undertaken, or of the kind of
solution which would satisfy those needs on behalf of which he had turned
•■to philosophy. And his conception of his problem seems to have been limited
and overpowered by his close adherence to the results end views of his
predecessors in the field, views which he had accepted perhaps too readily,
and which he had not yet fully determined for himself.
Of one thing he seems to have/assured the necessity for thorough-
[ - , - •• ■ *
.going system in philosophy, and this with however limited success he
P"' ' <■ '
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(1)
certainly strove to attain. That such a claim was inevitable on his
view of the object and purpose of philosophy is obvious enough. With this
as his aim he seems to have worked special parts of his scheme into as
systematic a form as they could well admit e.g. the treatment of
Substantiality Causality and Reciprocity. On the other hand it is just as
evident that certain parts of his early scheme are not systematically
• connected, and bear no resemblance except perhaps in name to his r '
; later results. This incompleteness of system seems due to the limited
• appreciation of the need for thoroughness, to the looseness of his terms,
Le.g. formal, abstract, etc. but mainly to the absence of any definite
w
tmethod for attaining it. The means by which system in the early scheme is j
J brought about is that of analysis of the concepts and relation of them by
f external reflexion upon them. This relation may take the form of that of
tgenus to species, (as e.g. in objectivity), or simply that of implication,
j' A given concept 0 is analysed and found to contain a certain element A which
•. whiefcr characterised another form of reality; but A by itself does not fully
■determine C, we require for that purpose another element B. It is not A
(1)
The conception of organism, organic unity, which is the basis of
Hegel's idea of system, was early realised by him. It has especial
fat this period in the sphere of ethics, v. Ros. 124 ff.VUJ.O i' I 4.UU J-II U1ICT Oi'iiCl C UJ- C V» Iwo ♦ ~ • , - J
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therefore which demands B hut 0 which demands both; nor does 13 by itself
fully determine 0. One category does not 'pass uwtu another; they
exist side by side. Such connection as does exist is quite external. The
process of uniting the different moments is not immanent in those moments
themselves, but operating from without. The Logic is Logic of external
reflexion; it is our reflexion#the reflexion of the subject investigating
that determines the content of the Logic and its arrangement. And when he
declares that in metaphysic the content 'reflects itself', it is not made
clear how this self-reflexion is related to the external reflexion. The
concepti^ef of reflexion is as a whole uncritical, confused and undefined,
and seems to have as many forms as there are matters to be reflected upon.
There is philosophical reflexion as the process of philosophy as a whole;
there is external reflexion in the Logic; 'ideal reflexion' characterising
the notion; self-reflexion in the metaphysic and those are in no way
related or critised. There is therefore strictly speaking no one method
e /.
ogenity and incomplete¬
ness which the system exhibits. He does indeed describe reflexion as a
'movement' but this simply applies to it as a process. And again he uses
c >
the term dialectic to describe the process of negating^limiting and
defining the content; but it has no precise meaning for him; no meaning
distinct from what it might have had for any one using it after Kant or
Pichte, but yet not using it in their restricted and specific sense.
All these obscurities are perhaps inevitable in an early scheme
in this early scheme; and this accounts for the he^r
56.
which is perhaps merely tentative, and too much ought not to he expected
from it. Still these difficulties point the way to the course Hegel must
•pursue if his view is to gain clearness and completeness.
PART II.






We should expect the deficiencies, the errors, and uncritical
['■positions which we discover in the early view to be gradually removed in
i
cthe course of Hegel's development. And this is what to some extent is
.found in the next period to which we now pass. The more prominent defects
: are removed in the first instance. The difficulties and ambiguities .under-
tlying the distinction of Being (Seyn) and Thought (Begriff) are met and a
I definite interpretation offered of their nature and. relation. The
distinction of form and content as the basis of the separation of logic
from metaphysic is dropped, and while this distinction is still in a sense
maintained we shall find that it has another meaning, is determined in
another way. The nature therefore of logic and met,aphysic in this new view
"• is in decided contrast to the earlier. And with this change also the
,uncritical adoption of the results, both in metaphysic and in logic, of
preceding thinkers, to which we referred, vanishes. The breaking down of
[the abrupt distinction of content from form leads likewise to an
assimilation of logic to metaphysic; the latter becomes more 'formal*, the
.former more concrete. The incompleteness in systematic connexion between
ithe elements of the two disciplines as also betv/een the various parts of
philosophy is in a measure removed by the adoption not so much of a
philosophical method as of a more determinate philosophical point of view.




of system could have been realised by means of this principle we cannot
decide, as no detailed scheme similar to that already given is presented
in this period. What we have in fact is rather the analysis of terms,
principles and systems. We still find therefore greater precision and
definiteness in Hegel*s conceptions, which come from a reconsideration
and examination of ideas and facts hitherto simply accepted or even
assumed. We thus have rather the elements and fundamental principles of a
system than an actual connected scheme.
We have only material to enable us to determine Hegel's general
attitude and the main influences which dominate his thinking in this
period. In a sense it is one of transition. Hegel becomes conscious of
his philosophical position and master of his terms. But still the
principles adopted at this time are not worked out and some of his
positions are in his later treatment modified or even abandoned. We
might perhaps naturally expect that Hegel in such a period of criticism
would prove establish and defend the position he actually adopts; but this
is not the case. True to his characteristic manner of exposition he work3
from the principle, adopted as a conclusion, and we are left simply to
state what this is without being informed as to why or how he came to
adopt it. We shall therefore best bring out Hegel's view of logic at this
stage of its development by first of all indicating his general
philosophical position at this time and then stating more fully the place
and nature of this logic.
59.
The period we are considering falls between 1801 apd 1807, between
the departure of Hegel from Frankfurt for Jena and the publication of the
*Phanomenologie.' Hegel was drawn to Jena in the first place because
he felt that his apprenticeship was ended and that his 'Wanderjahre' had
best be spent in filling some post at a universityJ and in the second place
because Schelling, with whom he had for years kept up friendly correspond—
fence, and with whose work and thinking he was thoroughly familiar, was
teaching at Jena and advised his going thither, the university being at that
time the literary and philosophical centre of Germany.
Such a step meant much intellectually as well as practically for Hegel.
<. The hitherto dominant interest in religion pure and simple soon became al¬
most wholly supplanted by the interest in philosophy; the religious view of
f facts in the world gives place to a purely philosophical interpretation of
| them; the indeterminate concepts of religious thinking are exchanged for
\ the accuracy, definiteness and explicitness of systematic thought. And with
f this entire abandonment to philosophy comes a corresponding revulsion from
the vaguer mysticism in which he had hitherto sought light and satisfaction.
rMysticism he now^ characterises as a pictorial imaginative medium for the
expression of the Idea or the Absolute; it is neither feeling nor science,




again it is the Idea hound hy fantasy and emotion. He describes it
roundly as a 'splendid rhetoric' which itself confesses the impotence of the
medium through which it seeks to express the essence of reality. He will
have the essence brought into definiteness, and that solely through the
f'elear element' of thought, through the medium of determinate conceptions;
for the 'clear element is the universal, the concept, the notion (Begriff).'
This all-importance of the purely philosophical interpretation of
reality does not however imply the absence of that religious'tendenfcj' which
we saw to be the essential form of his interest in philosophy and the
Source of his vital interest in it. This appears not merely from the fact
<that philosophy is to him a 'Speculative science,' whose object is Absolute
Reality as such, but also from the nature of the supreme principle of
Reality which he adopts, and from the place assigned to religion in his
(
.philosophy. He still holds Spirit to be the principle of Reality, ' and
In one sketch of philosophy he makes religion the final and highest moment
(2)
?f it. 7 The change of attitude may perhaps be best described by saying
{interest
Jhat whereas formerly he had a religious)in the object of philosophy, he has
jpw a purely philosophical interest in the object of religion, the object in
joth cases being ultimately the same.
It is otherwise impossible to appreciate the position he adopts on
CD (2)
Werke 1.395. Ros. 188. Ros. 179.
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certain points (more especially the place assigned to Mind (Spirit) in his
treatment), or to connect the view of the present period both with what
succeeds and with what preceded it unless we keep in mind that all along the
Absolute for Hegel is Spirit. That this is the nature of ultimate Reality
.'seems in fact never to have meant anything else for him. We have already
■indicated the origin of this position which Hegel consistently adopts all
<through his career, and we need not insist further on its significance.
The problem of philosophy as a speculative science is to determine
this ultimate reality, and to interpret finite reality in the light of it.
It is not one reality among other realities; if so, it vrould be a finite
reality; it is rather the ground or basal Reality of all realities. Hegel
had therefore to deal in the first instance with the usual general forms or
kinds of finite realities that presented themselves; for thereby he \,rould
••specify more particularly the problems and aspects of philosophy. And he is
at no groat pains to determine what these realities are; that had already
Ibeen done by his predecessors and was in fact an obvious commonplace in
philosophy. These most general and distinct finite realities are Nature
and Mind. He takes these as palpably different facts of experience and
A*
seeks speculatively to systematise their content and to connect them with
each other and with the Absolute Reality.
We need seek no other reason or origin than that just given for this
distinction of these philosophical sciences, which indeed we have already
met with in a certain form in the early period and which becomes a
uj A1" &
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permanent part of Hegel's philosophy in its final form. He simply takes
.Nature and Mind as distinct facts, and the most general of distinct facts
I
,and shapes them into a speculative scheme of the universe. It seems both
untrue and unnecessary to treat them merely as 'deductions' from 'ideas.'
For Hegel they are and seem always to have been the primary realities of the
universe, dependent for their reality solely -on the absolute. It was in the
finite forms that Reality exhibited itself, and where it was immediately
present and known. There seems little doubt that in the lectures repeatedly
given at Jena on 'Philosophy of Nature* and 'Philosophy of Mind'^ he
discussed these facts primarily as we immediately meet them, seeking merely
ah
to interpret them from Sta absolute point .of view. Each is in itself so
far independent of th% other, and in the first instance can be treated
separately, presents a distinct order of facts. They are and must be also
t- .
connected as aspects of absolute reality, and such connection is necessary
to the completeness of speculative science. But the determination of this
Latter connection, while it occupies Hegel in the present stage more than
Ln the preceding, and occupies him still more in the later form of his
philosophy is imposed, on those realities from without, does not exclude their
; [ ■
Peculiar character, does not transform their nature. They have and preserve
their own reality and they^ as distinct realities^ are of interest in





i- We have little of distinctive importance regarding his explicit
L
interpretations and conceptions of each of these philosophical sciences,
f We have however some indication of the relation of Aind as such to Nature
!' as such as forms ofl Absolute Reality. There is indeed incorporated in
• Hegel's workiSln article from the ' Journal a*Philosophie*
7. edited by Schelling and Hegel together at Jena which deals specifically
5-with the * Verhaltniss d. Naturphilosophie zur Philosophie uberhaupt'; but
(3)
[ this article cannot be admitted to have been Hegel's production. In
another article however in the same volume 'uber d. wissenschaft«
j',Behawdlun£Sa.rteYi d. Naturrichts' we find the relation of Nature and
I Spirit as forms of the Absolute determined. Prom this it appears that
s the supreme expression discoverable for the Absolute is 'Sittlichkeit', that
form of spirit in which the freedom of a people most completely appears, in
I which legality as such, and morality as such are found and identified. It
»■ would appear that this for Hegel completely expresses the nature of ■
&■- .
'-the Absolute.^ For here alone are body and soul through and through
Jr -through united; here only is subjectivity also objectivity; identity and
• reality posited as identical; individuality, the union of universality and
s.; -
^particularity, completely realised. And these are the characteristic of
r {1) ^ (3) ,. <■., v
F Ros. 161. Werke I. So also maintain Erdmann f (Am***** «*r/
| (4)
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the Absolute. He distinguishes inside the Absolute its actual finite
appearance and existence for and in finite empirical consciousness (the
1,
/body, the real side of Ethicality), and 'the living spirit, the absolute
consciousness, the absolute and undifferentiated union of the ideal and
I'
the real of Ethicality.* It is the latter which is the absolute unity above
Spoken of; the former does not completely attain to the 'divinity* of the
(atter, though it still contains 'its absolute idea* afid is necessarily
bund up with it; hence the.place and significance of religion. But this
iistinction, as he himself indicates, does not effect the determination of
ri
she Absolute as above given; it is merely a difference of aspect of
"Sittlichkeit.* This then is the essential nature of absolute spirit; in iti
boo lute of itself is one and the same with self
nowledge of itself as itself, its absolute reality and its absolute
dentity and reflexion are identified. Such a union places spirit (mind)
Igher than Nature; for the latter is 'absolute self intuition, and the ■
.fetu^alisation of infinite diversity and mediation', i.e. the endless
rocess of eternal relation of part with part; it does not know itself, does
pt intuit or view itself as itself* Mind does(no£>know itself, and is at
nee the plurality of the universe, which it grasps, and is the implicit





In this assertion of the superiority of Spirit to Nature (a
superiority, the ethical importance of which Hegel was zealously eager to
aaintain and exhibit**1' hence for instance his expression the
'impotence* of nature) Hegel separates himself decidedly from Schelling, by
rhom he is otherwise at this period very much influenced, as we shall
presently see. The latter at most merely coordinates the two (Spirit and
Mature). The determination of different degrees of reality of Nature and
)f Spirit is one of the most important general positions established in
(3)
;his period. He maintains too that Nature in the totality of the
jontent of Spirit, is the 'negative moment*, or the phase of difference,
axt^nality, distinct from both the mere 'idea' and concrete real mind; but
aoints out that it is an essential and necessary moment of the -whole. In
this last contention he again differs from Schelling, for whom Nature is
as a 'precipate' from the idea, and thereby a contingency, a 'happening,'
and not a necessity. We are not given more definite information as to the
-elation of nature to mind or to that 'ideal'logic-metaphysical aspect of
speculative science to which we shall immediately turn; we may note
lowever that unlike Schelling, and the Romantic school generally Hegel
adhered characteristically to a logical treatment of philosophy of nature,
to the exhibition of the immanent reason in the objects of nature.
CD (2)
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Much more important for our purpose than the determination of the A,
content and relation of the two forms of reality above indicated are the■ 1
views which Hegel holds at this time on logic and metaphysics. It is here1
that the advance on his preceding position is so manifest; and it is here
that the influence of Schelling is so pronounced. Logic and metaphysic
together form, again, as in the early period, the first of the triad of
philosophical sciences; and, as in the case of, the other two sciences
(philosophy of nature anfi of mind), Hegel is in the first place and mainly
concerned to treat logic and metaphysic together simply as an independent
and self—subsistent part of philosophy, without immediate reference to
either of the other two sciences. He does indeed seek more eagerly and
perhaps more successfully to connect the first part of philosophy vrith the
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second (philosophy of nature), and seeks to determine the 'transition'
from the 'idea' to nature or the real, to pass logically and in ^
from metaphysic to a 'Realphilosophie', from the formal determination of
reality, to its concrete actual content. But what vre must observe is that
this for Hegel is -nether and a different problem from the independent
systematic treatment of the science in itself; the latter (philosophy of
nature) does not depend on or wait for the former, nor are the results and




method as the conclusions of the former enquiry. It is very important to
keep this in mind for the 'transition from logic to nature' in his later
philosophy when thus regarded historically ceases to be the riddle and
the enigma which it is usually considered. The Philosophy of Nature is all
along a distinct branch of philosophy; just as Nature is from the first
a distinct form of reality. Nature occupies a sphere of its own, and the
treatment of it is as such distinct from that of the others. It is not a
dependent branch of philosophy but a self-dependent, self-contained
exposition; its distinctiveness of subject-matter ensures that independence
It Is no more independent than the other parts of philosophy; but it is no
less. It is so from the start and it remains so to the end. Thus as we
shall find even at the last there is no attempt to sink away one part of
philosophy in another, or to evolve one part from and out of the content
of another (say Nature out of the Logic as such). The three parts of
philosophy are moments of a single whole, but self-dependent moments,
contained in and depending on that whole but not on each other in thcrf
separateness. But this is anticipating.
The independence of this first part of philosophy of the two other
parts appeared also in a sense in the early period; and that logic and
metaphysic should be a separate branch of philosophy, and should be in the
fir^t instance treated independently and in themselves seems obvious
enough. They had always formed a part of philosophy, and the nature of
philosophy itself demanded it. For clearly a science is to state in
67a.
the most general way, and determine in the most universal terms the
fundamental and essential character and nature of Reality as a whole; and
such an expression of the Absolute in formal 'pure* 'simple' universality is
what this part of philosophy specifically furnishes. Neither philosophy of
nature nor of mind does this; each deals with a certain aspect or definite
content of reality, not reality in its completeness. In a sense these tvfo
sciences themselves demand the other investigation, for only by its result
can it be determined where and in what form the Absolute is most concretely
revealed. And we find as a matter of fact that the nature of the Absolute
as determined by metaphysic is that Ihich the Absolute possesses in the
(1)
concrete form of *Sittlichke.it* above considered.
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It seems again to be in virtue of this character which metaphysio
possesses that it is treated as the first of the triad of philosophical
disciplines, and this not merely in the earlier schemes but in his later
philosophy; it furnishes the most universal, essential, fundamental and
formal determination of reality, ndb as this specially appears in definite
aspects in particular (in nature or in mind), but as it is in itself.
The name which Hegel assigns to this part of speculation varies a
little in the course of the period v.re are considering, and is partly
significant of the development he goes through. At first he calls it
simply Logic and Metaphysie, on which in 1802 he proposes to publish a
dealing with the whole of philosophical science, on which he repeatedly
lectured. r. e-i compendium (for there is no publication of such
a work at this time) in 1803 is the earliest presentation of his * System
of Philosophy' as such. He calls it a 'System of Speculative Philosophy',
and includes under it 1. Logic and Metaphysic or Transcendental Idealism.
2. Philosophy of Nature. 3. Philosophy of Mind. The two last he
designates later (1805) as 'Realphilosophie.'v In 1806 Speculative
Philosophy contains Phanomenology of Mind, Logic, and Philosophy of Nature
and of Mind; Metaphysic as a distinct discipline being significantly
CD
This became either a part of or gave place to a compendiumtreatise.1
CD (2)
Ros. 101. This term preserved in his final
view: v. Lg. I. Vorhede I. ad fin
00.
omitted. With this change agrees a division of his system,which must
have appeared late in this period, and in which the first part of his
system is given as 'Logic or the. Science of the Idea as such.' His own
(2)
statements too in the course of his development during this period seem
to indicate that gradual identification of logic with metaphysic which
became his final position. But this point of view is not made explicit in
a/i (ft fit**
writings HtWOSt fall within this period: we are^compel led to regard
metaphysic as different from logic, and requiring separate treatment.
The grounds for this position are clearly put forward in his various
articles to the above mentioned 'Journal' which are all with one exception
on subjects falling within the first of philosophical sciences
('Transcendental Idealism.').
Speculative science he maintains must start from the Absolute.^ This
is nothing less than an axiom with Hegel; philosophy he declares has not and
never had any other object. And this is not a postulate in the sense of
being that which is never proved, but which must always be hjyj/J in
order to make all proof possible. Rather it is present in every 'proof* and
the whole of philosophy is just a laying bare of the content of the absolute.
Nor againwioeit it appear as a 'demand' or a 'problem' at the end of
philosophy on which we are merely to 'believe'; it is real throughout and
CD (2) (3)
Ros. 179. 18, 19. W. I. 100ff XVI. 59. Absolute here




from the first in all philosophy.
And the Absolute has a necessary character; it is the one, the unity,
the identity of all and every finite. The absolute means simply absolute
identity, that into which every finite is refunded, which contains all
opposites, that in and by which all■opposition is conserved and at the same
time as opposition removed. The opposites so united are expressible in 1 ,rit
various ways; in one form they appear as body and soul, in another necessity
and freedom, in a third as Nature and Ego, again as subject and object, and
finally as thought (Begriff) and being. These, as the most fundamental
forms of opposition we. know, Hegel treats as all involving one another, and 5
uses e.g. the opposition between subject and object to express the same as
that between thought and being.
The Absolute then is the identity of subject and object; and the identi¬
ty of subject and object is the supreme principle of speculation of all
philosophical knowledge. But it is likewise presupposed in 'common life' as
well as in all philosophy; it lies at the basis of the 'common sense' of
(S)
the ordinary understanding. And in this fact lies the possibility and
the necessity of philosophy. For it is because in common sense and the
'culture^ arising out of it, this identity is lost sight of, although, or
rather because the opposites have been fixed as such and their reciprocal
CD (2)




: connexion overlooked, is still implicitly present and demanded, that
I philosophy is required. Whenever that which is only an appearance of the
r
; ■ absolute is out of. connexion with its source, becomes isolated,
(
£ independent and fixed, the power and sense of unity has vanished from man's
(l)
life, and can only be reinstated by philosophy. y 'Disruption,
^ separation, fission is therefore the source of the need of philosophy.'
f Such a need, says Hegel, is the only 'presupposition* philosophy can have;
it is all that presupposition means for it; and in strictness there is no
'presupposition', for the reason that if there were this would lie inside
philosophy itself. And as we see this 'need* contains .two elements, (a) the
c absolute itself, the ultimate identity above named, (b) the fact that-
consciousness has passed out of or away from this totality, has ceased to
I'̂
be aware of itself and only in and for this totality, has therefore 'fixed*
F
itself as separate from it, and thereby also split the Absolute into
fundamental but finite limited opposites.
Now this position which we have described is the general intellectual
situation out of which Hegel's philosophical (logico-metaphysical) thinking
at this time took its form, and from which all his philosophy in fact
f proceeded, and by which it is to the last conditioned. His conception of
this starting point is later on deepened and modified but it remains
72.
i'. substantially the same to the end.. It is the 'terra firma* of his
i' entrance into pure philosophy, and the groundwork of the mature philosophi—
, cal convictions to which he now began to give utterance. As we shall
immediately discover it is the general matter out of which he shapes his
philosophy, the " " of which his scheme is the " 'Tt*'45
Such being the raison d'etre of philosophy, its business is simply to
C^-
restore and reveal to consciousness that basal identity, to reassert the
supremacy and primacy of the absolute by explicitly exhibiting its actual
presence in every finite and fixed reality, to show that all finite relative
(2)
identities are merely "repetitions" of one and the same ultimate identity,
to reduce all appearances of the absolute, (which are limited and finite
expressions of it, and are set over against it as also against each other),
to that one 'true' and only Reality. There are thus two moments in this
procedure of philosophy, one which is the negation of the finite realities
as such by the unlimited, infinite absolute reality, the other the
assertion the preservation of the finite by virtue of its sharing in and
being determined by infinite reality.
Now the medium through which this and procedure of philosophy
cfc*.
^ realised is by reason. Reason alone is adequate to the absolute; 'it i3
(3)
the manifestation of the absolute', the activity of reason is the
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activity of the absolute, and Hegel's expressions warrant us even in
asserting that reason is simply the absolute in us, and therefore in
philosophy. For, as we found the absolute to be always the immanent
principle of all philosophy, so he maintains philosophy is one in all
ages because reason is one and single. The absolute identity, is a
'reason-identity'; tho principle of absolute identity at the root of all
philosophy is a 'principle of reason'; philosophy is the 'activity of
reason' only.*" ^ Hence the ^statement that philosophy is the knowledge
of the absolute is made equivalent in all respects to the statement that
philosophy is the self-knowledge of reason. The business of philosophy
is therefore merely put in another form when it is expressed as the
resolution of all finite opposites, fixed and determinate (a ueterminateness
due as we shall presently see to the action of understanding) into the one
identity, the one infinite of reason, which alone is and can be absolute and
unlimited. And as there is only one reason, and as 'every reason which has
directed itself upon itself and come to know itself has produced a true
(2)
philosophy', " every philosophy is in itself a constitutive and essential
mode form of reason. And this is the only significance which the various
philosophies v/hich have appeared from time to time possess, and
consequently so far as the inner essence of philosophy is concerned there
M .... OU
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is neither before nor after in philosophy, * neither forerunners nor
successors.' Every philosophy therefore finds its place in the one
totality of reason, and the most opposed and contradictory forms of
philosophy are the result of opposed factors or functions which are
constitutive of reason itself. Particular concrete instances of such
opposed philosophies we shall presently furnish.
Having then established what the aim and purpose of philosophy is we
must now determine by what process it is to attain its result. We have
already indicated the two moments or aspects attained by philosophy, the
resolution, reduction of determinate opposites to the absolute unity of all
opposition, the negation of the finite by the infinite, the destruction of
all differences by the supreme identity; and the positing, assertion of that
identity, that absolute, in all finite opposites, all relative identities,
To these two forms correspond two processes of reason^"^ by which they are
realised; to the first, Reflexion, to the#second, Transcendental
intuition, vision, direct immediate act of reason.
It must be borne in mind all along that these processes are not processes
of our reason merely,in which case they would be distinct from the result
and even that which is 'reflected' and could be thrown aside when the
result was obtained. Such a conception of reflexion is necessarily false,
because the whole meaning of Hegel's point of view i.3 that all such
(1)
W. I. 173 ff.
distinctions (as that between process #f our reason and process of the
object) are merely finite, are not and cannot be absolute, but are
themselves identified, their opposition overcome in the absolute, in the
• identity of reason.' It were therefore a manifest fatuity if those
processes by which philosophy systematically construes the content and
nature of the absolute identity of all opposites, all distinction, were
themselves based on or were merely one of the finite distinctions which
fall inside that identity itself. Consequently the only.alternative left
is that reflexion is absolute reflexion, reason-reflexion, reflexion which
is one with, is the same as that which is reflected, reflexion as indiffer¬
ent t" subjective and objective, which'appertains to both equally and
neither especially. And similarly of Anschauung. This will become clear
as we proceed.
We saw that philosophy arose out of or because of the fixing,
absolutising, of finite opposites. This 'fixing* 'positing' is the work
of understanding.^) Realities or aspects of reality are isolated and
while set over against each other and limited by each other are still taken
by understanding to be independent self-sufficient; beyond them
understanding does not seek to go and indeed by its very nature cannot go;
they are not therefore related to anything beyond or more ultimate than
themselves. By understanding the task of philosophy could not be
CD
W. I. 172: 178 f.
accomplished, for it does not attempt to construe the absolute; there is
no absolute for it, there are only finite limited realities fixed, and
over against each other and all existing simply side by side. Understand¬
ing is indeed a kind of reflexion, but it is 'isolated, isolating
reflexion*, and is thereby distinguished from' reflexion above named. What
distinguishes the reflexion of philosophy is just the presence and relation
of the Absolute to it. And as therefore the impossibility of construing
the absolute was due to the isolating and fixing of the opposite^ in it, so
this problem is only solved through negating these by, and connecting them
with the absolute. Philosophical reflexion is necessarily therefore
negative, and this in virtue of the relation to the absolute; it is *the
power of the negative absolute,' 'the negative side of the absolute,*
'absolutt,negativity>' Reason indeed is active even in understanfling, for
though the finite factors are fixed, yet one is limited b# another, and this-
other requires a third to limit it and so on endlessly. This very forced
progress to a complete totality sought by understanding is the work of
reason. Understanding remains in finitude, and never reaches infinity, yet
it still isolates the former and fixes, posits the latter as over against it
positing infinity understanding in its 'conceit' is simply 'imitating'
reason, for it negates the finite (as reason does) by the infinite, which
none the less is itself// a finite and exists 3ide by side with the finite
negated (which is not the case with the negation of reason). But when
leaves the two side by side and thereby infinity. But in so
77.
understanding does fix and oppose finitude to infinity it destroys itself,
for the maintenance of the one means the removal of the other. Reason alone
however knows this, and thereby it destroys understanding itself, and trans¬
lates its products simply into negatives.
This applies, of course, to all the finite isolated products of
understanding. Vie are left therefore with merely reason without,, any
opposites within it, pure reason with all finitudes resolved in it .and
-(totality ;
negated by it. Now this self-identical}of reason into which they can be
resolved may in the last resort be one of two orders determined as distinct
CD
by the kind of reality contained in each or the way in which the,1 'V
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absolute is expressed in each. These are the objective totality or
c i L s
infinity, and the subjective totality} the 'objective world' andth&.kingdottr \
i ■ ■ ,' ' t
of 'freedom.' These are the final opposites presented to reason and by
(2)
reason. But they are still not independent and self-subsistentj tljey
are related to and subsist in the absolute. Reason therefore musf.d1
their opposition and i/wD^ them. . And this is effected in one and the
.! "v .
I '
same act; for it unites them by negating both; that is the only unidnthey
( \
possess; for they only exist by being not united. Both are related to and
exist for the absolute, and the absolute is one and is the identity; they
(3) ' i
are therefore identical, and each is posited as the identity. The ;
(1) (2)




absolute, the same identity is that which negates the fixed finitudes in
the 'objective world' (world of sense) as also in the subjective world
(intellectual world, world of freedom), and these apparently different
worlds are simply the totalities, the infinities, the absolutes of finite
realities which qua finite and. fixed are undoubtedly distinct. But the one
absolute determines them as totalities and hence they are different forms
of the same identity, and are therefore truly and essentially identical
and their apparent difference is negated by that reason-identity, which
constitutes ©CLch.
Thus we see that reflexion from first to last is purely negative, and
the absolute in reflexion is simply the of opposites. The law of
reflexion is therefore 'that everything destroyiitselfthe life of each
finite reality is its death. And this as we saw applies universally to
*
everything except the absolute identity itself. It vrould apply even to
reflexion itself, if this opposed itself to the.absolute as a fixed element
of reality. It must negate itself likewise, for if it did not, 'it would
be determining itself by the law of contradiction'; it would assert itself
(1)
to be reason and would be obeying the law of understanding only; it
would posit itself absolutely against the absolute and yet maintain that
the absolute is the only identity. The only lavf to which it can rightly
(1)
W. I. 130 £: 180 .
conform must therefore be that of self-annihilation. This self-annihilation
just means that synthesis of oppositcs which constitutes the nature of the
absolute identity.. But synthesis of opposites is not really contradiction,
but rather the contradiction which abolishes, subl«Lt«$itself. And this is
reason as reflexion, of the negative side of speculation.
But as we saw there is another moment in the process of 'construing* thi
absolute. Reflexion maintains throughout that opposites must be negated,
that their being cancelled in and by the absolute is their truth. But it
does no more than this. There is a process which it even demands and pre¬
supposes, and yet which it does not and cannot perform, vis: bringing to the
light of philosophic knowledge the positive side of reason. This element or
aspect which defies all negation and endures throughout it is the identity
itself which maintains and preserves the content negated; and this side of
reason is ^nschauung.(-*■) Anschauung does not 'fix* ono opposite over
against another; if it did so it would perform the work of understanding.
And it cannot make 'real', or, so to say, 'precipitate', is 'ideal',
for this would be simply to determine the other side of an opposition, which
only exists as an antinomy, and has already been negated in reflexion.
Anschauung is concerned with the identity per se as reflexion is concerned
antinomy. Antimony therefore is the supreme law of
(1)
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with finite opposites as such; and is present not merely in the case of the
absolute identity, but also in that of those relative identities into
which the absolute identity differentiates itself. For even these relative
identities, e.g. the objective as such, is antinciffcial;for, though an iden¬
tity, it is not primarily a 'fixed' identity of understanding, but is
related to the absolute.^ And what /^nschauung does is to assert and
insist upon what is merely indicated by reflexion, to substantiate and
preserve what reflexion only demands and postulates. In the identity
as such antimony is immanently present, and in antimony as such the
indentity is implied. Anschauung expresses the immediate oneness of the
identity of reason to reason itself. It may function apart from reflexion;
but in this case it is simply empirical, unconscious, the merely 'given';
the relative identity of the objective e.g. is accepted in this way as
divided from the subjective. And similarly reflexion may operate by itself
and produce pure antinomy; in which case it furnishes indeed &nowledge, but
'pure' knowledge, formal negative knowledge, knowledge which determines
the content of the absolute by reference to that identity constituting its
substance, Hit can do no more than produce this reference, it produces
therefore antinomies and not the identity. Consequently if we are to have




reflexion without £nschauung|or The one is as absolutely
necessary as the other. And the union of these two is what speculation
seeks; this union is "transcendental knowledge," which alone fully
satisfies philosophy. For by it the union of subjective and objective,
intelligence and nature, consciousness and the unconscious, thought and
being is accomplished, and that is philosophic knowledge, or as we have put
it, the construing of the'absolute. What therefore is known, or viewed
( c*s*J'ipntA-+*-dr ) belongs to both worlds at once: the one world is
essentially identical with the other: being looked at from the standpoint
of thought is the scheme of intelligence, intelligence from the standpoint
of being is the scheme of absolute being. And obviously in philosophy,
transcendental knowledge and transcendental ^nschauung are one and the
same; for in both that identity is completely present; the difference of
expression 'denotes merely the preponderance of the ideal (formal negative)
«r real factor' in the absolute identity.
In the construction of the system of philosophy it however
that the production of this system is^the work of reflexion. ; For
it alone is concerned with the finitude, the opposites, the different
forms of identity, the manifold content of the absolute; and it is simply
out of this plurality that system is constructed, and owing to which
indeed philosophy is required. Reflexion therefore as the means by which
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this manifold of finitude is finally revealed as a limited determination
of the absolute identity, is necessarily the vital moving force in the
shaping of the system, and its formal essence is just that antinomy, that
synthesis of opposites, which constitutes the absolute.
But this being so it is very important to observe that we are thereby
debarred from attempting to express through reflexion the absolute in the
form of a single proposition, which shall be the fundamental supreme absolute
ground—principle of the system, which shall be valid for understanding and
from which the whole system may be known and constructed.^^ Such an
attempt is indeed simply nonsense. For propositions of this kind are
limited, conditioned and do not contain a contradiction. If the expression
of the principle contradicts itself it is not a proposition, if it do not
contradict itself it is conditioned, limited. Now the absolute- is the
unconditioned ground of reflexion, its expression therefore must contain *
contradiction and cannot be given in a single proposition. Its only
expression is in antii\oT»(^. What in the absolute identity is unitodjI
the synthesis and the antithesis, must be expressed in two propositions,
one expressing the identity, the other the opposition and division. Hence
e.g. either the propositions A « A and A - B are quite inadequate to the
absolute or else each expresses an antinomy and indeed the same antinon*.
(1)
^
W. I. 188 f.
Prom the foregoing it is easy to see that what philosophy furnishes
is nothing short of a totality of knowledge produced by reflexion and
constituting in itself*a system, an organic whole of concepts whose highest
(1)law is reason and not understanding.' It is an organic whole whose
ground lies in itself, and has no ground outside itself, an organisation
of moments or forms of knowledge (Erkenntnisse) every part of which is
itself the whole (through its implication of the absolute). As he else-*
where puts it 'every unit of knowledge is a truth, every particle of du3t
an organisation.' And the method by which this result is to be obtained
is, as we might expect, neither synthetic, nor analytic, but rather
(2)
development that is of reason itself and from itself; it is not
therefore the simple negation of its appearance, and mere resumption of it
into its essence, but rather the construing of even/ appearance as a
relative identity, and its own identity. No more precise account of this
method however is given, though its purport is sufficiently evident.
In such a system it is clear on the one hand how the history of
philosophical systems will be regarded, and on the other what place will be
assigned to special contracted and distinct modes of philosophising which
have appeared in the course of that history. For we see that the
consequence of maintaining that the problem and object of philosophy has
CD (2)
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at all times been one and the same, that philosophy is the self—knowledge
of reason, is that the history of philosophy is itself one philosophy in
different forms. Only on this view can we bring meaning into the history
of thought, and find it something other than simply a collection of
individual opinions. And thereby also we can judge a given system, for we
can distinguish what it tried to do from what it actually accomplished, can
(1)
distinguish the philosophy of the system from the system itself, and
determine its nature and result accordingly. And in particular directly
opposite forms of philosophy, e.g. scepticism and dogmatism, will thus be
not absolutely disconnected and irreconcilable modes of thinking, but
rather constituent aspects of the one content of reason. This must
necessarily be the case, and an analysis of both the forms would show that
neither is the Whole or the negative of philosophy, but actually, imply and
require each other. All philosophy is sceptical and dogmatical at once.
Scepticism as opposed to dogmatism is itself dogmatical, the complementary
side of dogmatism; as an'absolute* philosophy it is simply the negative side
(2)
of reason reflexion. Dogmatism as an absolute scheme is the assumption
by a finite, a conditioned, an opposite element of the nature and forms of
the absolute identity itself. It would bo outside our purpose however to
exhibit in greater detail the position which Ilegel here takes up; its
CD (2)
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general significance is all that here concerns us.
Of great importance is it for us to note that of the foregoing ground
plan of a system of philosophy Hegel assigns the name Logic to that part
which forms the content of reflexion proper and per se; and Metaphysic to th
that which was designated transcendental knowledge, and which was
convertible as we saw, with transcendental /4nschauung. This is made quite
clear from, a short statement of the content and character of logic and
t
metaphysic respectively which is extracted by his biographer from the
CD
manuscript lectures of this period. Here he distinguishes between
infinite knowledge, knowledge of the »t, and finite knowledge,
knowledge of finitude. The former is the knowledge of reason without
qualification (Vernun^terkenn.tniss); the latter is knowledge of reason as
qualified by understanding. That is, that which is finite is in the
absolute, has its source in reason, is not outside reason; but as it is for
reason as it presents itself to reason, it is negated b# it, has no self-
subsistency, is related to the absolute identity, and to other finite facts.
But in its finitude it can be and is abstracted from the absolute identity
of reason, and thus in a sense robbed of its reason-character, and thereby
fixed in its finiteness, becomes finite knowledge, knowledge of finite as





determines the problem of logic. For a 'true logic' will seek to state
systematically the forms of finitude, the formal elements of finite
knowledge. It will include an exposition of those products of under-
standing, in which by its abstracting and fixing of finite elements of the
content of reason it 'imitates' reason, though the identity it does produce
is merely 'formal.'
And further since the formsjof finite knowledge are really in and for
reason, a constituent part of logic must be the significance and character
possessed by those forms in this reference to reason. Such a significance
we have seen all along is purely negative; hence this concluding portion of
logic consists in the negative knowledge of reason, the sublating of finite
knowledge by reason-knowledge.
0o
The logic falls thus into three parts. The first contains the
universal forms, laws or categories of finitude in general, both in its
objective as well as its subjective aspect, statedpimply as to their
C*J
finiteness, as reflexes of the absolute. We must keep in mind that these
forms are not in the first instance as such categories of reason. Hegel is
stating in this part (and in the succeeding part) the elements which are for
understanding per se, the content of finite knowledge, knowledge as it is
determined by understanding, Taken by; itself therefore it embodies, as we
shall see presently, no philosophical conclusions; it is the work of
'isolated',limiting, finiting reflexion, not of philosophical reflexion,
reflexion which we saw was purely negative. These categories are thus not
uUl ' ' ' * "/ jfitT i r a..* """t. faf-i .ft > f
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real identities but formal identities; not identities which are at once
subjective and objective, but identities which contain no inner difference,
no inner opposition. They are not relative identities, in the sense we
defined above, but identities which as against each other are absolutely
fixed. These realities therefore, which though opposed are for speculation
identical, are taken in such formal identities of understanding to be
qualitatively different and each merely self—identical. And these finite
forms are reflexions from the absolute, the one light of the absolute is
passed through the angular prism of finitude; all reality is thus broken
up by it and separated into finite elements. But such finite determinations
are only ideally^ opposed to each other by understanding; they are not
real opposites, for real opposites understanding cannot construe; this can,
as vre saw, only be done by reason.
In the second part of the logic similarly we are still concerned with
finite knowledge, 'isolated reflexion', understanding as such* In this
part are considered the subjective forms of finitude, i.e. finite thought
itself, understanding and its processes. These are the usual forms of
concept, judgment and syllogism. It is in the first instance the concept,
judgment and syllogism in their purely formal character, that he has here
in view. He does use the torn concept (Begriff) as applicable to the
CD
By 'ideal* must here be understood abstract as opposed to concrete.
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absolute Itself, and employs the expression 'absolute concept' in this
C1)
reference; and again he treats judgment as an unconscious identity of
(2)
reason. out it is not concept and judgment as elements of reason that
he deals with in this part of the logic. It is the finite limited
concept, and judgment, formal, 'fixed', unreal (i.e. unphilosophioal), He
expressly points out that although syllogism expresses more clearly the
nature and character of reason, and is indeed commonly ascribed to reason,
still in this part of the logic he means syllogism as a formal process of
thought, as it is for finite knowledge for understanding. Such a syllogism
does not express speculative truth any more than the concept of understand*
ing is equal to the nature of the absolute. To apprehend the absolute
(3)
identity we must in fact remove it from the sphere of such concepts.
In the third part is stated the relation of reason to the foregoing
forms of finite knowledge. The first and second parts contain no reference
whatever to reason; they state simply facts concerning finite knowledge,)
the actual modes in which it appears. By its nature it cannot express
philosophical truth, and it is therefore not until we come to this third ;'
I I I
part that we enter upon philosophy; for only here have we knowledge of or
by reason. But it is only knowledge (by reason) of this finite knowledge,
CD (2) CD
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is only therefore as we have seen purely negative in character, it is
'negative knowledge of reason', it sublates finite knowledge by bringing
it into a new relation, which is at once truer than the relations of finite
knowledge as such, and the only true knowledge which the finite forms can
really possess. This new relation is the relation to the absolute identity.
Here then we have philosophical reflexion as contrasted with the isolated
finite reflexion of the first two parts of the logic. Here as we saw the
identities are 'relative identities', the opposites real oiposites. Reason
seises upon concept, judgment and syllogism, destroys their limited
character as they are for understanding, gives them the content and characte:
of the-absolute, and thus elevates them into expressions of infinite truth.
In this reference the concept as an expression for the absolute, becomes
the 'principle of opposition and the opposition itself,' the one concept
which differentiates itself into a plurality of determinate concepts, and
yet remains one throughout the plurality,So again of judgment. In
it the identity of reason is unconscious, but it is still operative in it an<
is in fact expressed by the copula 'is', though by this copula it is not
explicitly uttered. Rather this copula tends to obscure the reason element
(2)
and in judgment we find the predominance of difference. And syllogism







expression of the nature of the identity of reason.
This third part closes the logic. He mentions indeed that there is
usually given an 'a:plied* logic; but the content of this he holds to be
partly too general and trivial, and to be, so far as it contains any
philosophical significance, a part of the third division of the logic. The
third part introduces us to the metaphysic or to 'philosophy proper', where
we have the knowledge of reason per se, the sphere of the true Idea, the
the union of thought and being, reflexion and 4^3chauung.^^ The
distinction therefore of logic from metaphysic is, at least formally,
definite and decided. He maintains it consistently and explicitly not
(g)
merely in this sketch but elsewhere. And he does not strictly
coordinate logic with metaphysic as equally parts of philosophy; two parts
of logic as was pointed out have no immediate philosophical significance.
(3)
Logic he says expressly is in a sense an introduction to philosophy.
This view of logic however, while it obviously is justified in a manner by
the conception of its subject-matter and that of philosophy, must be
accepted in the light of his present treatment of logie and metaphysic,
Hegel admits that he takes this distinction between the two, which has been
(4)
so long maintained, for*the sake of its convenience.* It had been
customary apparently to make that distinction in philosophy, and to consider
(1) (2) (3) (4)
wJ I. 356. e.g. W. I, 181: 324. ,Ros. 191. Ros. 190,
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one as introductory to the other. Hegel adopted it as a convenient method
of oistinguisning problems in philosophy, but pointed out in so many
words that if logic is to be so considered then it must, to be an
introduction to speculative science, be treated speculatively. He thus at
once preserves historical usage and his own view of the subject. Hence the
logic is not introductory in the sense that per se it is outside
philosophy; this it cannot be for one part of it is knowledge of reason.
Rather it is a first stage in philosophy.
What philosophy, 'transcendental knowledge,* and metaphysic, to which
logic in that sense is introductory, has to accomplish, we have perhaps
sufficiently stated already. 'It has,' Hegel says, 'previously to construe
completely the principle of all philosophy' i.e. absolute identity, the
union of thought and being, of subject and object. This is the essence of
philosophy as of every true science; this is in philosophy the 'highest
Idea', the 'pure Idea.' Or "The essence of knowledge consists .in the
identity of universal and particular;, i.e. of what is posited under the
(1)
form of thought and of being." In it all the content of philosophy
(of logic, of T$nschauung) is taken up and presented in its pure absolute
form, determined by its relation to the absolute identity. And such a
philosophy is necessarily Idealism, because' it takes neither of the
(1)
W. I. 324: 356. XVI. Scepticism ad fin.
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opposites contained in the identity (subject, object, etc.) abstracted from
each other, but holds its highest Idea, its idea of Reason par excellence,
as determining both indifferently, each being by itself unreal.^
When vre seek more definite knowledge as to how this system can be
exhibited and what precisely its result would be we can furnish from the
(*)
.remains at our disposal no accurate answer. We can however state that the
conclusion reached in such a system, its final result is conceived in a
distinctly Schellingian form. The 'highest Idea' he says, is 'die Naoht
e- (2)♦ v ' I <11 i ^ jdes gottlichen Mystjriums.* 'Speculation,' he says, 'demands, in its
highest synthesis of the conscious and the unconscious, the negation of
consciousness itself. And thereby reason buries its reflexion of the
absolute identity, and its knowledge as well as its very- self in its own
(3)abyss.'v - There is doubtless a certain degree of mere metaphor in such
phraseology, though its philosophical purport is quite evident; it is indeec
the legitimate consequence of his principle of absolute identity. And it i£
of significance and importance in view of that relation of philosophy and
religion in Hegel, already noted, that such a conception is in ontire
agreement with his attitude in religion, where the principle of resignation,
with its abandonment of self, its negation of all'subjectivity' and
(4)
reference to self is held to be fundamental.
CD (2) (3)
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It will now have become evident from the foregoing statement that
Hegel in this period has made a decided advance in his conception of the
Ithe
nature m)logic. We have it is true no systematic exposition of his view,
but we have sufficient to enable us to appreciate the distance he has
travelled from his earlier position. It remains for us now to conclude
this survey of his second period by bringing into relief the main features
which chacterise this advance. We must also indicate briefly in what
essential respects he' differed from his chief immediate predecessors, a
difference which in this'period he has .already insisted upon in his
criticisms of Kant Pichte etc. And finally vre must point out in what
direction his further development proceeds during the next period, the
result of which finds its expression in the Larger Logic.
We would, to begin with, lay emphasis on four prominent and important
results arrived at in this period which chiefly exhibit in what respects
he advanced on the preceding. These are I. the acquisition of a
determining fundamental philosophical conception, II. the ascertainment of
the nature and procedure of the instrument of philosophising, III. the
closer approximation of logic to metaphysic, through the assimilation of
their content, IV. the naming of the method to be employed in constructing
a system. In virtue of the first—named feature Hegel gains an independence
of attitude in philosophy which places him outside the direct influence of
traditional or current philosophy. The mere repetition of the results of
others which was found in the early period is now no longer possible or
necessary. He has made up his mind as to what the nature of philosophy is,
what is its fundamental principle, a principle which is not only that of a
particular philosophy, but is that of all philosophy whatsoever. He does
not profess to work out a system. He is rather content to exhibit this
principle throughout the history of philosophy than to construct an entirely
(1)
new system. Prom this point of view he starts and by it he judges all
that has appeared as philosophy. The principle is not expounded fully and
requires: more exact determination,which however it does not receive in this
period. In identity which is the ground and unity of all opposites, that
which reason, (whose identity it is and which determines the activity of
reason,) seeks to exhibit at the end of its procedure as the essence of all
opposed finite elements, is assuredly a wide enough designation for all
that philosophy has done or seeks to do. But it was doubtless natural that
Hegel in stating this principle for the first time should have laid emphasis
rather on the unity, the identity of import in all systems than on their
special differences. And, though this principle receives modification and a
more definite content later on, its remains none the less in its general
form a fundamental position in his system to the last.




or at any time a principle from which to regard philosophy in its inmost
nature and in its history, it is necessarily also a principle by reference'
to which all the concepts of philosophy come to possess a really
philosophical meaning at all. And if we keep these prima facie quite
distinct spheres, to which this same principle applies, clearly in view,
we will see how easy »it was for Hegel to take up the position, which he as
a matter of fact does later on, of finding the actual counterpart of the
sequence of the concepts of the logic in the history of philosophy itself.
It was a common principle which determined the content of both; why then
should there not be an exact parallelism between the two? We seem there¬
fore warranted in finding one of the clues by which Hegel determined the
order and place in the sequence of the concepts of the logic in this
conception of the nature of philosophy and the significance of its history,
For, we may, in passing-, note again, Hegel was thoroughly acquainted with
the history of philosophy before he wrote the Phanomenologie, 1806—7,
and the logic did not begin to appear till 1812. He thus knew what the .
forms were in which the one principle of philosophy had appeared in the
course of its history. What more natural than the suggestion that these
had a necessary sequence? that this sequence was a logical one, (in his
later meaning of logic)? and that thus they afford a clue to determinigg
the sequence of the concepts, in the logic as such., and oven put the
thinker on the track of discovering the law of this sequence?
V
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It. is further of importance to note that Hegel does not work up to
this principle which governs his philosophy; it is simply his starting-
point, and fundamental notion; it arises from his conception of the need
and function of philosophy in life, but has no other 'presupposition* and .
no other warrant as a principle. The significance of this lies in the
fact that his system thus necessarily vrorks from that principle which is
at once its conclusion and goal as well as its starting place. And
hence it is that the specific character which the philosophic method all
along assumes is as he calls it 'deductive.* It could not be otherwise
with such a beginning. He did not seem to think it necessary to
establish his principle in the sense of give a ground for it; the.only
proof of which it admitted was to be found when it was systematically
worked out and completely presented, i.e. at the end of the system, not at
the beginning^ Indeed it would be futile to try to prove or establish his
principle in any other way, as we have already pointed out. And this modus
operandi, here for the first time clearly expressed, remains permanent in
Hegel*s philosophy.
Thus we see that the securing of a definite point of view can remove
two prominent defects of the preceding period, 1. the indeterminateness of
the content of his scheme, and its arbitrary acceptance of traditional
ideas, 2. the absence of connectedness in the content owing to
the lack of a central determining point of reference, the various
97.
conceptions cannot be 'deduced.*
Again the accurate analysis of the procedure of philosophy, the
ascertainment of the significance of reason, of reflexion, of Anschauung
goes very far indeed to obviate the obscurities and remove the inadequacies
of his early view* It is clearly of the first importance as a preliminary
to the conctrubtion of any system, that the fundamental terms, the primary
factors and functions necessary to that construction should be generally
defined* This determination however does not give us the system itself;
it is merely an essential to it.
Hegel again does not cannect these factors systematically with each
other; they are no more than definitely formulated, and in this sense are
used throughout all his criticism of his predecessors. And this analysis
has not merely a value for the accurate construction of a system; the
definition thereby given to the terms ^the nature of the content
of the system. Formerly we saw Hegel had distinguished the form from
*
the matter in knowledge, the form of knowledge from knowledge itself,
thought from being. In the second period these different factors are
identified, and the determination of the above terms signalises this
identification, which, though its form is changed, remains permanently in
Hegel's system.
Reflexion is a process which operates through and by means of this
identification; it is a reflexion of opposites, which are relatively
identical, are what they are by sharing in» being determined by, the one
08.
identity of reason. It is unnecessary to do more than point out the ex¬
treme importance of this step, which not merely gives a greater definite—
ness , precision, and consistency to Hegel*s thinking than was found in his
early view hut stamps Hegel's thinking ever after as i.n ■ sgeSfiagpBa
'IdentitHts-philosophie.' For example it is simply this same notion of
identity of opposites which appears when in the later logic the universals
of thought the categories are at the same time determinations of reality
(of the object, Gegenstand) or when opposed categories are viewed as
moments of their own unity.
We must not however import more into his present position than is
warranted. Reflexion, for example, must not be taken to be the#dialectic^
<***■ tfcJ- • &4- h ft.
/ and it must be viewed also as dealing, like the latter, with what is both
4^
form and content, both thought and being. But unlike the latter y) it has
».
not as such a positive side, it does not conserve the negated factors,'
i?•/the negation is produced by relating each to the absolute identity, i.e.
is produced by what in the first instance is external to the process of
reflexion itselfthe positive side of 'philosophical knowledge* is
referred to another sphere, that of ^nschauung. As a matter of fact the
39.
word 'dialectic* is hardly used at all in this period. No doubt it would
have been in agreement both with his own previous and with current
terminology to have used it as a designation for the process of reflexion
(l)
in the sense already defined. And from this point of view he could well
have called logic as understood in this period, logic of reason
(Vernunftlogik); dialectic. We vrould JUtus however have to
|«i /»>* »&*t.
distinguish this general use of the term dialectic from the later *noiro .
(m
^sg3B»ge and specific isense, we are entitled to find in
reflexion as defined in this period the source, the immediate forecaste of
the later dialectic.) If fffliil, VT t:~4 Hf "if ft-f
IrAi tiHX To this however we shall presently return.
The divergencies from his early views already stated necessitate a <}•:,-nj
change which is also an advance in his schemes o^metaphysie. We
are hardly justified in constituting a point-by-point comparison between
the conceptions of the two periods. We cannot find so accurate a
correspondence between them. The previous doctrine of is
simply supplanted by the third part of the new logic; there is very little
connection or similarity discoverable between them. The second parts of
both logics do indeed correspond somewhat closely; the later seems
unquestionably a more definite and precise form of the earlier. In the case
(1)
cp. W. I. 366-7.
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of the first parts however we are not entitled to affirm a close
similarity, owing to the absence of any detailed discussion of this part in
the.logic of the second period. Doubtless the content of the two must
have been similar, but to what extent we cannot fully determine. Doth
contain forms and categories of reality; but whereas in the early logic
these are categories of *being% in the second logic they are categories
(laws) of finitude in general, both in a subjective and objective reference.
Both again regard the subject matter of logic to belong to understanding;
■but while the early logic is merely logic of understanding, and is
illuminated by no analysis of understanding and its relation to reason,
the second logic can be only in part viewed as a logic of understanding,
contains one division devoted solely to the work of reason, and can in
virtue of the close.connection between reason and understanding as already
determined be considered as (entirely a logic of reason. This is as we saw
in virtue of the nature of reflexion, with which logic deals, and in which
the distinction between knowledge,^thought] and being, (a distinction
vital to the early logic) is removed.
It is an obvious and necessary result of all this that logic should in
this period become metaphysical, that the only distinction which obtains
between the two should fall inside metaphysic itself. The distinction in
fact is that between reason as primarily negative and reason as both
positive and negative at once, reason in relation with finitude as such,
f
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and reason as dealing with its 'Infinite* content, the absolute identity.
And this approximation of logic and metaphysio is of vital
significance. Metaphysic itself comes to be dealt with in terminology which
. OJholds directly of logic. The use of such terms as 'absolute notion*
(Begriff), 'absolute Idea' (Idee) for the identity of reason indicates this.
All that is required to bring his later position clearly into view is a stil!
further criticism of his terms, and a more thorough systematisation of his
fundamental ideas.
; Finally we have the method characterised by which Hegel would establish
his philosophical system. This method is described as development. As was
already stated we have no complete exposition of the nature and moaning of
this method, or^of how it actually works in detail. That it should have beei
named development's a decided advance in precision of method on the previous
period, indicates the form in which his system would appear, and points the
direction his further advance will take. The conception of a developmental
method (as distinct from the purely "deductive" method of Fichte and in part
of Schelling) was in all probability suggested by Schelling's "Transcenden-
t-0
talctldealismuis", where 'philosophy' is stated to be^ and^expounded as the
'history of the steps or epochs of self-eonsciousness', a history which starts
from a position 'deduced* as fundamental necessary and indubitable and
"allows the various acts" of self-consciousness to "arise" in a series
f(J /L- MrSrf C-^ AL
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representing grades of complexity and explioitness of self-consciousness^
More than the general connection we cannot, owing to the incompleteness of
our resources, indicate.
In all these ways then Hegel has made distinct and ascertainable
progress on his early view. For the rest, it is not difficult to discover
the defects and incompleteness of his views at this period and the next
steps of advance. -But before doing so it will be well to state as briefly
as possible the nature of the relation to his greater contemporaries more
especially to Schelling, which his views at this time exhibit. We say
'briefly*, because such a statement is rather of the nature of a
- i E ">.] Jx^Vfcv*. (liUMMM-
digression from our main subject^and Hililli#» Hegel's views at this time
are too generally stated to admit of an indication of any more than
general affinities (or the reverse) between Hegel and his contemporaries.
(1)
v. Trans. Ideal." Absch. III. . V*rerrin. XII. ad fin: also preface.
/ 6 3
We are not left in much doubt regarding Hegel's attitude during this
period towards his immediate contemporaries. His main contributions to the
"Critical Journal"were critical and expository discussions of their
positions. It is important however to bear in mind that in these statements
he is concerned primarily and indeed almost entirely with the fundamental
%~> 5
conceptions of the various systems rather than with^detailf
he deals with their principles in the broadest and most general outline*
not with particular parts of their system, or special developments of their
! principle. Hence we will not find^and cannot expect^that much direct light
is thrown on the^ treatment of the nature and content, of Logic by the
examination to which he subjects those systems. The main interest for us
of his criticisms lies in their accentuation of the central and fundamental
principle -which he had by this time gained for himself, in the confirmation
we thereby find of the exposition we have given of that principle, and the
TOefc&j- into which it is brought by contrast with the positions he
criticises. They merely signalise his attainment of a governing conception
and his triumphant confidence in its truth; and perhaps too in a distant
manner suggest the future system into which that conception will develop.
la all of them, we must observe at the outset, he found the recognition
of the same general "speculative idea", the ultimate identity of subject and
object. It was not this conception in its general form which separated
'
Fiehte from Schelling, and both from Kant or Jacobi. It was the manner in
which this principle was grasped and expressed by each, the completeness
JOi*
and explicitness with which the full meaning of that idea was maintained
and exhibited in their several systems, which distinguished the one thinker
from another. This principle he himself shared with all these thinkers; it
is his own clear and complete conception of its nature which is the basis
of his criticism or of his interpretation. His attitude towards all of
them is thus at once sympathetic and critical; his criticism is, true to his
unvarying method of treatment, essentially immanent.
Towards Kant and Fiehte he takes up a position primarily antagonistic
and negative. The genuine speculative^ element in Kant Hegel finds in the
problem^ and in the solution offered to the problem "how are synthetic a
priori judgments possible." The very expression of this problem indicates
and implies the ground idea of the unity, the "identity of subject and
(2)
predicate particular and universal, being, and thought. ' This unity is
not a product of these opposites, but the original and absolute identity of
them, from which in fact they sunder themselves. The judgment formed from
them is just the original and primal dividing, or severing (Ur-teil) of the
elements in the unity. The possibility of this union lies ihre^orr; the
idea it expresses is an idea of reason. This original and ultimate princi¬
ple of unity appears in Kant*3 Kritik in various forms. It is found in the
^Speculation means henceforward for Hegel the scientific comprehen¬
sion of the Absolute qu& Absolute, a science -which starts from and deals
with all reality from the point of view and vantage-ground of the Absolute,




'synthetic unity of apperception', 'productive imagination', 'category',
'scheme', as also in 'the forms of intuition' Space and Time. In all these
forms it is one and the same conception that is dominant and actually
present. They describe different functions, but functions of one and the
we are to explain and justify Kant's insistence on the concrete character
(2)
of knowledge, on the reciprocal necessity of '^nschauung* to 'Begriff*.
Unless again we regard the 'original synthetic unity of apperception',
not as a go-between, not as a meeting-place for an isolated subject existing
on one side and a world of objects on the other, but as the primal and
absolute unity out of which, as from their ultimate germ subject and object
proceed and in proceeding sunder themselves apart, it is quite impossible
this reason then we must distinguish between the merely logical Ego which
'accompanies' presentations, and this all constituting unity of the subject
with its object; we must separate the one from that of the other to give
meaning to Kant's position. All that Kant establishes regarding the con¬
crete character of experience, its unity, follows consistently from this
his fundamental position, and justifies the above interpretation of his
meaning.
same unity of reason (1) It is in the light of this ultimate unity that
CD (2) C3)
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Still Kant himself did not fully comprehend the significance of his
own essential conception. Instead of explicitly talcing that identity in
its truth its valid and ultimate meaning, that is as a concrete identity
with diverse aspects, as the concrete'final Idea, reason—constituted, and
reason-determined, where the diverse elements were explicit|dly and un¬
equivocally posited as identical, because moments in that ono primary
unity, Kant held by that unity simply and solely in the form in which it
appeared in judgment, where the divided dual elements are exhibited and
maintained only in their duality. For in the judgment what is insisted on
is primarily and indeed solely the diversity of the content; and for Kant
the judgment is the primary form of knowledge. Productive imagination vfhich
(1)
is the proximate ground of judgments, and is in fact understanding,
remains,(though in reality a pulse, a funotion, a potency of reason itself j)
sunk in diversity. The. absolute unity therefore never comes to light. The
identity, the universal which it contains vis: the category, remains for
ever over—against, opposed to the particular with which in judgment it is
united by the copula. The identity therefore is merely a relative formal
abstract identity. The other element, the particular, does not exist in it,
it comes to it, as a foreign element from without, which is necessary to it, {




understanding and sense, of universal and particular, of notion and
intuition is never completely and adequately established. Hence arise the
'thing-in—itself', the 'limitation of reason', the emphasis on 'human'
reason, the dialectic of 'pure* reason, the "^fixed and insurmountable
opposition between freedom and necessity etc. In all this Hegel finds
nothing but the consequences of his limited and erroneous conception of
the nature of that ultimate unity which it was 'his great merit' to have
laid bare. Not that Kant id not forced in spite of himself to be truer to
his own principle than his determination of it will logically allow. The
Idea of an "Intuitive understanding", for example, is the same idea as
that ofl transcendental (productive) imaginative; and such an understanding
Kant declares to be 'necessary.' Though he rejects the 'real' necessity of
it while admitting the conceptual necessity^'problematic* reality of it; yet
:J the bare admission of it shows his transcendence of his own limitations,
£
while the rejection of the absolute validity of the conception was after
♦
all dae, Hegel thinks, to his resolution to be limited, subjective and
c (1)
consistent with his finite formal position. Or again his emphatic
I insistence on the' autojaony and spontaneity of reason likewise carries Kant
beyond his restricted views; for this conception is in flat contradictionSr
i with the assertion of the necessity of an opposed non—rational element





over against and therefore limiting that freedom of reason. How oan
reason be free and autoraonous, if by its very necessities it is for ever
limited and hampered, modified snd;it may be, even indirectly guided in its
activity by this foreign material?
Hence, Hegel concludes, Want's scheme though certainly in principle
(2)
Idealism (i.e. a construction from and of the identity of opposites ) is
nothing more than merely formal Idealism. It contains the principle of
the absolute unity of opposites, of reason-knowledge, but by its restriction
to knowledge of understanding alone, ("finite"knowledge), to knowledge which
remains riveted to the diverse counter-posed elements of the one Reality,
(3)
instead of being genuine Idealism it becomes rather dualism. Its
"critical Idealism" consists in nothing but the knowledge that Ego and things
(4)
remain each fixed by themselves and unreconciled. The whole content
of the philosophy is not knowledge of the absolute at all, but knovfledge
of mere subjectivity a criticism of the faculty of knowledge; a revised
(5)
Lockeanism.
Mow. from the foregoing criticism of Kant we can gather with some
accuracy some of Hegel's own conceptions concerning the content of logic and
aetaphysic, which at once extend and accentuate what we have already
presented as his views at this period. We see at once how the above is a
(1) (2) (3) (4)




review of Kant in the light of a pronounced philosophical principle, which
transforms the notions and principles of Kant to its own purposes in the
belief that the principle of Kant is thereby most truly conserved. "A
priori" ceases to have the subjective 'nuance' which it has in Kant, its
meaning is convertible with 'absolute identity'; 'universal and necessary a
prion* means rooted in the reality of the one identity of reason ; it is
reason which has a priority not understanding as such. So again Hegel seems
prepared to accept Kant's notions as far as they go, as expressions or forms
of the absolute identity itself; but they are no longer mere notions of
, ^
understanding but finite!, fixed, limited notions of reason . Kant's
Logic ceases therefore at a single stroke to be regarded merely as a
subjective human apparatus for putting the tangled complexity of the world
into harmonious order, and becomes essentially constitutive of reality,
becomes at once objective and immanently determinant of it. And with this
comes the introduction of notions of both subjectivity and objectivity, as
we have already noted^^Hence further it is in the same line of transforma¬
tion that since the notions of Kant are notions of reason for Ilegel, and rea¬
son is-the ground identity J. the absolute reality, Kant's 'transcendental'
CD (2)
I. 21, 24, 32 etc. Kant himself deserves the great credit,
according to Hegel, of not limiting reason to the forms of finitude; but
rather placing reason' as such above and beyond it.' I. 57.
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Logic should cease to be that which states 'the conditions under which
experience is alone possible,* and become a 'metaphysical* Logic which
exhibits the ground notions of all reality; and that in general
'transcendental* should cease to have the limited meaning it has in Kant,
and become in every sense synonymous with 'metaphysical,* And finally we
XSme indicated how the possible knowledge of the absolute the reason
knowledge (which Hegel does not give but which he all along implies or
hints at) could be brought about. Such knowledge is no more than implicit
in Kant. But Kant's error just lay in restricting himself solely to
judgment as the form of philosophical knowledge. Hence the direction in
which true final reason-knowledge can alone lie is in that form of
knowledge which completes the judgment by making entirely explicit by
thorough the identity it implies. That form is the
(1)
syllogism. It is here that we have most clearly expressed and exhibited
(2)
that 'triplieity which is the germ of speculation* , and which it is one
of Kant's merits to have disclosed. It is in virtue of this triple content
and character of the one 'Idea*, that there is and can be no ultimate
CD
I. 24, 26, With this may be mentioned the thesi3 defended by Hegel
at his 'Habititation* in Jena: "Syllogismus est principium Idealisimi."
(Leben 157); but too much stress cannot in the nature of the case be laid








The above views vrhich 'nave now become fundamental for Hegel agree
clearly enough with the content of the Logic of this period which we have
already given. But they do more than this; they indicate the direction any
further development on his part would be sure to take. 7Iith~~Fiohte too
Hegel stands in decided opposition; an opposition which he is never weary
j
of reiterating. The ground of his opposition is precisely the same as in the
case of Kant, and the criticism only differs slightly from that of the
latter. For Fichte the primal principle and ground-fact i3 the Ego, :
Subjectivity, Thought, inward Self-consciousness. This is the absolute,
the Identity. So far his principle is idealistic, and so far it is genuine
speculation. But it is of the essence of his conception that (£he) nothing
more lies in the Ego than the subjective content of the Ego, Hence all the
detailed content which the object possesses comes externally to this mere ;
CD
abstract * empty* form of Reality. Or to put it in other words the
objectivity has no self—subsistence, no reality on a level with the reality
\
of the subject; object is dependent on it, and even produced and brought
forward by it. This being so the identity is not an identity of both
subject and object but an identity of subject only; the object does not




constituted by the subject. The whole system of Pichte therefore remains
rooted in subjectivity alone; and the very reality of the objective world
which he set out to explain does not.possess the substantiality necessary to
warrant any explanation of it; in short objectivity per se is not explained
at all. So far as this principle has content, that content is subjective
only, 'sensation', 'intuition', 'feeling', 'impulse'; and these and their
(1)
complexities constitute all that objectivity means for Pichte. And thi3
remains true not merely in the theoretical construction of Reality, but in
the complementary or supplementary realisation of the objective sense-world
through practical act of pure will. For here too there is nothing but
subjectivity to start with, and out of subjectivity it does not pass, and
(2)
eannot by its own logic pass. There is thus on Fichte's view no absolute
Identity; there is only a relative identity, that of the subject and its
content; there can indeed hardly be said to be an identity at all for the
ultimate faGt is a merely formal principle and the particular the filling in
is and remains external to it, or forced into U. oJr extra. There is no
objective content; nature is only sense-content, and has no subsistency of
its own. The absolute identity therefore does not contain diversity of
content, but rather one order of content into which the other i3 simply






relation and by reference to the empirical subject/1'' The whole
principle is therefore merely formal; its content limited, its reality
solely subjective.
Again when we consider its method similar imperfection is found. That
method consists in what is called 'Deduction.' Its nature is in point^of
fact a result and an implicit recognition of the finitude and incomplete¬
ness of the fundamental principle. For the ultimate primal and universal
truth and certainty, pure Egoity, pure self—consciousness, is admitted to
be itself incomplete; it is limited by another from which it is and must
(2-1
be abstracted in order to be obtained as ultimate principle. But this
limitation is a conditionedness which in order to become absolute, the one
identity, it must overcome, and overcome by embracing that other. The
recognition of this conditionedness and thereby of the necessity of passing
over to the other, of supplementing the incompleteness, of filling up the
empty and abstract principle is the nerve of this "deduction" of the one out
(3)
of the other. That other stands in absolute contrary opposition; it is
non-Ego. It therefore is and remains in itself foreign to that which it
supplements. The deduction is not the result of an analysis of a content;
but rather of the absence of any content at all; it is the result of a want,








all except itself, of objectivity in general; objectivity is to pure
knowledge a mere minus. The deduction consists in taking up again that
which was abstracted from, and attaching it on to the pure notion; in short
changing the sign in the process, changing the minus into a plus. It is as
if one he.d spent one's money and had nothing left but an empty purse; then
proceeded to deduce money from the fact of the empty purse^the sole meaning
of the empty purse just consisting in the absence of money.^
It is true that this completion cannot be recognised without the idea
of the totality from which the abstraction is ma.de. And there again lies
the error of the whole-.procedure. For if this is so, then why was the
absolute merely subjectively conceived; why was merely one term of the
identity, one part of the whole taken as absolute? Why was the start and
the construction not made from the whole itself, from the underlying unity?
vi
The only reason apparently w«as that this part, this subjectivity has
immediate empirical certainty and truth, truth which every one can accept at
(2)
once. Since however Fichte restricts himself to this partial reality and
yet insists on completing it, by passing to another and from this again to
another, it is clear that this process by its very nature, if the objective
world is to be gathered into the fold of the Ego, go on ad infinitum. No





ever remain still one outside the fold; for without that other still to
seek the Ego would cease to be itself. ' The totality therefore is never
really attained; it continues as always what is to be attained; the complete
identity the absolute unity which is the goal of philosophical endeavour
U)
remains only an unfulfilled 'ought', a 'sollen.'
From all this therefore, and the above contains the essential errors
(2)
in the scheme, Hegel concludes that by Fichte's principle and method
absolute knowledge can never be attained. Fichte's idealism is an
entirely barren knowledge; a mere 'formal idealism'. It is no true
knowledge, which must begin from the absolute, and the absolute is not an
abstraction, nor incomplete, nor a part. Its idealism is indeed like Kant's
a kind of dualism; its identity its principle of unity is the merely
relative principle of determination of one by an other, a casual connection
of'one with the other. An insurmountable opposition is the essence of its
content and method; contradiction and not the resolution of contradiction
(3)
is its inevitable result.
It is evident then that Hegel's differences from Fichte are based
on the same grounds as in the case of Kant, and that the correction of
Fichte's principle and method are to be found in the fuller and more
concrete appreciation of the absolute Identity on the one hand and by the
(1)1. 117. (2)1. 117, 123.
(3)
e.g. that between freedom and necessity. I. 127-8.
Hi
use of 'true intellectual Anschauung* as the instrument of systematisa—
(D
m .tion. This we found already established.
It Is significant for the understanding of the development which Hegel
thinks at this time philosophy should undergo, and for the actual
realisation of -which we may reasonably infer Hegel now (1802) intended,
(2
or had already actually begun, to set himself to labour, that he considers
that with. Kant,. Pichte and Jacobi an epoch in the development of' the new
principle of speculation has exhausted and completed itself. For in all
these that principle has been conceived and expressed in a one-sided,
limited, incomplete form, and all possible variations of that single form
common to- them all have been exhibited by them. That form is subjectivity,
the idealism in all three is grounded on a restricted reference to one sid^
one pole of the absolute identity, that of the subject; their idealism is
nothing more than the dogmatic metaphysic of subjectivity. In all of them
the one primal reality is the subject; the objective world becomes mere
appearance (Kant) or affection, determination of the sensibility of the
subject (Fichte), or merely that whose reality is supported by and
(3) ■
conditioned on belief (Jacobi). In all of them the absolute as such, as
absolute identity is a mere beyond, for Kant a Ding an sioh, for Fichte a
(1) (2) (3)
I. 123. I. 155 ff. The separate consideration of
Jacobi*s fundamental ideas would yield no more light on Hegel's position and
can be here dispensed with. cp. I. 119-120, 156.
//?
pollen, for Jaoobi a Glauben (for Glauben is the condition both of the
(1)
objective world and of the absolute per. se ). In Kant the absolute
Identity is a mere thought^a mere form of objectivity, is not actually
realised by and in that which for him is the fundamental element the
notion, the form, the universal. In Jacobi the opposition found in
experience is only overcome by what is beyond for knowledge, and the
attainment of this beyond which is to reconcile opposites is merely
subjective, it is a belief, a 'yearning'.. Fiehte then is a union of the
bare formal objectivity of Kant with the yearning the mere subjectivity of
Jacbbi, in the form of a 'demand*; which however is still not an absolute
(3)
identity but still confined to subjectivity. Thus these three exhaust
the possibilities of this one-sided conception of the principle of Idealism,
without satisfying the needs of absolute knowledge. Their system begins and
remains in the process of reflexion, of relativity, of duality, of
diversity; and this characterises their entire exposition. It is because
I i
these forms of philosophy complete the cycle of systems based on the
'absoluteness of finitude', and rooted in the one-sidedness and limitation
(3)
which characterises a time of culture, discipline, development (Bildung) ,
that a true philosophy may be expected to rise to its full completeness
through and by way of the negation of the absoluteness of their positions.
(1) (2) " (3)
I. 102 ff. 8. 116-7, I. 155—6.
And the time for the appearance of such a development of philosophy has
L°0
now come, says Hegel. Hot that the negation of those systems means their
annihilation; they contain what is of essential philosophical significance.
For in ""fcln&w- thought, by that ceaseless process of negation of opposition
and finitude,. is recognised to be, what it in truth is, infinite, 'the
negative side of the absolute.' May we not fairly discover in all this the
words of the herald who was himself to become the apostle of Absolute
Idealism?
The disagreement which Hegel shows with the positions of the thinkers
above considered is based upon principles explicitj^ly and consciously in
harmony with those of Schelling. That connexion is so close in form and
expression at this time that it would involve needless repetition to state
and compare their several positions. We find the same general conception
(l)
of the nature and meaning of the absolute identityv ; the preservation of
(2)
both opposites alongside the negation of each per se ; the dividing,
(3)
negative function of reflexion : the character of the absolute as the
(4)
"the indifference-point" of subject and object and the
9*
difference betvreen subject abd object simply quantitative, duo to a
(5)
'preponderance' of the real over the ideal factor. It is to be observed
(1) (3) (3)
(5)
I. 250 ff. I. 251. I. zsz.
(4)






however that vre have only grounds for asserting a general community of
principle; further comparison of views of Hegel with those of Sohelling,
beyond what can be gathered from what we have already stated, is not open
to us. Their logic and metaphysic would presumably be the same in content
for Hegel remarks, both Pichte and Schelling in their respective ways had
like himself attempted to state in some systematic form Logic or
(1)
Speculative Philosophy* The difference of treatment between Hegel and
Schelling on these points, so far at least as discoverable, is that Hegel
deals confessedly with logic as a distinct and separate discipline of
philosophy and acknowledges its importance; while Schelling fuses logic
(?)with metaphysic proper. J' This difference between them seems of less
importance at first sight than it really is; for we shall see that it is
just the separation of problems regarded as identical by Schelling, that
ig»»an to be characteristic of Hegel's own system.
Other instances of divergence between them, of a more pronounced and
deliberate kind, can also be found to exist at this time, alongside the
general ostensible agreement. There is a difference in the conception of
method in the two cases, a point on which Hegel laid ever increasing
importance as he proceeded. Hegel's fundamental conception is that of




in 'Trans.Totalis » .'
flo
the later with the earlier steps in the process. Applications of this we
have already had to a certain very limited extent in these schemes or
sketches of schemes of philosophy and its parts which we had so far stated.
The fuller consciousness of its importance grew with his intellectual
development till he finally arrived at that conception of the method which
he could and did regard as the very pulse—beat of the life of absolute
truth, its only final medium of expression. It is the lack of development
(ll
which he considers the primary defect in Scholling's system. And this
is easily seen to be true of Schelling's system as exhibited in the work
which had appeared just before Itegel came to Jena the "Transcendental
Idealismns." There is connection for there is both "deduction" and
"construction" in the system; but there is no development in any proper
sense of the term. Like Fichte, Schelling starts from what he calls
fundamental supreme principles and from these as the highest, ultimata
of speculative knowledge proceeds to educe or deduce the remaining content
of the system as derivative though of course constitutive and necessary
elements in the whole. This is the reverse of a developmental method.
And moreover there is no inner connectedness of part with part; there is
the connection of a single purpose in the system, but not the objective




'Maehtspruch of an external agent that the whole obeys an ordered plan.
These and similar defects of method (and it would be easy to discover others
would be readily perceptible to Hegel, to whoa system was second nature,
and for whom the significance of development was becoming ever more
manifest.
And indeed he did not rest content with merely recognising this defect
in a general way; we find some indication of his views regarding the
function of development in the 'system of Identity' mentioned in the only
(1)article in which at this time he deals with Schelling. He there points
out that while the two philosophical sciences of Intelligence and of Nature
are both sciences of the content of Identity, yet because the content of
each is itself, the one Identity, the sciences cannot be.left side by side
and opposed but 'must be regarded as forming one continuity as one connected
science.' So again mind is not merely in its totality 'mind but also
carries with it the self-construction of nature'; and vice-versa. Or
farther 'the original identity must unite both (the negative synthesis,
synthesis by negation of opposites, and real positive synthesis of them) in
the Anschauung of the objective process of the Absolute in its complete
entirety.' Now this conception of an immediate and necessary continuity




not seen in direct contrast with Spelling's ovm views as e/i i il e.g.
in the introduction tc the "Trans. Ideal." But it ought to be pointed out
that the conception has at least no warrant or support from Spelling
himself, for whom those sciences were palpably different ways of stating
objective truth, the objective unity of subject ahd object. They were
different because that unity was construed on a different basis in each case
in the one case from object, in the other from the subject; and their
respective constructions were as different as object is from subject. Hegel
probably supposes he is in agreement with Spelling in his interpretation;
but it seems to indicate the. presence of a conception alien to Spelling's
own view, and peculiar to Hegel himself. Hegel has however not shown in
detail how it could be brought about, so that it would be valueless to
•eitr<arid it further.
But again not merely in the method but in the nature and meaning of
philosophy, Hegel differs from Scheiling. For the latter philosophy has its
origin in poetry, is by itself a subjective activity, which remains inside
the limits of its identity, and can only be again delivered from its
subjectivity, can only pass beyond those limits into complete objectivity
by means of Art. Art is the deliverer the coadjutor, the essential"the
only and true and external organon und document" of philosophy, the
creative productive function necessary to realise the objectivity philosophy
/23
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demands. witn Hegel on the other hand philosophy has its roots in
religion, has its own functions and instrument complete in itself, is a
self—closed activity, lives and moves in the.clear transparency of the
n-tion, of conceptions, and as contrasted with religion is the
reflective process by which the immediate unity of the individual with the
universal present in religion is reproduced in the sphere of conception and
of thought. It is hardly necessary to point out how this profound differenc
of point of view, purpose, and content of philosophy would affect the
respective systems of the two thinkers.
Finally there is a specific advance and transcendence of Schelling's
point of view. That 'quantitative preponderance' of the polar opposites in
an indifferent neutrum did not long satisfy Hegel. By his work in ethics
primarily but also by other considerations to be mentioned presently it was
not long before he broke through that conception of an indifferent unity of
opposites. Mind was seen to be higher than and not on a level with
»
nature. But with such a radical change of conception of the relatMBw of
the opposed elements in the absolute there would necessarily come a change
in the conception of the absolute itself. And this change we shall find
taking place. How soon Hegel split with Schelling after their first
collaboration in 1801 we cannot exactly say. Oertain it is that his warm




agreement did not last long. Jq find him writing in his note book
during this Jena period that "a short time will make it clear what
Schelling's philosophy essentially is. Judgment upon it stands tffltHftij
so to say before the door; for many already understand it. Indeed
or evidence as simply empirical experience how far they can lead us."
Surely these words vrould loosen for ever any relations of intimate union
or intellectual sympathy which Hegel had for Schelling, and leave Hegel
again, but at a very much higher level of attainment, in the independence
vrhich he possessed before committing himself to the philosophical
influences of Jena.





In order to understand the line of development which leads Hegel to
the position which he finally adopts, and the reasons'which induced him to
alter the views which he held during the period we have just reviewed, we
must "bear in mind the demands which he expected philosophy to satisfy. 1"' ■>
4
These were that it should be the complete explication of the knowledge of t
Absolute, that the system of such knowledge should be determined by the
inner and immanent connexion of its contents, and that the nature of the
Absolute should be shown to be mind, spirit, (Geist). These are for Hegel
simply claims, postulates, fundamental contentions which must be made by
those who would fulfil the task of philosophy. Ho does not seek to prove
them, or rather he takes the only possible proof of them to be the actual
realisation of them, by philosophy; they characterise his personal interest
in philosophy and the predominating influences which were active throughout
it.
Now in spite of certain appearances to the contrary Hegol did not give
way on any of these points during the second period; they existed side by
side with positions which were in themselves incompatible with them. It is
of course on the third point that this seems less evident. It certainly is
impossible, at the same time to hold that the absolute, the unity of subject
and object, is mind, and also that the absolute is the identity of subject
and object which is equally indifferent to both, in the sense that it i3
indistinguishably both at once and not one more than the other. For the
nature of mind holds more directly of the subject than of the object, and
/%(>
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consequently the Absolute would not be equally indifferent to both subject ar
and object. And this view Hegel undoubtedly allowed to fall in the back¬
ground at this time. But we are not entitled from the records left us to
infer that that position had been even temporarily abandoned. For not to
mention that the influence of Schelling lasted at the most for so short a
time, after which Hegel brought again and finally into prominence the
supreme importance of the conception of Spirit, we find throughout this
period continual fluctuations between the Schellingian conception of the
Absolute and that which he^hitherto held and later established. At one
time he regards the Absolute as the 'Indifference point*of subject and ob¬
ject, at another he takes the Absolute to be most properly concrete
individuality that union of universal and particular which is the nature of
CV
intelligence. Or again the Absolute is supremely 'Sittlichkeit*; at
(1)
another time a characterless Identity. Further when describing , (in
semi-theological terms, it is true,) the nature of God ho does in such wise
as to indicate that God as such was not a mere —of reality, but a
living active self-consciousness. This attitude of hesitancy and ambiguity
he abandons by maintaining the position of the supremacy of mind over nature,
of subject over object, the position which as we already pointed out^marks






But it is important to note that this was no more than the reassertion
of that principle which was indubitable dogma with Hegel all along. And
having now adopted this position, he sought to establish it and to elaborate
its complete import during those years immediately preceding the appearance
of the 'Phanomenologie*, when his separation from Schelling, or as Hegel
preferred to say, 'the Schellingian school', was once for all signalised in
the famous preface to that work.
This contention that "mind is higher than nature" is no mere secondary
and unimportant difference from the view that the one is of the same value
as the other for the Absolute, whe-fce both are identical; it becomes the
foundation of that doctrine of degrees of reality which characterises
Hegel's system, it determines the point of view from which a system is to
be obtained by stating the fundamental reality in it, and it indicates the
line of development which he must immediately follow in order to obtain that
system. Let Hegel once abandon the position that the Absolute is the
indifferent identity of both subject and object and there wa3 nothing
possible for him except to maintain that the Absolute should be per se
mind.
It must however be observed on the other hand that this did not mean
the annihilation of the view that the Absolute is unity of subject and
object, of all opposites. On this he is at one with Schelling and also with
Pichte. The point is what most accurately and completely expresses the
/tC
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nature of the Absolute? Mind and nature, subject and object together are
the Absolute, and are opposed in it; is .the Absolute the neutrum of both or
is it one rather than the other? There is no third position possible.^ ^
Now it is stating the same problem to ask are subject and object on the
same level of reality, of content, of import, of meaning, have they both in
all and every respect the same nature; or is the content of one higher than,
superior to the other? Hegel maintained for a time the former alternative
in the period we have been considering. For it there appears that each is
simply a 'relative identity', the 'preponderance' of one or the other
opposite is due to the point of view from which the Absolute is regarded,
all philosophy consists in the 'repetition of one and the same identity', v!i
the Absolute is the 'indifferent unity of both.* Henceforward however he
adopts the second alternative, and thereby breaks with Schelling. All his
subsequent philosophy is simply the complete establishment and exposition of
this view. The plan by which he sought to obtain this result, we shall
presently indicate. We have merely to note that this explicit adoption or
rather readoption of Mind as the fundamental philosophical principle is what
leads him to abandon the Schellingian attitude of the second period and
CD
We might say that the initial difference between Ffchte Schelling
and Hegel just consisted.in the alternative adopted by each respectively.
F$chte chose the latter giving none but a subjective reality to object;
Schelling chose the former giving equal reality to both; Hegel chose the




determines finally the current of his subsequent thinking.
The reasons for this advance seem; to have been cumulative. We have
already insisted perhaps sufficiently, on the essentially religious and
moral motives which led Hegel to abandon himself to philosophy. These
fashioned his interest in its problems, and in a manner predetermined the
result. Mind always appeared to him as the deepest, most real of "ftealities.
This is seen for instance in the place which he assigns to Morality in his
scheme in the second period. It is there taken t'l be the fullest most
(1)concrete expression of the absolute. Again the actual relations of mind
to nature in moral experience, the very idea of freedom seemed to compel him
(2)to place one on a different plane from the other. And on the other hand
in intellectual experience the difference was also equally clear. The very
meaning of knowledge meant the dominance of mind over nature, of subject
over object, a superiority and prerogative which had been established by
Kant in such a way as to have become almost self evident. Moreover the
meaning which Hegel gives to philosophy in particular would seem
necessarily to lead him to this position. Philosophy as we saw was the self-
knowledge of reason; the identity which is the ultimate fact is the
identity of reason. But if so, then reality must be primarily mind, which




cp. Ros. Leben. 187.
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ordinate with object, nature, 'necessity.* It is impossible to treat all
philosophy (pnilosophy of nature included) solely in terms of reason, arid
impossible to speak of 'the self-knowledge, the self-intuition of the
absolute,* 'absolute knowledge*^ ^ which the absolute possesses of itself
and yet maintain that the absolute is merely the indifferent identity of
both mind and nature.. Rather it is in nature of that self-knowledge that
it must be 'higher than* it.
There is further to be calculated the influence on Hegel for years of
Plato's philosophy, in which assuredly there is little indication of an
equality of value or significance between mind and nature. And the concep¬
tion of this relation derivable from Plato was confirmed and more
systematically elaborated by Aristotle with whom in the later years at Jena
Hegel became intimately acquainted and whose influence upon him hencefor¬
ward is pronounced and effective. And finally in addition to all this we
must take note of a characteristic of Hegel's mind which made it impossible
for him to acquiesce for long in such an identity as Schelling offered.This
was his deep appreciation of the fullness, the richness, the multiplicity
of the content of the world. When therefore he saw the results to which
such a view as he advocated in and out of the "Critical Journal" really led
and were actually tending inside the School of Schelling how it denuded
(I) : " "




the universe of its plentitude of difference, and converted it at best into
a monotonous repetition of a characterless indifferent identity, it is small
surprise that such a position should not be lone attractive to a mind am to
fully alive by nature, knowledgejand experience to its varied meaning. All
these factors therefore taken together seem to make it inevitable that
Hegel should find satisfaction only in the principle that the absolute is
mind, and should seek to 'demonstrate' that it is so.
The mention of the last of the above influences leads us to another
aspect of philosophy which, as we have already stated, must be
insisted upon and realised, if it is to attain its end the completeness
of the knowledge of the content of the absolute. This was obviously
present and operative in the second period, though it is not itself carried
out. As it appears there however it is certainly defective and questionable,
and it henceforth undergoes decided modifications. We found that Hegel made
a somewhat abrupt distinction between infinite knowledge and finite
knowledge, between the knowledge which is concerned with the absolute
identity qua absolute, and that which deals with the finite realities taken
as finite. And we found that the latter was dealt with by reflexion per se
finite and infinite, was determined by understanding and by reason in its
negative aspect, and formed the sphere appropriated by logic; while the
former was dealt with by transcendental knowledge which was one with
transcendental Anschauung, was determined solely by reason and that in its




proper.* And Logic we saw had at Lest merely a negative value for
metaphysic, the finite had significance for the absolute only where and in
so far as it was negated. Sow such a result was soon seen to be unsatis¬
factory in many ways. For in the first place how could the knowledge of
the absolute be complete if the content of the absolute was removed? and
what content remained after, all the finite content was abstracted from the
absolute as such? How was it possible to 'construe' the absolute at all
when the opposites which appeared were viewed simply as negations and were
merely negated? And since these finitudes belonged to the sphere of logic
what remained then for metaphysic, for transcendental knowledge to do? All
finitudes being as such excluded from metaphysic nothing was to be done but
to show the 'repetition' of one and the same identity throughout all
reality. 'Construing* it could only mean exhibiting its self-identity
everywhere, not showing how it maintained itself as different or in
differences, but showing that all differences were not differences at all
but the same identity. All differences were finite and could only appear
in .the view of finite knowledge to be different. For infinite knowledge
there vras literally nothing but the one identity. But such a metaphysic
in the attempt to give complete knowledge of the absolute succeeded or
might succeed in giving completeness but utterly failed to give knowledge.
Nothing was to be gained or received from the continuous manifestation of




known. In addition this identity, could hardly be exhibited in the
differences, for there were no real differences for it at all. These all
held good merely inside the sphere of the finite and were already negated
in logic (in * philosophical reflexion'); the differences were for the
absolute indifferent. What made them different was the absence of that
positive element, the identity, found and discussed in metaphysic; when
this appeared.or was exhibited the differences vanished. In transcendental
knowledge therefore, in that 'union of reflexion and Ansohauung' nothing
could be dealt with but the absolute identity which was at best refunded intc
into those realities which had a mere semblance of difference-.—a
procedure either impossible -or inadequate and false, the former
*
i>f thefe really are no different realities into which the identity is to be
refunded, the latter if thorpe are such realities. And further it is also
evident that such a metaphysic seems perilously near to a discussion of
what is a merely abstract identity of understanding, against which Hegel had
already waged war.. The logic had been the negative assertion of an absolute
whose positive reality was exhibited in metaphysic;. but the negative
activity of this absolute which appeared in the logic had wiped out as with
a.sponge all the plentitude of content which would have given meaning to
the positive assertion of its identity and left nothing to be considered
hut a characterless blank. No real knowledge of the absolute was given
in the logic itself; at best only a knowledge of what the absolute was not;
it
10.
yet when the metaphysie seeks to supply this knowledge of the absolute
identity there is nothing in particular to know except that the absolute
identity alone is. It is not open to show that this identity is
determined as different* there is no getting back to the differences at all
for the simple reason that they have been already abolished in the logic in
order to find place only for the one absolute. It is as if all the wealth
of the world were reduced by a process of elimination to a single species
of commodity which thereupon turned out to have by nature of the case no
exchange value whatever. It certainly seemed therefore that with such an
absolute what had been attained was not an identity which substantialised
the various opposites of knowledge but rather one which remained apart from
them altogether and at most destroyed the substantiality they possessed in
finite knowledge. It was in fact an absolute identity which did not appear
abstract merely because it had established itself by destroying everything
which offered itself as a rival to its supremacy the lion which herded
with the flocks and became lord of them by the might of its hunger.
And this result was not the fault of the logic, but rather of the
metaphysie; the logic becausenegative of the finite content did not demand
the metaphysie, the metaphysic rather demanded a negative logic; it was
because the metaphysic was so conceived that the logic was negative to
prepare for it. For metaphysic there was literally only one reality; and
T©t in spite of this finite elements actually existed. It was plain that the
11.
completeness of the knowledge of the absolute ought somehow to find a place
for these finite realities, which would at once do justice to their reality
while refusing to take them as simply finite. Hegel appreciated the
importance of this intensely, and soon felt it impossible on these
intellectual and other grounds already indicated, to find satisfaction in
a picture which secured the harmony of its effect at the price of the
monotony of its colouring. And he saw that there was only one requisite nec
essary to attain a different and more satisfactory result..— namely to alter
the purely negative character of all finitude. This was the sole ground of
objection, the source of all the barrenness of the result of his previous
conception, and here accordingly the change should bo effected. The finite
factors the finite opposites should not be entirely negated,- and all
differences vanish before the ono identity; they should be posited.
But note that by retaining as he did the conception of an absolute
which must be infinite in the sense of including all and determining all,
and one and identical (just as formerly) the character of finitude.as
hitherto conceived was not entirely changed but only partially so. The
finite opposites were to be both posited, substabtialised, and negated as
well. The mere insistence on the latter had turned the absolute into the
immediate tomb of the finite; the insistence on the former only would give
immortality to all finitude, and destroy the meaning of the absolute. To
avoid both these results required him to demand the negation as well as the
preservation of the finite.
\
12.
Indications indeed are not lacking that the importance of both these
factors had occurred to him even when holding the view which he henceforth
abandons. For as vre saw above the finite realities are related to the
absolute^are therefore in a sense posited in it, though the positing is
purely negative, they are only related to it in order to be negated by it.
Similarly again by asserting that the finite as such was the province of
understanding, and yet that knowledge of understanding was *not entirely
* (1)
opposed to that of reason, but rather intimately connected with it, we
have clear suggestion that a positive character belonged even to that which
was negated by reason. And when it is maintained that reflexion, negation,
is merely one side, the negative side, of reason the same idea is in a
measure contained. The truth is that the purely negative treatment of
finitude which is undoubtedly the dominant tone of this period was1 due to an
over emphasis on the, merely negative side of the activity of reason, which
was perhaps a natural exaggeration when he had for the first time seized the
significance of an absolute philosophy. If then the consequences to which
this led did not by the nature of the case realise that knowledge of the _
absolute which he sought this purely negative activity of reasoiywst be
qualified.
Now the positive aspect or moment of reason had hitherto been contribute
ft « #





negative moment of reason^ was to ity and belonged to metaphysio.
If thefcefore a positive character was to be contributed to the finite
realities as such it could only come from the ^nschauung of metaphusic.
But in that case the relation between reflexion and /^nschauung must cease
to be so external, the one must share the nature of the other, must be
(1)
found with it. They must in fact become one activity with two insepara¬
ble moments, a single moment with opposite poles, a functional unity of two
factors; reflexion must function with y^nschauung, ^nschauung must
and negate with reflexion; all externality of relation between the two must
vanish. This then would give the completeness of knowledge desired; nothing
finite would in such a case be left out; every finite would get its due, and
find its place in the absolute*, its positive reality would be conserved by
the positive function introduced; and yet the absolute would likewise hold
its place as absolute because every finite is to be negated, and negation
in such a case can only come from the one absolute and infinite reality. Anc
nothing more nor less than such a unity of negative and positive function
would satisfy Hegel's demands; and nothing else except such a unity con¬
ceived somehow just as that sort of unity and no other.
[t. jjS^tyuy^foe says that transcendental reflexion and^nschauung are
out thepoint is that in spite of this tidentification,
they still remain side by side as distinct factors or processes, neither is




It is not, bo it noted, by laying greater emphasis on understanding
as opposed to reason that this new result is to be brought about. True it
had been by the denial of that fixity contributed by understanding that the
negation of the finite had been maintained in the logic. But this fixity,
we must observe, was attributed/ to an unauthorised and indefensible act of
CD
understanding, which 'robbed' finxtude of its reason-character, and
LLJ
stemmed the flux of its own essential negativity. 'The nature of understand¬
ing was determined from the point of view of reason, and as this was purely
negative in. character it had no right per se to fix and determine finitude,
and was much nearer in so doing, so far at least as philosophy was
concerned, to illusion than truth. Now however when the positive element
of the finite becomes emphasised and insisted on, understanding assumes
another and a most important place in Hegel's treatment; but this is
. because the positive element sanctions the fixity of the finite which is
the work of understanding, not because understanding of itself asserts -a
positive element to belong to the finite. Here as before it is reason that
settles the place and value of understanding; it is because reason demands
and asserts a positive aspect in the finite in order to attain that
completeness of knowledge desiderated, that the claims of understanding to
to substantiate the finite are allowed to hold good, just as it is reason
which determines how far they are valid. No doubt this role which
^V>s. 190. ^ ,X(f
/J?
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understanding usually plays influenced Hegel at this juncture, and no
doubt his reaction from the barreness of aoi absolute identity would find
greater resource and satisfaction in the definiteness the concreteness of
the world as determined by understanding, and would induce him doubtless
to insist on the recognition of its claims per se, and this might suggest
the necessity for asserting that positive aspect of the finite already
mentioned. Still in spite of this, and in spite of the extraordinary, pro>*
minence he henceforth attaches to understanding, which he declares to be
"die verwundersam$te und groszte oder vielmehr die absolute Macht,"^ it
is clear for the above reasons that it is the positive character derived
in the manner and for the purposes stated that gives force and authority
to the claims of understanding, and not understanding ) which fuses a posi¬
tive content into the purely negative activity of reason. And this will
become still more evident as we proceed.
Now, since the above considerations indicate the line of development
which Hegel is to follow in order to attain that completeness of knowledge
of the absolute desired, if we can lay bare the plan and the means he
adopted to obtain that method which would realise that end vre shall have





accomplish this till we deal with the third essential characteristic of
philosophy on which Hegel insisted. We nay note in passing that it was
impossible to make the change above described by itself. Along with such
a change were necessarily involved the abandonment of the absolute as
hitherto conceived, and a change of attitude towards the finite opposites,
subjectrobject, Mind;Nature etc. The latter could not henceforth be
viewed as indifferently the same and identical with each other; with the
insistence on the positive character of each finite opposite these finite
facts required to be considered'per se, and their relations to be deter¬
mined by reference to each other as well as to the absolute. Hence the
possibility of asserting that one was 'higher than the other.*' The third
characteristic which in Hegel's view philosophy must have was*, we saw, the
systematic connexion of its content. During the period we have considered
there is obviously enough an attempt at systematic connexion, and with
some measure of success. But it is equally clear that this connexion was
not thorough nor was it brought about by the inner relation of the
content. The parts of the logic were not directly connected with each
other, nor was there any except an external relation between logic and
metaphysic. There was lacking that inner necessity in the scheme, which
could only come through development. He had indeed hinted that this was
the proper method by which to attain the system he required. But the law
of this method he had not yet formulated. All the parts of his scheme have
V
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this much connexion that they are all determined by reason, vhiefc zlasm im
fact gave them philosophical significance. But more than this ttej earn
hardly be. said to possess. The law of the logic is one principle of
connexion; that of the metaphysic another. The former is antiimj, th©
latter the immediacy of ^nschayung. But one proceeds independently off take
other, and no direct relation is established between them. Finitmfe is
laid waste, and no connexion between the finite elements exists: ©x®at|tfc tSfcs.1L
of a common ruin by a common enemy; and then without any evident ;prB$»srar-
tion we enter at a single stride into the impregnable citadel off tfee
absolute. We are not led up to the abs-- lute through and hj means off
finitude; simply by the magic might of anschauung the absolute rises ©m«t
takes shape before us. How we come by such a method is not established!., mar
is it shown how we get possession of the two-edged sword of reflexion.
These are not so mucfi distinct forms of knowledge, as distinct kinds ©ff it,
CM
and one is^arbitrary in starting point and procedure as the other.
Again the same objections can be raised, and for the sane reasons,
against the relation which exists between the identity of the absolute an&
(simply
the finite opposites, sua- finite differences. These ar^v placed. ever ai
against each other in ^mediated and unreconcilled .opposition and no
connexion, organic or other, is exhibited between them. The result is as we
saw they occupy two different spheres, in the one there is no identity in
the other no difference.
18
There is further no inner connexion stated between the various
functions understanding, reason, anschauung, negative and positive reason;
and yet all the knowledge supplied in the scheme is derived from these
sources. They are, as it were, various closed chambers of knowledge, all
important in themselves, but one hardly more so than the other, for each
contains distinct information, and with no evident unity or connexion
between them except that they all exist together under, a common roof.
There is finally to be noted the ambiguous character of reflexion and
anschauung in the scheme. At one time he seems to distinguish between
reflexion and the object of reflexion, between anschauung and what is
' angeschafct'; at another time he seems to make no such distinction whatever.
The general position he takes up inclines him towards the latter rather than
the former; and as we saw any other view would make his position meaningless.
For its essential import is to insist on the identity of each with the
other; and he is concerned not with the psychological process of thought,
but with its result. Still the other view does appear either as a survival
from his earlier scheme or because as a matter of fact the terms in
question ?/ere ambiguous. The effectual removal of this ambiguity was
clearly imperative before any system could claim to be thorough; and its
deliberate removal would go a long way to attain that systematic completeness
desired. Such an undertaking is indeed what Hegel set himself, the final




It Is evident from the foregoing indication of the defects in
systematisation of the content of knowledge that if Hegel was fully to
attain his ideal of system decided changes required to be made. For the
purpose of the construction of the system he -desired, one thing was
absolutely necessary, and would indeed be sufficient, there must be a
unity of method governing the whole procedure from first to last. This was
the radical defect of the construction of the scheme he had formed in the
second period; though this defect was in the nature of the case, for the
parts of the scheme contained forms of knowledge each determined by a
different principle. Since the parts were external to each other and each
had a distinct method of procedure there could be no one systematic whole
determined, by a single method. Method is necessarily dependent on content,
if the system is to possess that character of inner necessity which Hegel
sought. But the various functions above specified, negative and positive
reason etc., were not to be abandoned as valueless when the new" advance was
- v
made. Rather that advance proceeds along the.lines indicated by them; they
are in reality permanent factors in. his system. But inasmuch as the defect
of his present scheme lay in allowing each to do its work independently
he was bound to remove this defect if he would accomplish that purpose
he has in view. And this could only be done and would be satisfactorily
done, if each factor were shown to be a function of a single activity, a
moment in a single process. Hence the remaining problem to be
/!}//
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settled was how to obtain such a method.
Now it is impossible to understand how Hegel overcame these three
kinds of defects which rendered his second scheme unsatisfactory unless
we realise that no one could be removed without a corresponding alteration
in the others. They were all necessarily involved in each other. It was
at once impossible and useless for him to attempt to discover a true and
thorough method of systematisation without taking account of the
completeness of the content of the system; and similarly he could not
determine the completeness of the content without immediate and essential
reference to his fundamental principle. And it is again clear that the
primary fact on the meaning of which all else depends, is the nature of
that fundamental principle itself. If once this is determined all the
other elements (the method and the contents) will appear at once, or be
easily determinable; for on that depends everything else in the system.
The first problem then is to determine the nature and meaning of his ground
principle. That principle which henceforward is the fundamental tenet
of his system is as we have seen the Real of Realities is Mind. The
Absolute, Ultimate Reality, is not the mere of Indifference; it
is not the mere quantitative equilibrium of the opposed poles of reality,
(subject, object etc.); it is one rather than, more than the other. One
is actually superior to the other, higher than it, because embracing in
itself what the other is^was. yet something further which lifts it above the
°ther. And therefore the absolute can be expressed more truly by this one
%
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than by the other. Since that which is higher contains in itself as a
moment what is characteristic of the other, the absolute is primarily and
essentially and in the last resort the higher of the two. This is what in
reality the absolute is; this is what in reality is absolute, what is
absolutely Real.
But if Hegel has once risen above the position of Indifferent- Identity
has once established that there is a difference, saintly a difference in
degree of reality, between these polar opposites, and that this difference
is vital and fundamental, he has thereby set himself a unique and distinct
problem. That problem is to establish and exhibit this in philosophical, i,
e. for him systenjatic form. It do.es not and cannot remain a mere
conviction; the other two essential demands which he makes on philosophy
force him to work it out in detail. Philosophy must not be merely love
of knowledge, but must actually be real knowledge. And it can only be
called real knowledge if it is complete knowledge, knowledge of the whole.
This is simply what it claims to be, less than this will not satisfy it.
But knowledge of the whole must be a whole of knowledge, must be system, and
must by the nature of the case be a necessary system. Philosophical truth
is and must be therefore system of philosophy.
Incidentally therefore any principle1 which claims to furnish
philosophical knowledge and yet cannot or does not furnish it in this form
is thereby on this ground alone self-condemned. Thus when we are offered as
a Princip"' . that we know the absolute immediately by feeling or
/ fri
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by anschauung, nothing more can by such a process be supplied us, no
construction no . But wo do not thereby get philosophical
knowledge,rather we get a substitute for ail philosophy, not a system of
truth but that which renders any such system as dispensable as it is
impossible; and indeed the satisfaction thereby sought is not the
satisfaction of science, but rather that of religious enthusiasm, something
nearer to cultured mysticism than explicit knowledge, not truth but rather
edification.
Hegel then must work out his new conception systematically. And this
is the more necessary when the difference which he asserts is as vital
as he believes1it to be. For' all finitude is embraced under one or other of
the fundamental opposed realities subject object etc., and hence the
assertion of the superiority of the one over the other must affect all
reality, be present throughout it, and must therefore be thoroughly
/ ■' 1
established everywhere, if it is to be ultimately valid at all. Nothing
^ V". ' ; • ; '• • ' - ' • ••
less than this Will satisfy; a more general exposition of his contention
will not suffice; he must show it to hold at every step where subject is
brought into relation with object, mind with nature, etc. For take up
) * \ ; '1
reality at any point and we shall find that there we have ipso facto a
relation between- these two opposites; the reality we deal with either
belongs to, is a1 part of the world of nature only, or of mind only, or
Partly of one 'partly of the other. But in any and every case that
relation is in .Some form present; one opposite cannot be taken by itself
U)i /H }. - . ;7;
/*?
• - »
without further reference, it must imply end be related to the other.
Consequently if this superiority is to be real it must be shown to exist
wherever that relation exists, it must be shown to hold in short of every
phase or part of reality.
n And it is not only necessary to do so, it is in the nature of the case
quite possible to do it. For we have this relation appearing in different
ways, in different spheres embracing one order of fact at one place,
another at another. We have it now for example as the relation of per—
» i
ofrni-enlt to perceived, now as that of observation to observed, now as that
of an assertion of a lav/ betvreen facts, or again in conduct, in moral
action. All these are different, and yet all imply and express this same
fundamental relation. Now each of these because different can be treated
separately and by itself; we can isolate it from others, and regard it
simply as it stands. Hence we can examine each of these various forms
where the relation holds, and show that in every form without exception
this superiority is discoverable.
Hence then the maintenance of the supremacy of mind is simply the
other side to, has as its necessary completement, the complete and
detailed exhibition of this supremacy over all reality. It means that mind
is to embrace its object i.e. not to exclude it (that would be dualism);
nor to negate it (that would be s&liplsm); nor to be on a level with it
(that would be the Indifferentism of Schelling); but to contain it in
itself. This alone for Hegel is Idealism.
>
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Now it was^to solve this problem and establish that position that Hegel
wrote the "Phenomenology of Mind." Such being the general nature of the
problem which he has to solve, it is not difficult to see that to accomplish
his purpose the enquiry will conveniently fall into two parts. In one
part he will be exclusively engaged in showing, that mind, when and wherever
y/e find it in relation to an object, is actually .'higher than'^ its
object, actually contains that object in itself, that only in so far as an
object is the mind's own, is the mind's "own self, is it an object for and
over against mind at all. In such an enquiry there will be no need to
confine attention o any one form under which the relation exists. Any and
every form will have to be considered. It must be shown that wherever the
relation exists, throughout the whole range of. the life of mind, an analysis
of the relation will in all cases show that the essential character and con<fc
tent of an object is mind-constituted mind—determined, that its being as an
object for consciousness is the same as its being for itself, that its
constitutive moments are determined by mind and for mind. Here then we
have no special regard for the ultimate form under which such a relation is
most truly expressed, or indeed is only expressed truly and fully at all.
This will of course be in the background of the enquiry all along, for it
is the final result to be arrived at, and in a.measure determines the
enquiry from first to last. Still because it is only at best one form of
(l)This phrase will become more precise as we. proceed.
the relation, it will not in this part be treated in any other way except
simply as a special form of the relation in question. Por not merely the
true form of the relation, but untrue, in the sense of imperfect forms of
it must be considered. In some cases e.g. in perception the object seems
and is ordinarily taken to be quite external to mind; the latter seems to
exist by itself, it is merely •given1 to mind from without. Yet this is a
form of the relation of mind to an object, and for that reason alone must
find a place in the enquiry. In others again e.g. the moral order or
religion the object seems entirely determined or at least mainly determined
fromnwnd itself, is a sort of of&eot- of its own activity; but here we have
also a relation of an object to mind of a certain distinct type. And
between the apparent pure externality of the object to mind, and the
apparent simple 'manifestation* of mind in its object there is room for
considerable variety of forms of the relation, all of them actual relations,
hut all more or less imperfect (when judged from the final and true form).
All these then must be dealt with separately, for all have claims to
consideration because in all of them mind is established in relation to an
object. Prom the -point of view of this enquiry it is in the first instance
of no importance what degree of perfection any relation may possess what
degree of inwardness its terms may have to each other; the determination of
this degree is an after result, discovered in the course of enquiry and by
it. The mere fact that the relation actually is discoverable, falls inside
26.
the experience of Kind, the mere fact that mind is related to an object
no matter how that object nay present itself, or what special attitude mind
may take up towards it is all that is necessary to warrant the discussion
in the enquiry of the relation thereby established. Every relation because
it exists must be dealt with simply because it expresses a determination,
a definite pulse in the life of mind. Every relation because it exists
is necessary to mind, for in each and all mind is determined differently,
and the richness of its experience is not summed up in any one only.
The question regarding the truth of any given relation thus takes the
form, not of whether it has any truth at all; the fact that mind is so
determined with reference to an object itself implies that it has truth, for
any relation is a determinate part of the experience of mind, and is
necessary to it. And. because necessary to it, each form of the relation is,
taken by itself, true; for in each mind is closed with its object, is
satisfied and rests with it, there is an 'agreement between the mind and
f 1)
the object', and the symbol or indication of this agreement is the
'certainty* the mind possesses in dealing with the object in question*—a
certainty vrhich is present in every form under which the relation appears.
Since then every instance of the relation must be ipso facto true for mind,
the further and second question is what amount or degree of truth does each
(1)
The ordinary conception of 'truth.'
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possess; what degree of intimacy is expressed by any given relation, how
par does the object dealt with at an$ point realise express the actual and
essential nature of mind, how far is the mind in dealing with the object
explicitly■'■an-a aware of itself as being in its object, as being at one with
it as well as its own self. To express it briefly and from another point
of view, the degree of truth of a given relation between the mind and its
object is determined by reference to and in virtue of the fundamental
primacy and supremacy of mind in the relation; the fact that each relation
does have truth at all, no matter what the relation be, is due to the inner
unity of mind with its object in every case.
Looked at in this way therefore the enquiry deals with all actual
relations between mind and objects because they are true and in virtue of
their truth. But it at once distinguishes itself from two other enquiries
which hardly concern it at all. It does not deal with the history of any
given relation in itself, does not show how any relation arose, out of what
factors or processes it was produced. Such a discussion was excluded
because it was not the genesis of the relation that was philosophically
important, but the relation itself, not the process but the product, not the
origin but the actual meaning. Nor again is the above enquiry concerned
tff8(l)
with the consequences which result^when a given relation is established.
Each relation is regarded simply as a particular form of experience with a




conditions and a nature of its own. Prom such a treatment of the relation
we can exclude all the detailed content of the particular sphere of
experience constituted by the relation in question and determined in all
respects by it. For example in the relation between mind and its object
found in perception, we can analyse its nature simply as a relation, can
determine its constitutive factors, can show that in it the object appears
as a thing and its qualities and is in this form a particular mode of the
activity of mind; but in so doing we need not state what particular .q things
and qualities there are in thersphere of experience to which perception is
*
appropriate. Similarly of the relation of mind to its object for example
in morality. It is the form and character of any relation, not the varied
content which it embraces and determines, that is considered in the above
enquiry. It will therefore deal with all the different relations in
which the mind can stand to its object, but will not include either the
genesis of those relations or a systematic statement of all that is
contained under them. To include the former would be at once irrelevant and
^philosophical; to include the latter is impossible and unnecessary, for all
the forms treated of (with the exception of the last, as we shall see) are
imperfect can neither contain nor exhibit the full truth which alone will
completely and without reservation satisfy mind.
But it is clear from what has been said that if we are not to have
here a genetic history of mind nor an explicit system either of imperfect
°r perfect knowledge^ of incomplete or complete truth, we have at least
y
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elements of both history of mind and of truth. For each mode considered by
itself expresses an essential and necessary attitude of mind, and in each
there is truth. All modes or relations of mind to objects are simply to be
taken .-.as they actual^ appear or have appeared that is we are to have a
history of these various forms. And all such relations are regarded solely
with reference to the kind and degree of truth they possess. Hence the
enquiry is a historical analysis or analytical history of the kinds of
truth of which the mind is capable.
Or again if we consider the relation of the mind to an object as the
(1)
essential characteristic of all that is named.Experience, the enquiry
in question may be named a constructive history of the forms of experience.
Once more if we take consciousnessjto the fundamental form under
which mind exists, that which constitutes its very existence the enquiry
can be looked at as. a philosophical history of consciousness.
Or finally regarded as an analysis and statement of the functions,
the activities of mind in its relation with reality we may view it simply
as a transcendental psychology. All these various expressions merely
indicate different aspects of precisely the same problem.
To carry out this enquiry is then the first part of that problem which
Hegel was forced to undertake and to solve if the principle he sought to
Phan. d. Geistes Einleit 27.
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establish was to be fully developed. Such an undertaking was precisely what
he sought to accomplish in his "Phenomenology of Mind," the origin and
purpose of which is contained in the general statement we have just given.
We must defer for a moment any further exposition of the content of
the Phenomenology. It is of immediate importance to note that the analysis
(1)
and discussion contained in it must have occupied from about 1803 till
the time of its publication 1806—7. For it was from this time onward that
the breach with Sehelling became ever wider; and his examination of the
various forms of experience seems at once to have created and confirmed his .
difference from him. All along he had maintained with Schelling that
subject was one with object; in the Phenomenology he proceeded to examine
and analyse this in detail. It was this analysis that was the vital problem
on the answer to which depended the nature of the relation between those- w ■'
opposed elements of reality and the character of the unity which held them
together. This enquiry alone could give Hegel any new result of his own, as
it alone could establish a final philosophical position. Not that Schelling
or Fichte or even Kant had not likewise maintained the * unity of subject and
object'; nor had they neglected the enquiry into the relation subsisting
between them. It was neither such an enquiry nor the fact of the unity whlcl
distinguished Hegel's problem from theirs or made taicessary his new and
CD
He promises to have the Phen. published by the autumn of 1805.
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analysis. It was rather the character of the enquiry and the
nature of the unity which distinguished him from them and which compelled
him to reundertake an enquiry and establish in his own way a result which
in their general form were similar to those of his predecessors. For
consciously and explicitly with and from the bare absolute unity of the two
stated in the form, of a single principle and thence 'deducing' from this
highest fundamental fact all the content of experience, Hegel neither starts
from, that unity nor does he even admit the validity of expressing in the
form of a single proposition the principle of all philosophy. Sehelling and
Fichte start from the supreme fact, which should rather be conclusion and
result than a starting point; but a beginning in philosophy should properly
be the simplest truth and not the highest. Hegel on the.other hand takes
up the position that if subject and object are one, then in all cases where
in experience we find them in relation we ought either to find them actually
expressing this unity, or else by their imperfection, their incompleteness
their inner disagreement revealing to analysis the presence in them/in every
ease and thereby pointing towards and 'loading up to* that complete explicit
unity 'which is their inmost reality. Let us then, he seems to say, instead
instead of as in the case of Sehelling
(1)
as also of Fichte beginning
CD
Vis. in "Trans. Idealism."
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of starting from the highest form of their relation start from cases where
they are obviously separate and opposed and let us by examining these see
where and why they fall short of and how near they approach to their
essential unity. This was clearly a different procedure from that of either
Fichte or Schelling, and held in itself prospect of a conclusion different
in character, though necessarily not in principle from theirs. The
suggestion of such an enquiry may possibly have come from Scheliing's
conception of the content of philosophy being simply the history.of self-
consciousness, though it is manifestly suggested also as simply the reverse
process of establishing idealism frtwnthat of Fichte and Schelling.
There were moreover two secondary but very important reasons for
undertaking the enquiry .contained in the Phenomenology. There was first a
consideration of practical importance. Hegel had a distinct and in that
sense a new philosophical point of view, and a new philosophical truth to
lay before the world, and being new it was distinct from the ordinary
conceptions of his immediate audience in the lecture room, and of the
larger philosophical public. If then he was to succeed in establishing
the claims of his own view, if he was to get his new truth understood,
he was bound to raaet his audience half-way. This implied that he should
treat the forms of experience familiar to his audience and deal with them
in such a way as at once to appreciate their conceptions of these forms
and indicate the significance which his own view compelled him to attach
them. This was the more necessary because each of those forms laid claim
33.
to possess a truth of its own a claim which the natural consciousness
was prepared to admit as absolute. Hegel admitted this claim on.the part
of those various forms to possess truth and thereby stood on the same level
with his audience; but by a device he converted these several
forms of truth discoverable in experience into steps by which ho might
lead his public up to his own final point of view. Thus he at once
enriched and enlarged the conception of truth and of experience familiar to
his audience by doing justice to each form in which the mind experienced
truth, and by bringing all such forms within the sweep of his analysis;
while at the same time he thereby conducted a tilers to the position at
which he himself stood. Looked at in this way the Phenomenology is a
^wu/i^c introduction to Hegel*s philosophy, the preparatory text-
- \ f i \
book to Absolute Idealism.^~
The other reason which made the enquiry necessary was theoretical.
Hegel's philosophical point of view was in the first instance merely one
among others which had also appeared in the course of history, and prima
facie had no more right to be considered final truth than" any of the
Ithe
others. Yet it was of its very essence to lay' claim to be| absolute and
true philosophical position; all others were at best simply imperfect
forms or precursors of it. Such a claim was not merely opposed to the
(1)
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similar contentions of other thinkers who had appeared in the past, and who
likewise claimed to have the final truth, but came into abrupt collision
with the views of his immediate antecedents and contemporaries, who equally
claimed to have fashioned the final scheme. He was therefore bound to
defend his claim and establish his position, and this could only be
accomplished to his own satisfaction and that of others if he systematically
proved the truth of his own view.
Now only one method of proof was open to him. For he held on the one
hand that his own view ?ras the absolutely true and on the other hand that
the views of others were likewise true, but imperfect. His proof therefore
had to reconcile both these positions. And this was only possible by
showing that the truth the other vie\rs contained was true by being a form
or experience of his own, and was imperfect because it did not completely
but only implicitly contained his view and was thus at the same time out of
agreement with its own immanent principle. And on the other side he had to
show that his own view actually and explicitly expressed the truth implied
in the other imperfect views and really contained whatever truth was
present in them. This second part of the proof is merely the counterpart
of the first, and indeed is obviously presupposed by the first itself. If
then Hegel could establish both these claims he would completely justify
theoretically not merely to himself but to the philosophical public the
claims he had put forward on behalf of his own philosophy. Regarded in the •
^ght of this purpose, the Phenomenology may be considered the systematic
35.
(1)
proof of the standpoint of absolute idealism. It was then to
accomplish all these ends above indicated, vis.: to remove the defects of
his preceding position introduce and establish his new conception that the
enquiry contained in the Phenomenology was undertaken. In what manner this
the first part of his problem was carried out we shall presently state.
CD
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It is not difficult to discover what bearing such an enquiry will
have on the other two essential factors in philosophy, its content and its
method. For while the systematic and exhaustive discussion and grounding
of the principle of Hegel's philosophy form the problem and purpose of the
Phenomenology, it must not be supposed that the enquiry is a by-product
of his system a mere introduction, external and independent of it. This we
shall show later on more fully is not the case; and meanwhile we may merely
note that Hegel himself considered that the wprMvas a constitutive part of
(1)
his system. It is inevitable then that the enquiry would determine both
content and method as well as principle. Now all relations between subject
and object, the whole contents of experience are to be passed in review from
the most extreme forms of opposition between these-two elements, up to their
closest most explicit affinity. And in all of them subject and object are
to be shown to be essential one, subject being 'higher than', the
determining ground of and including the object. The whole content of
experience will thus appear as moments or modes of the ground reality of
experience . Since then all experience is to be embraced, since in
all that unity between subject and object is to be exhibited, nothing of
experience will be omitted from the content of philosophy, and every conteht
U)
Briefe I. 52; Log. I. 1st Preface ad fin, note: The change of title
there mentioned seems obviously due not to change of point of view regarding
the work; but to external reasons.
/
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will have- that place in experience which it is entitled to as a
moment in the one experience of the one reality, mind. Consequently on
this hot•view and as a result of this now enquiry there will not be a
merely abstract characterless 'indifferent' identity, the finite varied
content of experience will not exist simply to be negated. Both the unity
and the differences will be maintained and preserved, and the one by means
of and because of the other. Thus the only and complete content of
*
philosophy will be the whole diversity • experience which alone reveals and
where alone is found the meaning and content of that absolute which is the
only object of philosophy. Hot the absolute per se as an identity
indifferent to though uniting subject and object, but that absolute, that
unity only in and through its own wealth of varied content is what hence¬
forward is to be found in philosophy. The absolute because essentially
and truly mind is not merely at once substance and subject, but is pre-
(1)
eminently and primarily subject, a unity containing and revealing all
its diversity to itself and preserving it because possessing it as its
self, and thus knowing, containing, exhibiting nothing but what it reveals*—
the whole contents of experience. That the absolute is subject not
substance, that all the reality of the absolute can only be what it
reveals, that all experience is just the laying out in extenso of the
CD
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content of the absolute^—all these are mutually implicative or oven,
convertible statements,. That then will ho henceforth the actual and only
content of philosophy on Hegel's principle.
And it is cloar that this advance which he is to take is just the
counter-stroke of his previous negative attitude towards all finitude.
Rot merely does he maintain and preserve all finitude through and bj means
of the absolute; the tendency of this new view even seems to be to do full
justice to them at the expense of the absolute itself. It is clear that
this complete preservation of finitude is a necessary consequence of the
supremacy of subject over object. But of this again.
With such a determination of principle and content, the method of
philosophy must necessarily appear [if only, so to say, unconsciously and
naturally.)by means of and in the course of the enquiry itself. Not that
Hegel could possibly bo unaware of the method by which this 'system of
experience' was to be constructed until he had well begun. He must
certainly have had a conception of the course the enquiry was to follow
from the start. But it is equally clear that he could only become fully
conscious of the richness and full significance of that conception after it
had been thoroughly and comprehensively used. That general conception
was undoubtedly that of development, a method which he had already
suggested as the only appropriate one for philosophy, a method 'neither
synthetic nor analytic.* This conception he found lacking even in his
/<>!
philosphical comrade Schelling/1^ and it is stating this divergence from
another point of view to say that the method of philosophy was the weapon
of separation of the one from the other.
But what can development mean, except that we must begin from the
lowest form of experience, the form where subject and object stand furthest
apart from each other, and from that point work up and through all the
various relations of subject and object which will and do show various
degrees of closeness of union between these opposite poles, till we reach
a.point where they are explicitly and without any reservation absolutely
7
one. Granted that subject and.object are identical, are one in
inseparably unity, granted that the absolute is and must be the identity of
these differences, (and this is the cardinal certainty from which Hegel
starts, a certainty which he maintained with confidence from the Jena
period onwards), still though that is ultimate and absolute truth, yet
the absolute must not be 'shot out of a pistol'at us; it is too rich and
concrete to be either appreciated or expressed at the start and, as it
were, at a single stroke; we must begin at the lowest level of its reality
and work from that. True we begin with the absolute, it is the 'terminus a
guo' of all genuine philosophy; but we must not begin from and at the
absolute, it is for our enquiry, for the system, the 'terminus ad quern';
_
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onl$ at the end are we brought actually face to face with it in its full
truth. Thus then the only beginning with which we can properly begin is
at that point of experience (which throughout is determined by the
fundamental unity of subject and object) where subject mind and object
stand ostensibly so far apart while yet maintaining a connexion by
referring explicit^/ly to one another. And since further it is their
fundamental unity that is the one final ultimate fact for the connexion
of both, the one.theme of our enquiry the succeeding forms of experience
will naturally be determined"on the one hand from this starting point on .
the other from the ultimate goal; in other words by the degree of explicit
realisation of the essential unity of these two opposites named. Thus
then the method consists in the systematic connexion of all the forms of
experience (actual moments appearances of the absolute) a connexion which
exists because all have a place and must be maintained in the one absolute,
and 'which is brought about by the immanent inner critical reference by
each of its actual furm (a form common to every experience, subject
object) to its essential determining vital nature, of its actual content
to the ideal of all experience. Only so does each form stand preserved
limited and connected with every other in the one system of experience.
The whole thus forms an organic development; its moving vital principle
is nameable as dialectic; and only by such a method can the demands of
system be met and completely satisfied.
It is clear in what consists the advance in this conception of the
/I 6
nature of the method over that of the preceding period. Anschauung and
Reflexion are no longer different and contrasted functions of the one
mind; they are fused into one single process without losing their essential
nature (the expression respectively of the positive and negative content
and processes of reason), yet without preserving their individual
•»
distinctiveness. The process of negating that of positing, and that
i
by one and the same act of reason. This advance is precisely what is
necessary to remove that artificiality of contrast of these two functions.
But now no sooner will this enquiry of the Phenomenology he completed
than another problem will present itself for solution, a problem already
implicit in the Phenomenology all along but only, becoming perfectly
visibly prominent at the end of that enquiry. If the unity of subject
and object is the one all-dominating reality of all experience, and if the
modes of this unity are just the modes of experience, then does not the
problem suggest itself to state in systematic connectedness the essences
qui .essences, the modes of unity qua unity which have been the ground
reality throughout the whole of the Phenomenology. We have those various
concrete relations of subject and object in experience; can we not, must
we not proceed further to extract or abstract the inner kernel of
ultimate truth exhibited and possessed by all the several moments of
experience, the vital essence contained in and determining each mode of
experience, each relation of subject to object, and constituting it a
necessary pulse in the life of the absolute. There is in every mode such a
vital essence, namely the identity, the unity which is the ground of the
connexion of subject ahd object in each case. And each such unity, each
several essence will be a specific truth, the ultimate truth namely of
each mode. The complete system of such unities such essences will of
course cover the sane area as that of the Phenomenology, namely the whole
of experience, the content of the absolute. The only difference will be
that whereas in the Phenomenology we have the concrete existent temporal
actual appearance of experience, in the other enquiry we shall have nothing
else but the abstract 'formal1 conceptual 'pure' essentialities stripped of
all direct reference to the diversity and tangibility of existent experiences
and expressed and connected simply in and through the purity and simplicity
of their true character. The content of this new science being the inner
reality of each mode of experience, and this inner reality being as we saw
the principle of connection of the various modes; it is further evident that
the method which this new science will follow will be none other than that of
the Phenomenology itself; it needs none other and it can find none other.
The only difference will be that the method will in this new science be
formed and exhibited in its transparent simplicity and purity; for here it
is operating upon and with and through a content which is itself transparent
and.'pure.'
But what else can this new science be but just what has been hitherto
/n
known as Logic? It will appear and is indeed evident that these vital
essences can only be concepts thoughts wkfrf&s, as such; and these have been
and are always the matter of Logic. But if then Logic is this ultimate
final absolute science par excellence it is clear that it will cease to be
R
distinct from and/JLie outside 'metaphysie'; will cease to be an
'introduction* to metaphysic will become an independent and self-
dependent science; will cease to be validly divisible into logic of
understanding and logic of reason; will cease to be a 'negative logic of
reflection', and will become in very deed the ultimate absolute all-
embracing science, with an ultimate absolute method-—will be speculative
philosophy in its truest form.
Thus the transformation of Hegel's principle and the systematic
establishment of its content, implied, paved the way for, and indeed necessi¬
tated his epoch-making Reformation of Logic. He was undoubtedly aware
that this was his next step after the Phenomenology, which, he indicates
(1)
to Schelling, is "merely the beginning." Not that there was no Logic at
all similar to.his own already given to the world. Fichte's "Wissen—
schaftslehre", and Schelling's "Transcendental Idealismns" vrere after all
merely attempts to establish by itself Logic or speculative philosophy as a
complete and independent science.But neither of them saw at all clearly
(1) ' (2)
Briefe I. 79. Leben 179, 188-9,
that this was really what they were trying to do; and in Fichte's case
both principle and method were wrong, in Schelling's while the principle
(1)
was m a way sound there was no proper method, no 'development'. The
importance-and significance of Hegel's reformation consisted not merely
in the soundness of the principle and the perfection 0f the method, but in
the careful, precise and sharp distinction of the problems of Logic.
Logic with him ceases to be mixed up in and with the concrete existent forms
and characteristics of the experience we find ready to hand; Logic is pure
Logic, deals with pure notions and essences, Logic handles the conception
as such. All that holds of existent experience, as concrete embodied
historico-factual appearance of the absolute is dealt with in a distinct
science in the Phenomenology. Notions, essences, thought-unities in
their'purity' and ultimacy are dealt with in another science in Logic
alone. It was exactly that confusion of problems that characterised both
Fichte and Schelling and even Kant; all of whose work is in truth restricted
(2)what characterises phenomenology of mind.
How all the changes are brought about we must now proceed to determine.
(1) (A)
ibid. cp. Ency.^485 (3rd ed.), j332 (1st ed.
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PART III.
The problem of the Phenomenology is perhaps best stated to be the
'Enquiry into and Examination of the reality of Knowledge.*^ This is not
the only or the fullest expression for it; others will meet us as we
proceed, and some have been already indicated. But the above seems for our
Immediate purpose the most accurate and precise, and we will therefore at the
outset make clear the import of its meaning. To begin with it must be noted
that the discussion does not in any way concern the possibility of
knowledgeit does not enquire whether there is really knowledge at all or
even whether knowledge is of the real. Hegel simply accepts in the first
instance the fact that there is knowledge, and accepts this fact in much the
(2)
same way that it is accepted by the ordinary consciousness. And with
this he must also admit the claims of all forms of knowledge to be actual
knowledge, at least prima facie. Whether and what knowledge is possible,
what are the conditions of possible knowledge, or again what are the limits
of knowledge he does not at all investigate.
Now knowledge taken in this very general sense is not,strictly
speaking^science, and yet is wide enough to include the latter. But it is





most perfect shape as Speculative science. Philosophy. Consequently not
knowledge as such, but scientific knowledge par excellence is his main
interest. And it is evident that this ideal knowledge, this ideal of
science is present to Hegel throughout the whole argument, and is as much a
reality for him as knowledge in general. He does not merely lead up to
this conception; it is active all along. It was presupposed as vre saw
before writing the Phenomenology; and thigj. conception of this supreme . J
science is operative throughout the investigation. It is not simply an
"ideal'' off science which cannot be attained; it is emphatically actual
science, the most real, the truest form of science attainable; indeed
strictly considered it is the only veritably true science. Only in this
its highest form does knowledge become real science, truly and really
knowledge. The phrase 'reality.of knowledge* has thus a double meaning.
All knowledge is real knowledge which is knowledge at all; all the
knowledge that appears bears this character, and the highest is at any rate
as much a form of knowledge as all the other forms, and is real in the same
sense as they are. But just in virtue of this community between all forms
of knowledge it is necessary to signalise the difference between what is par
excellence knowledge true science, and what is ordinary knowledge. Regarded
in this light true science is the only real knowledge; in it we have
knowledge as it truly is; knowledge "really." And this twofold interpreta¬
tion of 'reality* gives rise as we shall see to a twofold conception of the
problem. On the one hand it is an investigation into every form of
knowledge, on the other an enquiry concerning true and absolute acience.
When knowledge is taken in its widest significance there is only one
general characteristic common to all its forms, that namely by which
knowledge is knowledge-.— that it is the relation of subject to an object,
the presence of an object for and to consciousness. Such is indeed the
ordinary conception of knowledge. But the ordinary view distinguishes
between the presence of an object for consciousness and the existence of
the object by itself, as it is apart from such a reference. And this
distinction it expresses by maintaining that while in the former case we
have knowledge in the latter case there is truth, for the truth is the
essence of the object, the object as it is in itself without further
reference. This view of the difference between knowledge and truth Hegel
agrees to adopt without close scrutiny, partly because it is the ordinary
conceptions of knowledge with which he has to deal, and by accepting these
he has committed himself likewise to the ordinary interpretation above
given, partly because it provides him with a distinction of immediate use
for his own enquiry and a point of departure for it. For it is clear that
in that distinction between knowledge and truth we have the means at once
of determining what true science is and of investigating all other forms of
(1)knowledge as knowledge. This will become evident if we consider what
is the relation between the two factors,named.
Phan. 17.
172.
All knowledge has for its content truth; truth is not merely the goal
or aim of knowledge, it is all that any form of knowledge can contain/
Knowledge indeed nay he even asserted to be identical with truth. But this
•v/S
statement is ambigusasfc; for if truth is taken to mean, as it ought to mean,
the whole truth and nothing less, then obviously it was to emphasise the
difference between knowledge and truth, and to deny their absolute identity
CD
that the above distinction was drawn. At the same time however it must
be maintained that in some measure knowledge at all times and in every form
contains and claims truth. Hence it is necessary as well as convenient to
distinguish between the truth which there is for consciousness in every
form of knowledge, the truth which is possessed by consciousness wherever it
is related to an object, wherever there is an object for it; and the truth
of the object in itself, the complete essence of the object, which may or
may not actually be for consciousness, but which is all that the object is
and contains. Now it seems in the very nature of the case that these two
forms of truth will approximate. For the nature of knowledge of the truth
(2)
being true knowledge, since "the whole alone is the true^" ' it is
impossible to rest content in anything short of the complete truth. And it
is equally manifest that this truth will be attained .more completely by some
forms of knowledge than by others, more completely according to the measure
in which the object in itself, in its truth, is for consciousness. Hence
(D





it becomes very easy to admit that for even/ degree of approximation to the
truth in its completeness there is a specific corresponding form of
knowledge* If then we turn this result which appears as an inference, into
(1
a premises and a starting point for discussion we can say that every form '
of knowledge, even/ mode in which an object is for and to consciousness is
different from every other just in the degree of identification of the
object in itself with the object for consciousness and can be investigated
from that point of view.
Further, truth, according to the usual conception, consists in the
* agreement.of thought with its object.* Translated into the above terms,
this means that truth is the agreement of the object for consciousness
with the object as it is in itself. If then the only truth is the whole,
and if partial truth means merely partial agreement between the object for
consciousness with the object in itself the only complete resting place for
knowledge is where the agreement becomes absolute, where the two are
identified, where thought and the object are identical. Such an identifi¬
cation therefore is the ideal of truth, the truth of knowledge, the
absolutely true, and this is precisely the meaning of Speculative Science
in Hegel's sense, and with this as an ideal all other forms of truth and of
knowledge can be compared.
_
"Form" here and throughout this statement of the Phan. (unless
otherwise indicated) a "Gestalt."
Now if we give the abstract statements and conceptions more concrete
shape we shall see at once their significance for the investigation we are
considering. Truth is realised when thought * agrees', 'corresponds* with
its object. But 'thought* is simply the abstract expression for the Ego,
for the Subject, Mind. The Ego, as Hegel is never weary of saying, ne-ans
thought. Consequently t ich the object is to'agree* to attain truth at
all (whather partial or complete) is the Subject, the Ego itself. In
absolute truth, in absolute science, we saw thought, notion v/as identical
with object; in such truth the object was its notion, the notion its own
be one. But so Subject will be to itself object, Ego will be to itself
non E|o, Consciousness will be simply Self-consciousness. In other words
the absolute truth and reality of knowledge, science, is the presence to
consciousness of its own self; Self-consciousness is the truth of that
relation of mind to its object which constitutes knowledge. Only when the
externality of the object to mind has ceased, only when thought is
identified with its object, have we absolute truth, absolute knowledge; and
such identity is only possible, has no place except in self-consciousness.
Mow what object is it that the self has to itself in such knowledge?
What is its *self*? This is nothing other than thought. But if the
presence of thought to itself is the absolute truth, then the truth of the
object as it is in itself, above signalised aaTdistinct from knowledge as
such, urnst simply be thought, the notion. The object in itself is the
truth of the object, the object in itself is its essence, and this essence
is just the notion of the object, the thought which constitutes the object
is the object as it is in itself. If so then it is not the object in all
its details, in all its plurality of content which is expressed in its
notion, but the essence of the obja ct, the object as it is in itself (an
. -k
sich). Hence the self which is present "Mr itself# and thereby constitutes
absolute truth must be the totality of the essences, the- notions which
constitute and determine reality as a whole. Thus the complete and systerna^'
tic exposition of these would give absolute knowledge, speculative science,
and would alone satisfy the demand for the *supremacy of mind*, 'the
omnipotence of reason.*
As compared with this ideal of science ordinary knowledge presents a
decided contrast. Here all we have is the presence of an object to and for
consciousness; and this is distinct from the truth, from the object as it
is in itself. In knowledge as we usually find it consciousness falls in some
sense apart from and outside its object; these are not so much identified
as set over against and opposed to each other. Par from Subjectand object
being identical, they appear as the most absolute difference possible. Still
let the difference be asserted to be as absolute as possible it is evident,
-even from the view currently taken concerning their relation, that on the
v*>
one hand consciousness has -as knowledge some truth, that is, there is
always some identity some agreement between subject and object; and on the
other there is a closer intimacy, a nearer agreement and identity between
consciousness and its object in some spheres of experience than in others,
though in none short of absolute truth is the distinction and opposition
removed entirely. Now that there is truth at all implies that the essence
of the object, the object as it is in itself, is in some form or degree pre¬
sent to consciousness; and that consciousness should vary in the extent
of agreement simply means that consciousness can differ in its relation to
truth.
These two facts combined with that conception of absolute truth
already outlined, not merely suggest the analysis of the various forms of
knowledge with a view to establishing the degree of truth they contain,-but
indicate at the same the line along which the enquiry is to proceed. For
in the Phenomenology Hegel investigates knowledge with a view to discovering
the truth of knowledge, that knowledge which is absolutely true, contains
and reveals absolute truth. Knowledge, to repeat, consists in the presence
of an object to consciousness. But Hegel does not consider the object qua
object; to do this would be simply to increase our knowledge of the objeet
as such. He has to investigate the relation established in any form of
knowledge, the way in which mind (consciousness) appears when an object is
present to it. In other words it is consciousness in relation to objects,
and the forms that relation assumes, that is the object of enquiry. All
these forms ate forms of knowledge; and the point of the investigation is
first to disclose the true form, the truth, of knowledge. Now the truer
form of knowledge meant a greater * agreement1between consciousness and its
177.
object and vice versa. Hence it is that, since in all knowledge there is
besides distinction of consciousness and object, * agreement* between them
according to the truth contained in any given form, a change in the truth
means a change' at once of the object and of the form of consciousness. A
difference in the form of knowledge is only possible by a difference in both
form of consciousness and object of consciousness. That this should be the
(1)
case follows at once from the nature of truth and of knowledge. These
are constituted by a relation, the former of the notion of an object to the
object itself, the latter by the presence of an object to consciousness; and
these two apparently different relations become as we saw essentially one
and the same relation by the identification of thought and consciousness.
That relation then being necessary it is obvious that a change in the degree
or forms of knowledge means a change in both terms through which the
relation is constituted. And when therefore we investigate knowledge with
a view to determining its truth, that form of it which alone contains and
furnishes absolute truth, absolute science, in which alone the goal of
knowledge is absolutely realised, it is in the nature of knowledge and of
truth that every change in the form of knowledge, the determination of a
higher, a truer knowledge should mean an alteration both of the form of
(2}
consciousness and of the object. '
The very wide meaning which is given to knowledge in this enquiry






Now there is only one way in which this enquiry can be prosecuted. It
is assumed at the start that there is absolutely true knowledge, that there
is only one such form of knowledge, and that all other forms of knowledge
cannot give absolute truth. At best these latter contain merely implicitly!;
that absolute truth, and if we regard truth as one, the truth they contain
is truth in virtue of this implicit identity of their form with absolute
knowledge. The investigation of these forms then with a view to discover¬
ing their truth can consist solely in the comparison of the truth of
knowledge vrith the actual knowledge in a given case. And this comparison
cannot and must not be external, in the sense that the standard by which
knowledge is judged is brought to it from a sphere outside consciousness in
which is present that relation to an object. The comparison, the criticism
is immanent. For the truth of knowledge and the knowledge itself both fall
inside consciousness; both belong to, are contained in, consciousness,
the knowledge obviously so, the truth also because it is the truth of
knowledge. It must not however be supposed that the conception of absolute
truth is explicitly present at every stage or form of knowledge and that it i
is by means of this that the comparison is made. This is neither necessary
nor possible; in fact that this should be the case would be absurd. It is
not necessary, because every form of knowledge as we saw, (and as indeed is
perhaps obvious enough) has its own truth, that which is for it, the object
in itself, the essence of the object which exists for it, and it is by this
that the comparison need alone be made» And it is not possible, because
that conception of absolute truth is not attained, does not become evident tc
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consciousness till the end of the investigation itself. No doubt we may
say it is absolute truth which is >Kplicitly present in the truth of any
given form of knowledge; still this is not what is actually present and by
which the truth of that knowledge is determinable. The truth of any given
form of knowledge, and that knowledge itself, the object^ as it is for
4?
consciousness, and that which consciousness accepts as the essence of that
object, the object *in itself*, are both in consciousness. Consciousness
has in itself both the standard and the knowledge compared by the standard
Hence it is that the comparison is immanent; the investigation of knowledge
and the knowledge investigated both fall inside the one consciousness; the
investigation is of(consciousness by consciousness, and the enquiry just
consists inj whether the knowledge corresponds with the truth|, both of which
are present in consoiousnes
It night indeed be suggested that the enquiry is impossible, for the
is
only knowledge there is of the object as it is in knowledge, that it is
impossible to get behind this to the truth of the object the object as it
is in itself, or again that the only truth is just the object as it is for
consciousness. But the mere fact that in consciousness there is knowledge




In the widest sense. Phan. 08. Phan. 70.
If then it is found by the above method of procedure that knowledge
does not correspond to the truth, the knowledge must bo altered. But this
alteration, is at once a negation of the former knowledge and the introduc¬
tion of a change in the object, a new truth. It is" the latter because the
object present to consciousness and of which there was knowledge was simply
the object necessary to that act and form of knowledge. The change .
therefore in the knowledge arising out of the above comparison necessarily
implies a change in the object, would not be a change without it. And by
this change consciousness becomes aware that what was previously present as
the essence, as the truth in contrast to the knowledge, is not in reality th
essence but. merely the essence for consciousness, not really the truth, but
the truth for it. This in fact is just what the change means, the
recognition what previously was present as the truth was after all only
truth for consciousness, and the substitution of another truth(another
"an sich") in place of that which has appeared merely relative to
(1)
consciousness.
Again it is the former (the negation of the previous knowledge), for
that knowledge has shown itself not to correspond to the truth of the object
present to it, is in that sense false and is removed and replaced by the
(2)
succeeding knowledge. Still it is not simply abolished or utterly false.
(1) (2)
Phan. 71. Phan. 30 f.
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The mere fact that the changed knowledge proceeds from and succeeds to the
previous form means that this new knowledge is determined by the preceding
and is,therefore not the absolute denial of it but merely 'the negation
A
relative to the prcfcording knowledge, i.e. is a determinate limited negation
c i)
of it. In notion of this the proceeding form is, while negated, at the
•same time preserved, and maintains its reality in the succeeding, for it
determines the character of the latter. And further because the truth which
is compared and contrasted with each form of knowledge, is the truth of that
knowledge and of no other, the changed knowledge is the immediate and only
, the immediate negation, of the proceeding.
It is by the combination of all these factors then that the science of
the phenomenal forms of experience is constructed and obtained. None are
thereby omitted, all have a place in the context of experience. All are
limited, finite and in part untrue; yet their untruth does not mean their
annihilation; their untruth means no more and no less than that, by the
immanent process of their own content, each brings to view its inner truth,
becomes therefore absorbed in that truth, which again because a new content
of experience establishes a new form of experience ipso facto the negation
of but at the same time the result of and therefore containing the preceding.
T ,it is this character of negation determinate negation, as in fact




No other method oquld lead up to, by inner and immanent necessity, the
truest form of knowledge; and by no other method could it be ascertained
that all modes of experience had been included in the system. By no other
method therefore could the two ends of the enquiry be realised to exhibit all
experience as the organised content of the absolute, and) prove, justify,
establish the position of absolute Idealism, that substance is subject. And
again no other method would be suitable for this purpose; for the method is
one with the content itself, is not brought externally to it, is essentially
bound up with it, to refuse to acknowledge the one is to deny the claim and
meaning of the other. It is the content which imposes upon itself and re—
veals itself - through this method; for that content, being the moments of
mind which can and does abstract Itself from any particular content, and yet
posit each moment as its self, must thereby have its own immanent movement.
This process then is the inner critical exposition of the mind's
content (experience) to itself, and is named a dialectic movement. It
consists in nothing other than in asserting in bringing into explicit and
complete distinctness that identity by which, and in virtue of which the
opposed elements subject—object, in inseparable unity throughout experience.
Instead of leaving them opposed and expressing them as is- done in the
judgment or proposition (where their separateness is emphasised) this method
regards their identity their unity alone. Hence the prepositional form
and with it the process of establishing proving by reference to and by means




It accomplishes by that movement of inner
connexion what is otherwise established by more or loss external proof.
And just this insistence on complete and full presentation of that inner
unity constitutes the distinctive feature of dialectic process as compared
without exposing its entire content to view.
Such is the ground plan of this Science of Experience. All the forms
nodes of mind are taken simply as they exist side by side, as facts in the
history of conscious experience, as 'appearances' of mind. Phenomenal they
are too in another sense that namely of being appearances of true and
(3)
perfect science. In either or both cases the science which gives the
analysis and synthesis of all these phenomena of mind's experience is
accurately named Phenomenology of Mind*
eOaOiSat9&sek3G»Oa^(nt^!eS^iBaf..
In passing from this general statement of the matter and method of the
enquiry itself vre must remove at least one possible obscurity which seems
to hang over the investigation from the start. It is not evident from the
above whether the process as describe to be found actually taking place in
the consciousness investigated or whether the several moments in the
process appear in the significance ascribed to them solely for the
consciousness investigating. Does the consciousness which is engrossed
(2)





in actual experience become aware that on the abearance of a new truth the
form of consciousness, the form of knowledge must likewise be altered, that
the new truth present to the mirror of consciousness means that the mirror
itself has likewise revolved, and must necessarily revolve with it? Clearly
the ordinary consciousness is not actually aware of such a change; the
change is as it were behind its back and. in spite, of itself.
Consequently there is a moment of truth, of essence known, and of what is
to consciousness which does not come to light in the actual living
unobserving consciousness, but only to the investigator. Still this is
obviously only a formal difference; for the content of each new truth must
be present to the ordinary consciousness; must indeed be explicitly present.
It is merely the process by which it enters and becomes aware of the tmth,
and so possesses a new experience, it is only the origination' of the new
forms which becomes explicit to the investigator in a way which is not
(1)
present to the consciousness embedded in experience.. And it is this
double reference of the problem which gives rise to the double significance
of the essence, the truth, the object in itself, which appear: n the
investigation and is necessary to it. For the truth while at rst simply
taken as distinct from knowledge alone was seen to possess a twofold aspect,
that in which it appeared as truth for consciousness, and that in which it




which the mode of consciousness was changed and a new truth constituted.
It will not serve our purpose at all directly to furnish any systematic
account of the actual argument of the Phenomenology itself. Our primary
interest in it lies in its plan, and purpose which wo have already given,
and more particularly in its conclusion. We must restrict ourselves
therefore to stating in a sentence' by what steps Hegel reaches the result of
the Phenomenology.
Taking experience as it 'naturally' presents itself to mind, there are
throe primary and specifically distinct objects to which consciousness
can stand in relation, can know, with which it can identify itself. The
broadly distinguishable objects are:what exists as "object in space and time,
as 'external* to mind} the self^ mind as such, the subject as a self* and
what is at once itself and external object, what is neither of the former
specifically, but is both at once. These three give the general attitudes
of mind, known as consciousness (of objects), self-consciousness and reason.
Each has its own special modi; e.g. in the first the most elementary,, the
simplest mode is that where consciousness and objectivity merely meet at
particular points, so to say, the stage of merely immediate awareness of
objectivity sense knowledge sensuous consciousness. Another modi again
is^yfhere that original opposition is still posited but almost and implicit¬
ly overcome. And so on for the various modi of these three ground-forms of
nind.
Now the consists in beginning with that general form where
18G.
the essential and implicit identity hot-seen, the or posed elements in. the
relation is least asserted, namely at the stare of consciousness," and
if
Eoreover^begins with that particular mode in consciousness in which there
seems least of all identity, where mind and object stand furthest from,
complete exhaustive oneness namely at the stage of sense-consciousness. It
then proceeds by the method and means already indicated to shovr that
one mode when examined leads on to, finds its truth in another, the modes
of consciousness finding their truth in self—consciousness whore the
identity is more manifest, and this latter again finding its ultimate
truth in reason, where mind reaches its richest expression. Reason is thus
the truth of consciousness, the highest mode of mind. It embraces all
reality; and is all reality; objectivity and subjectivity arc one. This
is, therefore, the final general stage of the whole enquiry.
But the argument is not vet exhausted. For as we reach reason at
JL
first, that identity is merely abstract ahd formiasL The rest of the enquir;
is then devoted to completely exhausting all that this, the chief and final
result which was to be established, contains. The procedure is again
determined in the manner in which the three ground-forms of the whole
\
enquiry were established, namely- by reference to 'the distinctive spheres
I




in that kind of object which as a whole named Nature, which is
immediately identical -with it, but which qua nature and because merely
immediately present to reason is only implicitly identified with mind as
/
reason. Again by consideration of the unity of reason with Naturo we are
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led on to the unity of reason with its self, self-consciousness of reason,
mint concrete mind proper. From this again we pass to what is the truth
of both the outwardness, the external identity., of reason with nature, and
of the inwardness, the internal identity of reason with its self. This is
the absolute explicit and complete unsevered identity of reason with all
reality without exception, where individual mind is one with absolute mind,
where the absolute reality is absolute reason, absolute personality, subject.
This sphere is in the first instance that of religion and in the second
instance that of absolute knowledge. This last then is the final complete
and without qualification the truest mode of mind, highest truth of
experience, the result and the realisation of the whole enquiry. As it is
this form of mind which is, as we said, of supreme moment to our enquiry vro
pass to consider it separately.
This conclusion of the Phenomenology of Mind is of the greatest
significance not merely with reference to the various forms of mind which
have appeared in the course of the enquiry but also in regard to Hegel's
philosophy as a whole, and more particularly, as we shall see presently, in
regard to the Logic. It is essential therefore for our purpose that the
import of "Absolute Knowledge" should be fully appreciated. Let us recall
the problem which the Phenomenology seeks to solve. We saw that it sought
to state systematically all the attitudes which consciousness takes up
towards what is presented to it.as an object, and to exhibit the truth of
each form which showed itself, and by consequence therefore to state that
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form which was without qualification the final and completely true relation
which consciousness could take up to its object. The enquiry presupposed,
as a convenient though necessary starting point, the opposedness of object
to consciousness, the separation of consciousness on the one side from the
object of which mind is conscious on the other, and presupposed also the
conception of truth which, equally with the other presupposition, is found
in ordinary thought as it currently appears. And it is by means of the
inner connexion and"initial distinction between these two presuppositions—
between the relation of the object to consciousness its presence for
consciousness, which constitutes knowledge., on the one hand, and the object
as it is in itself, the idea of truth on the other-—that the enquiry
proceeds, and that the stages of its movement are determined. It is.in
virtue of' the fact that the object is for consciousness (and in that sense
external to separate from it) that it is possible for mind to be cognisant
of its truth, and it is because in truth mind knows the object as it is in
itself that the separateness of mind froxa the object can be shown and can
be found to vanish.
How it is in the very nature of such an examination into the * truth of
knowledge* that the results arrived at in the course of it should in effect
be double—sided in character. The enquiry affects mind on the one side
and the object of consciousness on the other, and affects them simultan¬
eously;, a determination of the one implies a determination of the other.
is not merely a certain object present to consciousness, but a
certain mode of consciousness peculiar to that object present to it; and
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these proceed pari pasu. Hence it is that an analysis of the truth
contained in a given moment or form of knowledge has reference to both sides
of the relation constituted in and by knowledge. Thus a change or
modification of the truth of a given form of knowledge means a change both
on the part of the object of consciousness and on the part of consciousness.
In short the truth of the object in any given case means also a truth of
consciousness, a specific pulse or moment of its life, a phase of mental,
(spiritual) experience, a fact in the life of mind; the development of the
one proceeds throughout by the side of the other a higher truth in the one
case just means at the same time and in the same sense a higher truth in the
case of the other. The knowledge of the truth and the truth of knowledge
pass from stage to stage together.
Further it results from the nature of the initial contrast between
truth and knowledge that the enquiry should be a determinate process towards
a definite conclusion. The 'truth of knowledge* means not merely the truth .
at a given stage but the final and absolute truth. In this sense also the
enquiry has a double reference, a reference not merely to. the nature and
significance of the knowledge immediately under consideration, but also to
the highest and truest form under which knowledge can appear in spiritual
experience. And it is just as true to say that 'the truth of any given form
of knowledge determines the final truth, as to say that the latter is what
implicitly determines the former. For it is of the nature of any given form
of knowledge (except the first) that it should be the truth in the first
place of what immediately precedes it and by implication the truth of all
that has gone "before, that it should include it in itself as a moment in its
own content, and. thereby determined by itself. Thus just as in any given
case the truth in question is determined by what precedes, and is what it is
by virtue of that which precedes and which it contains, as the final form is
the last determination of the truth, depending on because containing, and
evolved out of the preceding. On the other hand again it is equally and
perhaps more obviously true that it is the presence of the final form as the
ideal and end at each stage ,in the process which determines the truth of
each form of knowledge. The mere fact that in each there is truth and that
this truth is not annihilated implies that it shares in the nature of the
perfect.fera of knowledge.
What this final form must be is evident from the contrast between truth
and knowledge already mentioned. Since knowledge consists in the presence
and yet opposedness of an object to consciousness and since the consciousness
of the object in itself (its truth) means the dissolution of the opposition
between the object in itself and the object for consciousness, it follows
that the final and complete truth of knowledge can only then be attained
when the objectivity of the object and the truth of the object have been
entirely and without reserve identified. Now the objectivity of r.n object
just consists in its being for oonsciousness^in the maintenance of a self-
subsistence in contrast with and in that sense apart from consciousness; its i
j
being for consciousness and its objectivity are interchangeable terms. But a
it only maintains that subsistence and apartness in so far as and so long as
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the contrast persists.between the object in itself and the object for mind;
because it is in virtue of the "in itself" of the object that it is possible
for the object to subsist over against to bo for consciousness. If then
this "in itself" which constitutes its positi&»» substantiality becomes itself
object of consciousness, is itself for' consciousness, then clearly
objectivity opposedness of the object to consciousness has ceased to exist.
Thus we see that the final fora of knowledge moans and contains not merely
the identification of the object in itself and the object for consciousness,
but also the identification of the object itself with mind.
Reciprocally again such a conclusion equally signifies that mind is
identified in true knowledge with the object; for since the opposition has
vanished, the result leaves neither of the factors necessary to knowledge
alone and by itself to constitute the perfect form of knowledge. The argu¬
ment as we saw had a double reference throughout, a reference both to the
. *
object and to mind, and truth affected both equally. Hence in the final
absolute and completely true form of knowledge mind and its object are
absolutely one, the final truth of the object is-the complete truth of mind,,
the ultimate being of the one is identical with that of the other. And this
highest form is not simply , an ideal to which ail the preceding forms point
a&d which determines the process of the enquiry; it is itself a definite
actual form among other forms of knowledge; the truth of knowledge is at once
the absolute truth of mind , that fora of mind in which it most completely
a&<3 truly exhibits its essential self, and the absolute content of object—
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ivity, the inmost and ultimate essence of reality as a whole.
17ow vre have but to bear in nind these various aspects and determining
facts of the enquiry which have just been stated in order to make more
explicit the definite content of absolute knowledge. The throe significant
elements are: the double•reference first mentioned, the character and
conditions of the process of the enquiry, and 'the result at which it
finally arrives and must arrive. Since the truth obtained at each stage
registers a moment of the object as well as of mind, the deepening of the
knowledge of the truth of the object, i.e. the increased explicit conscious¬
ness of its inmost essence, means at the same time a more explicit
expression of the essential and ultimate content of mind. But since mind
becomes explicit only to itself, this unfolding of its content is simply
the increasing of the consciousness of itself by mind, the development of
self-consciousness. And again since the evolution of the content of
consciousness is synchronous with the gradual disappearance of the uistinc*
tion between mind and its object, the abolition of external objectivity is
the establishment of complete self-consciousness; the objectivity which is
there found is also and essentially subjectivity and conversely. The proees
. %
of the enquiry thus leads first of all to the #wa*in*lation of the object to
and with the content of mind as such, and thereafter evolves into complete
©xplicit^ness the inner and entire nature of mind in all its determinate
relations to itself; the whole argument being therefore a gradual
approximation by mind to its own essential self.
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Wo found the first steps in this self—consciousness actually reached
when the moment reason was attained; and thence forward it will be noted
mind is occupied solely and consciously with its self, in some one or other
of the forms under which it is presented to itself. Reason is not simply
a "function" of mind amon» other functions; it is a phase or form of actual
mind; it is that form namely in which mind abstractly and explicitly
expresses its oneness vrith itself in its object. It is the first the
immediate and- therefore formal and merely general statement of the mind's
.own nature; for the bare consciousness that its object is itself, that
itself is one.with all reality, that all reality is itself, is the first
moment in which raind appears explicitly as what it actually is. It is not
in reason conscious of its self as distinct from the reality of which it is
conscious; it is conscious of itself in all reality. The opposition
between consciousness and reality had already been overcome in the
discussion of understanding; and the consciousness of self as -opposed to a
consciousness of reality asserted to be distinct from an individual self
had also been passed in review.
reason therefore mind first appears in its truth, having the
character of universality, as conscious only of its self wheresoever and
whensoever it has an object presented to it, as one with all objectivity, as
subjective and objective at once. And this which is the first statement of
the truth of mind is the first indication of the result of the whole
enquiry. For reason is not merely the nature of mind, it is at the same
ID4.
tine tlT© nature of all reality; is not to be set over against reality; that
would take us back to the opposition already overcome; there is no distinc¬
tion between reason and reality, the one is without reservation the other.
Reason is therefore the truth of objectivity. Reason however is not
completely realised, mind, and it is thus distinct from further developments
of mind. It is merely the first approximation to the ultimate truth
regarding mind and its relation to objectivity. In short reason is
essentially mind but reason does not exhaust the content of mind. Only when
reason is further developed .does it exhibit the complete reality of mind.
This.step having been taken the argument from reason onwards slightly
alters in complexion. Kind has now ceased to be distinct from its object, 01
to be conscious that it is so.. The further process of the argument consist*
(toAfvwwu]ttherefore in mind «wes®eymore inward to itself, in the deepening of its
consciousness of its own reality. In reason mind has established itself
as the ground reality of the world; with it all inner opposition between
mind and objectivity has ceased; there is no reality left to which it is
foreign, no reality whose nature it does not determine. The only develop¬
ment which remains possible therefore must consist in the more intimate
consciousness by mind of itself, a process by which mind is shown to be
more concrete, richer in content and which finally lays bare the ultimate
and -atjnature of mind, the highest, the eompletest form under which it
appears.
All along, be it observed, mind is both objectivity and subjectivity,
its realisation of its itself is not confined to a subjective sphere; its
explicit reality is essentially the negation of any opposition between the
two; what it shows itself concretely to be, it is objectively quite as
* • 6
truly as subjectively. It may bo said that in_ .the argument
seems to have passed away from any reference to the objective^) to a very
narrow meaning (to what lies "outside" consciousness), and if so entertained
would make the whole argument meaningless. For mind has already been shown
in reason to be by itsolf and one with objectivity even in that narrow sense
in which it can be restricted to externality in the form of ' nature*, and the
very reason for moving to mind as it fully appears in ari(j its
identification
allied forms, is that there that A of mind with objectivity, that
inmost unity of mind and reality is more closely and explicitly and
consciously realised and expressed, and therefore mind in these forms is
more truly itself.
Further because mind has been established as the one all—pervading
all determining all embracing reality, this gradual process of realising
its content reaches a stage (in the sphere of Inner where
objective realised self—subsistent mind is contrasted with, is opposed to the
inner consciousness of its self which the individual mind possesses. Out of
this contrast, which is also an inner though not explicit union, religion,
^ we saw, arises. Now it obviously lies in the very nature of Hegel's
principle hitherto developed that the ultimate absolute reality, which is
the object with which consciousness in religion is concerned, should be
130.
convertible with absolute nind. This after what has been said hardly
needs to be proved. But again it is characteristic of religion to lay its
enphasis not upon the specific individual who is religious but upon the
object with which the religious mind is concerned, namely the Absolute
Reality. That is the one all—absorbing fact before the religious
consciousness, before -which that consciousness itself seems to fade into
insignificance. In religion, in short, the individual, reality is transcend
ed, another reality asserts itself higher than and containing itself the
f ^
transcended a-ii—.i*fe reality. Hence it is for this reason that in religion
rnind reaches a deeper consciousness of its own reality, makes more concrete
its own nature than was possible in the case of morality. For in the
latter mind is conscious of itself in individuals, its reality as the
universal principle is explicitly and concretely established in the sphere
of finite individual minds, -without direct implication in that result of the
ultimate and absolute' mind which contains and is the fundamental reality of
both the merely immediate reality with which reason is concerned and of the
VUjuAJUCtf
self-$Mj>ftflwtod reality which appears in morality. But in religion it is
this ultimate Reality as such, in the totality of its contents^-w^w**© nature
is especially, indeed solely determined. Instead of absolute mind being
either implicitly present or insufficiently realised wo have there in the
religious consciousness its actual content as it is in itself made explicit
and determinate. And the development of mind into concreteness being simply
the expression of a consciousness/itself, we see that in religion absolute
mind becomes actualised and self-conscious. In other words in religion we
have the absolute nature of mind, as the ground reality of the world,
completely and definitely expressed.
Now we have just seen that religion has its whole significance and
interest in the absolute essence which is its object; it eliminates or
delimitates the individual in the sense that the religious mind occupies the
sphere of Supreme Reality, is consciously one with it, plants itself in it,
and claims direct and immediate relation with and cognisance it. It
places itself so to say at the point of view of Absolute Reality. But from
this consideration^only a very short step is necessary deliberately and
without qualification to take up the actual position of the Absolute as such.
In fact such a step is already implicit in that transcendence of the
individual just spoken of. And this step Hegel has no hesitation in taking.
Indeed he was logically compelled to take it not merely by the above
consideration but by the very nature of his principle, a principle which
also made it easy for him to do so. For since mind has been established as
the absolute essence of all reality, individual mind and absolute mind are
thereby identified; and since the concreteness and reality of mind consist
in self-consciousness, we have in the self-consciousness of individual mind
the concreteness of absolute mind itself, the realisation of the one
combines with it and expresses that of the other. When therefore in religion
the individual asserts and maintains its unity with absolute mind, and claims
that in absolute mind it is conscious of its own essence, its own self, that
the absolute mind is itself and that its own self-consciousness just means
the complete and explicit union with the absolute, it is evident that the
identification is as emphatic as it could be, that the elimination of the
individual as such is secured, and that the standpoint of the absolute can
be confidently assumed.
This position is established in the result obtained by consideration ol
religion: the highest and final form of religion is shown to be revealed
religion. That this should be the highest form is simply the direct
consequence of the nature of his fundamental principle. For given that '11
Reality is essentially mind, and that the self-consciousness which appears
in religion finds the self of which it is conscious in the absolute essence
of the world, it is in the nature of the case that the highest form under
vrhic'n that relation to the absolute is expressible should be that of'the
immediate and direct consciousness of its content and nature, or in other
words should be the direct manifestation by the absolute of its inmost
reality to the mind whose self it consciously is. If true religion is
found where absolute mind is the self of the religious consciousness, it
obviously follows that, the nature of self—consciousness being that of the
direct coming to and presence in consciousness of the content of the self,
the truest expression for the relation established between the absolute and
the religious mind is that of manifestation, immediate outgoing of its
reality, direct communication of the content of the former to the latter;
and this is the character of revealed religion. But while in revealed
religion the assumption of the standpoint of the absolute as it is in it¬
self and for itself without reservation, i.e. without reference to the
individual, is assured and indeed made necessary, while in fact revealed
religion simply means that in it we are immediately placed at the position
of absolute mind as such, (for otherwise it would not be revelation at ail)
yet in religion at any rate the individual is not explicitly and positively
eliminated. If this were the case it would not strictly .be revelation, for
revelation implies necessarily revelation to a mind which in some sense is
distinct from the source of the revelation. Still the individual is only
preserved in such a sense as to make it entirely compatible with the direct
presence of the absolute. And this obviously can only bo done by the
thorough identification of the individual with the absolute mind, or as it
is otherwise expressible, of the human with the divine nature, a complete <
unity which Hegel explicitly maintains. But this while it seems to reassert
the separate reality of the individual, restores us to the position of the
absolute by that very indifference of the content of individual and 'absolute
nind. Still the maintenance of that distinction is necessary to religion
as such. Hence it is that in religion the Absolute is not completely and
explicitly determined as it essentially is. In religion the absolute
content is merely "represented"* to consciousness; it is
not explicitly expressed in terms adequate to its- nature, but in
symbolic or incomplete form. The content is certainly revealed in its
fullness, but the form in which this takes place is not the form which
expresses that content in its truth, an inadequacy due to the nature of
religion and to the maintenance of that distinction "between absolute and
finite nind.
Thus in religion absolute mind is not determinately and absolutely
self-conscious. In order to become so one step and one only is necessary,
that the form in which it is consciousness of its self should absolutely
correspond and be adapted to the self of which it is conscious. But to
obtain this, any such distinction as that which is necessary to religion,
must 'dearly be abolished. The absolute mind must be the sole reality for
which and by which its own content is explicitly determined. But this
result is only obtainable and is accurately attained when to its content is
given the form of its inmost self. The absence of this is all that is
wanting to that content as it appears in revealed religion; and to adopt this
step is to express completely and truly the essential and final nature of
absolute mind. When absolute mind gives to its content the form of its
.self, knows itself only as it is in its self without further reference it
has become perfectly conscious of itself, has attained the highest pliase
of its reality, has expressed its deepest ultimate truth. But to know itself
in and through the form of self, is to comprehend its reality in its own
Torn, to identify its reality with its own truth, and to find the one in the
other, to have as its object the self for which the object is present. And
this is simply to realise its own notion, the notion of its self, that by
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which it is what it essentially- is; to be outwardly and to itself solely
what it is inwardly and in itself, to be both objectively and subjectively
merely and completely its self means nothing other than the realisation
of its very truth, its notion. This self which knows itself, in its own
notion, and in that notion has realised itself is simply absolute knowledge;
knowledge of the absolute content of absolute mind by absolute mind is
perfect and final knowledge, is true science.
Not, be it noted, merely knowledge about mind, nor again simply a
knowledge which is for mind. It is a form or mode of mind which is absolute
knowledge; highest mode of mind is literally convertible with absolute
knowledge; for hero we are dealing with knowledge as a living activity, as
an active process, not as a product. Here then absolute mind is completely
explicit and concretely realised. And with this it is obvious that the
standpoint of absolute mind has been fully and unequivocally adopted. This
knowledge of which we speak has no limiting reference to individual finite
aind; it is solely the standpoint of the absolute from which such knowledge
is regarded, and from which the knowledge is furnished. It is without
-t
•pensen unlimited, in-finite perfect absolute knowledge to which we have
attained and which is here considered.
Such a point of view is clearly the logical and final w** of the
result arrived at in revealed religion; no other step was left to take, and
this step taken was at once possible and necessary. Absolute knowledge is
thus the necessary conclusion of the Phenomenology. It follows indeed from
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the two ground principles and vital contentions of the enquiry, that
reality is essentially mind, and that mind is in its essence self
conscious.
Thus in absolute knowledge the limitations of individual knowledge are
removed, the conscious contrast and opposition between the object and the
consciousness to which it is present have been completely overcome,
"natural* consciousness has been conducted up to the point of view of true
(1)
knowledge, the various forms and moments of * universal have been
(2)
successively passed in review and made explicit to it as its own.
This result however does not mean, indeed it seems both paradoxical and
absurd to suppose it can mean, that when we reach absolute knowledge in the
course of the enquiry we are literally transported out of all possible and
'actual contact with and relation to the individual self-consciousness which
we saw to be a factor necessarily to be regarded when dealing with religion,
and which in fact is the mind we are in the first instance more immediately
aware of. We saw that in revealed religion absolute mind was explicitly
identified with the individual finite "human" mind; that the content of the
former is revealed, made manifest to the latter, that the content of the
latter is in reality that of the former. Now this relation is double—sided;
the very meaning of such revelation implied that the reality of both was
CD (2)
Phan. p. 22, 62. ibid. 22, 23, etc.
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actually and explicitly the same in content; the individual was conscious
of the absolute as its self, the absolute was conscious of itself in and
through the individual. And it is admitted that the content of both religion
(1)
and absolute knowledge is the same. Hence therefore the further
e*
determination of that content which establish/absolute knowledge without
qualification is likewise and at the same time the determination of the
content of our finite self-consciousness. We are bound to admit this if we
would make all those elements consistent which we have already mentioned.
But if so we see at once that there is no inherent impossibility in the
assumption of the standpoint of absolute mind, and no need to suppose that
in such an assumption we are transported into a wholly different sphere. The
complete knowledge of self and by self which absolute knowledge furnishes
is expressible by and is determinative of our own self—consciousness; that is
to say, mind as we know it determined in the manner indicated attains to and
furnishes absolute knowledge. We might state this position otherwise by
saying that while in both revealed religion and absolute knowledge the
content is the same and in both the individual is essentially
identified with absolute mind, the content of mind is in religion regarded
from the side of the individual primarily, in science primarily from the side
of mind u. and without qualification. And this position agrees with





which were indicated at the outset.
Now this consideration has not merely the significance which it
obviously bears on its surface viz.: that in Science (V'issenschaft) we have t
mode of mind, a kind of knowledge which is actually real, and neither
impossible nor untrue. Regarded more closely it has also the indirect
importance of indicating what such science will furnish, what in detail the
content of such knowledge will be. The knowledge in question is absolute,
is knowledge of the absolute. That which is absolute, ultimate, unconditional*
ed, is mind or, more particularly, mind in its own essence. Now it is this
absolute essence which is asserted to be the self the reality of the
religious consciousness, and it is this essence which is the content of
both absolute and individual mind. But the essence of mind, the mind's
inmost self, that which in it is both objective and subjective, absolutely
real, is thought; or expressed as a multiplicity -£sf thoughts. And thought
mediating itself with itself, thought vc^h has the form of self and therefore
possesses that living movement characteristic of concrete self-consciousness
(mind) that mediation and self-reference which is the nature of mind, is a
(2)notion. In absolute knowledge therefore whicli is the realisation of the
nature of mind, the complete expression of its notion, not merely is the
nature of the knowledge simply the notion of mind, but the knowledge
supplied is simply of the notions which constitute the mind's essence,
_ _
Phan. 22, 3. p.27, 43, etc.
by which it is what it is. Mind knowing its self (thought) in the form
^ of self (self—referring unity) absolute essence, of the character
of mind, self-constituting, self—determining notion that is the principle,
nature and content of absolute knowledge.
Since then it is only those notions which constitute the essence of
mind of which absolute knowledge consists, and since it was the absolute
essence which was the self of the religious consciousness, we see how it is
possible at once to claim to have attained to absolute knowledge without
qualification, and yet not to pass beyond the sphere of individual mind, to
make such knowledge attainable by finite mind. The notions therefore which
are the ultimate and absolute essence of finite mind are identical with
those of absolute mind, and the determination of those notions in the former
reference is at the same time the satisfactory determination of them in the
latter. The essence of particular mind is a competent guide to the
essence of universal mind.
It should be noted in this reference that the content of absolute
knowledge is as a matter of fact in a sense circumscribed and limited.. It
is not all and every kind of knowledge; it is,, as appears indeed from the
whole enquiry, one form or mode of knowing among the various other forms
which have appeared in the course of this genetic history of knowledge. It
has or furnishes a specific kind of knowledge, is a determinate relation of
consciousness to an object, and in that sense and for that reason it is
limited in character. The fact that it is solely with notions that it deals
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would itself indicate that it is restricted. It is noteworthy indeed that
as we appraoch in the enquiry towards the complete expression of mind,
towards true knowledge the object of knowledge, that which is presented to
consciousness becomes gradually more universal and abstract in character.
That is in the nature of the case. For the attainment of absolute truth
means at once the extension of the area covered by the object of knowledge
and the determination of that object as the absolute essence of reality as
a whole; only so, is ultimate truth ascertained. And these qualifications
are obviously limitations of the nature of the truth arrived at. It is not
the whole of absolute reality in its wholeness and in its detail that is
professedly the content of absolute knowledge; it is simply the essences
the notions which are the ground realities of the absolute that it
determines. We may indeed go so far as to say that it was only such
elements in the absolute that could be known in their absoluteness, as in.
faet it was only such elements which were common to individual and absolute
Bind, only by such was individual in contact (so to absolute mind.
To suppose that in absolute knowledge we have the absolute as it is in its
literal detailed entirety fully and completely aware of itself, conscious of
itself as a concrete life seems far too grotesque and impossible a
presumption and is in reality as we have already shown not by any means
necessary in order to make valid and possible the claim to have attained
and to possess absolute knowledge.
Still the nature of this toIUltimo asserted to be characteristic of
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absolute knowledge requires to be carefully guarded and qualified. For in
a very definite sense it night be maintained that restriction ie precisely
what is not predicable of such knowledge. It embraces within its compass
the whole of reality, and the notions though necessarily abstract are with
equal necessity concrete, they contain in themselves all reality are at once
subjective and objective, self-mediating essences. In short then in so far
as (1) it is one form of knowing (though the truest) among the other forms j
which have appeared and which are necessary to mind, (2) it deals merely
with the essences, the notions of Absolute Reality, this knowledge is
limited in character; but in the sense that it deals with the concrete
essence of all reality it is not restricted.
From this we are led to determine what relation the content of this
final absolute knowledge bears to that of the preceding; in what relation
the truth determined.in and by absolute knowledge stands to that contained
in the other mode of knowing which appeared in the enquiry. And on this
point we are not left in much doubt. : In the first place it holds in the
case of science as it does of every stage in the process of the enquiry, that
the truth possessed by each mode of mind, each form of consciousness,
contains in itself the truth of the preceding form; the latter, as we saw,
is not merely superseded by the former, is not merely negated by it, it is
preserved and maintained in it. The very meaning of higher truth implies
°n the one hand that in it we have attained a fuller insight into, more
complete and essential conception of the object than was obtained by the
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by the preceding conception of it, and on the other that the truth arrived
at in the previous stage is so far as it is true TrgryUina4 in the later
and higher truth. The highest absolute truth therefore must contain in
itself all the truth which has appeared in the course of the enquiry.
Mow there is only one way in which this is possible and comprehensiblet
the truth possessed by absolute knowledge must be the absolute and complete
truth of a reality which has been presented in various ways to consciousness
in the course of the enquiry. For if as is assumed the truth attained by
absolute knowledge is different from the truth attained at the preceding
stages, and if also the reality whose truth is to be known were also
assumed to be different at each stage, then clearly we should have no
common ground whatever for the various moments of the truth, to which they
could r for, and by which they could be compared. It is true that in a
sense the object is also distinct at each stage; the object as it appears
to consciousness in perception for instance is not the same as the object
as it appears in * observing reason.* But it is because perception is
different from 'observation* that the object is constituted differently ia I
the two cases: in each case we have the one reality as a fact present to
consciousness, but the attitude consciousness takes up towards it, the mode
o.fi mind in each case determines it differently. If this were not so, we
repeat, if both ultimate object (reality) and truth were quite different in
each case then no relation of higher and lower truth could be established
or asserted.
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This point is made still clearer by a second consideration by means of
which the relation between the absolute truth ana the preceding can be
determined. It is one mind which is present and operative throughout the
whole of the enquiry; all these modes of consciousness which have appeared,
are modes of one mind and all are necessary to it. Hegel calls this
concrete mind 'the individual* and regards it on the one hand as the
'universal individual' which has passed through and entered into actual
possession of all those forms which appear in the course of its history
as given in the'Phenomenology,* and now here in the enquiry produces or
reproduces the process of its history, thus becoming fully conscious of
itself* and on the other hand as the *particular individual* which must pass
p
through all these stages in the fH-edyn.Iie-history of universal mind, must
(1)
become conscious of all these forms as its own. As these two aspects
are from the point of view of the aim of the enquiry the same in signifi¬
cance, their differences may here be regarded for our immediate purposes
as irrelevant. How just for the reason that there is only ono mind
throughout the enquiry, and that this necessarily contains in itself all
these moments, or phases of its reality that truest and highest mode of
Kind, absolute knowledge, must contain in itself, i.e. as part of its oven
content all the plurality of content found in the life of mind taken as a
whole. All the forms of consciousness-which have passed before us are
(D
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different and distinguishable truths of mind, necessary modes in which it
stands to reality, to an object- There is not simply one node and one truth
for mind, namely the truest mode, absolute knowledge. This would mean that
there was only one kind or phase of experience; a statement which is false
to experience itself. If indeed there were only absolute knowledge, we
night easily maintain that there could not be absolute knowledge at all; it
would have neither meaning nor content. Ill the forms that have appeared
arc taken as forms all equally essential to and constitutive of experience;
one cannot be literally a substitute for the other. We cannot e.g. by
possessing absolute knowledge ipso facto and in the same sense be moral,
or vice versa. Mind is too rich to be able to be gathered up into and
exhaustively represented by one form of consciousness even the highest; and
is equally too poor to be able to do without any. All of them are pulses in
the life and reality of mind, all of them are constitutive aspects and
elements of its own experience, each of them expresses and contains a truth
accessary to the full representation of its life and experience, a necessary
and true moment of its explicit reality.
Again because each phase of mind*s experience is a truth of mind, and
since, as we saw, such a truth has a double reference, a reference not only
to the mode of mind but to the object present to consciousness, the truth
st each stage will mean likewise the expression of a determinate truth of
Phen. 22, 23.
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reality. Consequently the richness of the experience of mind means at the
same time the richness in the truth and content of reality. Mind then
being one throughout its experience, and exhausting in these various modes
its own content will by that same process exhaust the whole truth contained
in experience. The multiplicity and diversity in the content of truth is
bound up with the multiplicity of the nodes of mind; and the one mind by
the different attitudes to objectivity becomes acquainted with and contains
(u
in itself the whole realm of truth. Absolute knowledge therefore will
and must exhibit as its content all the truths which make up the multiple
experience of mind. It must do so, because the existence of the various
truths of reality (which it is its nature as absolute truth to state) are
bound up with the existence of the modes of mind; the plurality of the
content of truth is only and is exhaustively found in and by means of these
forms of conscious® ss. If therefore absolute knowledge would not be simply
a bare repetition of self-consciousness, it must take up into itself all the
truth which makes up the experience of mind. Only from the latter in short
is the content of absolute knowledge drawn; only from the truth there found
is the absolute truth determinable. And this includes not merely the
forms of mind preceding the last, but the last itself also as a form of
nind. For the notion of.science, of absolute knowledge itself, because a





sphere of absolute knowledge and is determined as part of its content, as
we shall see later on, ;
Now from the considerations which we have adduced it becomes easy to
determine the relation in question. Every mode of mind contains and
expresses a truth of experience; every one is essential just for that
reason. Each is a specific moment in the living reality, mind. All these
iodes together contain the whole truth of experience. But since in absolute
knowledge mind knows itself as its self, in the form of self, and mind is the
entire and absolute reality, the complete knowledge of the notions of mind
must clearly exhaust the whole content of reality. None of the other forms
considered possess this characteristic, for in none of them does the mind
profess to know its self as it is in itself; none of them exhaustively
embrace the whole area of reality, express the whole nature of mind. Thus
then absolute knowledge will not merely contain and make explicit the
ultimate nature, the absolute truth of reality, it will also contain the
whole truth of reality, will be the sphere of complete absolute truth. But
if so, then clearly it ^5^ as a form of knowledge covers when taken solely
by itself precisely the field exhausted by the whole enquiry of the
Phenomenology. For this as we have pointed out embraces the whole truth
of experience. But in that case, if the final form of knowledge has as its
object the whole truth of which mind is capable, and if the whole sphere of
Logik. I. 34: III. 328.
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truth has been exhausted by the various and different forms of mind which
have appeared in the enquiry, then it is evident that the content of truth
as it is laid bare in the former must be identical or correspond with the
truth as it has appeared in the latter. It cannot be the same, for obvious
reasons already indicated. The truth in the two cases must therefore
correspond. In other words the notions which appear 3^ the absolute truth
in science, appear in the Phenomenology as forms of consciousness, as modes
(1)
of mind. And this holds good of every form without exception under ■
(2)
which mind has appeared.- For, as Hegel puts it, "as mind in its
concrete existence is not richer than science, neither is it in its content
poorer." Since mind is one and self-contained, since all the truth of which
mind is capable of experiencing is passed in review in the course of the
enquiry in those forms in which mind rfet actually experiences it, and since
finally science is the absolutely true form of mind and therefore containing
and exhausting its complete and ultimate truth, it is clear that the whole
of that truth which is necessary to the complete exposition of the range of
truth attained and possessed by mind must likewise appear as the content of
a science which professes simply to furnish complete truth in its absolute
and perfect form.
It must not be supposed that we have here two different truths of the
one experience or again two different experiences of one and the same
__ _
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complete truth. We cannot have the former, for truth is one., experience
being one and mind itself one. To suppose that we could have two truths
would mean with that we had not exhausted the area of truth known to mind,
or that the one mind could have totally diverse experiences. But the former
alternative is excluded by the assumption that the Phenomenology has passed
in review all the mind*s truth^; and the latter by the fact that one mind
simply means one experience. Again we cannot have two different experiences
of complete truth for the like.reasons. Absolute knowledge is certainly an
experience; but it is only a part or moment of it. Absolute knowledge when
completely developed all it contains covers the whole area of
experience. Consequently that which at once constitutes science a
determinate mode of experience, and yet makes it possible for it to embrace
all experience can only be the attitude taken up by mind in absolute
knowledge, the character of the truth which it contains and reveals. Or to
put it otherwise the one truth appears or presents itself differently in
experience taken as a whole and in absolute knowledge which embraces in Its
scope all experience. In the former (in experience) truth appears in
concrete form as mode attitude of mind, as it historically exists and
actually exhibits itself in time. In the latter (absolute knowledge) itseli
one mode of experience, truth appears in the form of truth, as truth,
abstract ultimate ^Strang
This form as we saw is that in which miitd knows its essence as its
self and in the form of self, the notion of mind explicitly and..,,»n,i.xily
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stated as notion. Thus it comes about that what is specific form of
experience, determinate form., of mind appears in absolute knowledge as a
notion, concept (Begriff), a determinate moment of absolute truth. Still in
spite of this difference it must not be supposed that there is any vital
opposition between the form (particular manifestation) of mind as such, and
the notion; that the notion is external to the form of experience, and is
merely brought to it so to say from without. So far indeed from this being
the case it is rather the intimate and.vital connexion between them which
must be insisted on. Per the notion pis not merely the resulting final
truth of mind, it is also the ground of the form of mind itself; it is at
once the culminating point of experience, and the ground of experience. The
movement towards the perfect form of mind, does not merely complete itself
in the notion; but the notion is the ground the inner principle of that
(1)
movement itself. Each concrete form of experience, the actual existing
form of mind contains and is in its essence and inner nature a notion.
This indeed is just what we might have expected. For on the one hand
it is mind*s own inner and ultimate truth which is gradually evolved by the
process of the enquiry, a result which by the aery nature of the process
could not be obtained unless it were contained immanenter in the preceding
forms. And on the other hand absolute knowledge explicitly professes to
state the full and essential content of mind, and can only do so if its
CD
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peculiar content is actually the inner truth of each phase of experience in
which nine! appears* It is to state the same fact in other words because
/ '
each movement of mind's experience is a form of knowledge (relation of
4S
I consciousness to an object) and h-^vof truth, and because absolute truth
is the content of absolute knowledge that the inner relation between absolute
knowledge and the preceding forms of experience is established and the
content of the one is the ultimate ground of the other. In both cases we
have knowledge, in both cases truth and in both cases the whole of
experience is covered. But in the one case the whole truth appears as all
the actual modes of concrete mind, as real appearances of real mind, in the
other case (science) the whole truth appears as the whole essence, the
complete essential content of. mind. In the one case truth in its diversity
is extended or distended in time over and in the form of experiences of mind
which appear as distinct from each other in the actual history of mind, which
differ from one another as experience occupying different moments in the
history of mind; in the other case truth is as a whole and at once contained
in and expressed by a single distinct form of experience, whose characteris¬
tic it is to contain the whole essence of mind, an essence whose diversity
\
.
consists in the determinate difference of one notion fro® another. The
Cwaavw* throughout the whole truth is in the one case simply the fact',
that the various experiences are experiences of one mind, which concretely
appears in all, and in each in a specifically different form, in the other
case the complete truth is expressed in the same specific form, namely in the
form of the notion, the essence of mind. But in spite of this close
connexion between the truth as it appears in science, and the truth as it
appears in concrete experience we must guard ourselves against a simple
identification of the two. We have seen that what appears as part or
moment in science has appeared and is found concretely as mode of mind's
existence in experience. But it must not be inferred from this that we
have merely to consult the latter in order to find the former, that we have
merely to go over all the modes of mind as they have appeared, determine
the essence of each of these and express the result as systematic science,
as absolute knowledge. In short absolute knowledge is not simply and
literally a reproduction in essentia of the modes of experience, a mere
restatement • sub specie of the historical appearances of
truth. There is no such merely step for step correspondence between them.
There is a specific determination in the content of truth as it appears in
absolute knowledge; without this indeed it would not be a different mode
of experience. We have stated wherein this determinateness consists, and it j
is in virtue of this specific character that the development and systematisa-^
tion of the content of absolute knowledge pursues a course of its own
without any explicit reference to those modes of mind whose essence they are.
"The pure notion," as Itogel puts it, "and its further development depend
fl) '
solely on its own pure characteristic determinateness."v That absolute |
_
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knowledge -will contain and exhibit the complete and absolute truth of
experience is indeed guaranteed by the fact that it is mind in its
essential character which is to be represented in and which is to be
satisfied by absolute knowledge; the unity of mind guarantees the completes
of the exposition of its essential nattire. The ultimate identity therefore
between the complete truth of absolute knowledge and the complete truth of
experience is thus guaranteed by.the" fact that it is the one and the same
mind whose truth is expressed in both, in the former as essence, in the
latter as concrete appearance.. An explicit and deliberate reference to the
latter in order actually to determine and evolve the content of the former
is therefore at once irrelevant and unnecessary. In the last result they
cannot Hit "17^ the same. Hence while in the main we may look for and will
discover a general correspondence, a detailed agreement need not be expected.
In regard to one important factor however both the Phenomenology as a
philosophical exposition of the modes of experience, and the exposition
contained in absolute knowledge -are unreservedly agreed, the method by
which the process is carried through, by which the system exhibited is
(1)
developed. This is the same in both. After what has already been stated
it .is evident enough that the method cannot be different in the two cases.
«e saw that the essence of each form of mind was a notion, and the movement
from one to another is a notional movement. Again it is the one
~ " _




mind whose complete truth is systematically expressed in each case. And
for the attainment of system of scientific coherence and connected
development there is only one true method. • The nature of this method as it
is pursued in the Phenomenology has already been indicated. The only
difference between the process of the development in the Phenomenology and
that in absolute knowledge is not in the principle by which the development
in either case is obtained but in the .nature of the object matter dealt with
by each. In the former mind is ostensibly divided from its object, and the
discovery of the absolute truth of knowledge was found to consist just in
the gradual approximation to final explicit identification of the two oppos¬
ed elements. In the latter that opposition has been overcome, truth
appears in form of truth, content and form of truth are identical; and here
the process of the system of absolute knowledge consists in the develop¬
ment of truth in the form of truth. In the former the method was applied
to mind simply as concrete actual mind; in the latter it is applied to the
truth of mind as truth. The method is bound to be the same for the method
was all along immanent in the content of the enquiry. The method which has
brought out each step and stage is the vital immanent activity of each
stage and Trrm itself. Hence the further development of the content of any
particular f if it is to be really true must follow the inner movement
which determines the essential nature of each stage itself. Only so could
any stage develop its emplicit content into system. And this is all that
absolute knowledge can do if it is to realise itself in a system; it must,
f) 220,
that in to nay, simply develop its content in the character ami determinate
ness which that content possesses. We might have say; a special develop¬
ment of parts of mind (as this appears in C, BB, of the Phenomenology) and
call this special development the System of Ethics (or as it is called
later in Hegel*s career, the Philosophy of Law) J or again we might have
similarly a special development of religion, and call it Philosophy of
Religion, and yet in all these cases have- application of one and the same
method. Similarly it is this one method which must operate throughout the
development of absolute knowledge, which is simply one mode of experience
like those others, one offshoot from the root and mainster of all
experience, mind.
In- what: has just preceded we have stated,as completely
as'is necessary for our purpose* the character and content
of Absolute Knowledge. We have shown its place in the con-
crete experience of mind/as' an' existent fact; we have seen
that it is the inevitable and necessary outcome of the
enquiry into the truth of mind, and have stated in what
respects it differs from,and in what it agrees with,the
preceding modes of mind. The importance of a precise
determination of absolute 'knowledge for the development of
Hegel's Logic cannot well be over-estimated. For, in fact,
as must have become already evident, absolute knowledge is
simply that science which appears in his system as Logic.(I)
Absolute Knowledge is not science in general, but science
lifted into its abstractness, science in its inmost essence,
fche very notion of science, science in its final principle,-
its ultimate terms. It is not a descriptive analysis of
any and every science, but the definite determination of a
special science, namely, essential science, science of the
(1) Phan.29,45. Logik.1*8.34,35.
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essences. Such a science v/as for Hegel Logic. That, this,
identification of Absolute Knowledge with the Logic was in
no sense an aft or-thought on Hegel's, part is quite evident
from the passages referred to, and indeed from the nature
of absolute knowledge itself. But if then Hegel established
the Logic as the final and complete truth of mind and main-
tained precisely the same position when frwoki-ag; out the
Logic itself the significance of the nature of Absolute
Knowledge as stated in the Phenomenology for the determina¬
tion of the nature and content of the Logic in the form in
/
which we now have it^is manifestly very great.
Between the appearance of the Phenomenology in 1806-7
ana that of the first volume of the Logic, 1812, we have
no published writings of Hegel to assist us in the discovery
of the process by which the Logic as such was being con¬
structed. We have, indeed, one publication which while it
did not appear in printed form till after his death was in
its substance produced auring this interval. I refer to the
"Philosophische Propaedectt ik" . (1) Important as are these
(1) Werke XVIII.
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collected notes of Kegel's lectures(1) to the Gymnasium
pupils in Nurnberg during his Rectorship, and helpful as
they are in the elucidation of some points in his scheme,
it xs impossible for two reasons to find them of value for
the determination of the. last stages in the development of
his Logic. In the first place, the contents of the logical
parts of these notes are in their main elements entirely
the same as those fowned in the final systematic statement,
and in their details only on unimportant points divergent
from it. They,therefore.,in no way indicate any better than
the final Logic itself how his positions were obtained, In
the seco.nd place,the form in which these notes were furnished
was determined solely with reference to the needs ana capa¬
cities of those to whom they ware given; so that what does
not appear in therr. cannot be assumed to have bean absent from
the mind, of the author himself, or to have been not yet grasp-
ed. by him; and w..at does appear in them rqualli'i,3.s. its presence
there and was in its matter and method thero presented by
the fact of its being adapted to the intelligence of those





who listened to it. Hence, for instance, it is significant
that the compressed inner and immediate connection of one
part with another, and its immanent development out of it
by the strenous application of 'the only true philosophical
method'(1) hardly appear at all in these notes. What is
found and what indeed gives them their value, is primarily
the precise distinction of one element from another, the
' Idefinite delimitation of one part from the succeediifrjr, and
the grouping of the elements under general headings -
exactly what was necessary for the beginner in philosophy,
but not, therefore, a completely philosophical exposition.
In the absence, then, of any direct assistance from
Kegel's utterances between 1807 and. 1812, we must seek to
determine the mode of the construction of the Logic by such
aid as the Phenomenology can supply, dno. that identifica¬
tion of Logic with absolute knowledge, which wo have al¬
ready mentioned, furnishes a satisfactory ana entirely
trustworthy clue by which to attain this object, 'for not
(1) There is hardly any indication of an explicitly
adopted philosophical method at all in the"PrupaedH.
Yet Hegel's method had been used in constructing She
Phan, and its importance recognised.
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merely1' is this identification consciously made in the Pheno¬
menology, but it is ratified ano. repeated in the statements
made in the Logic itself. This indicates,indeed,that Kegel
had-attained his final philosophical position by 1800 ( or
perhaps a year or two earlier, for the Phenomenology was
written between 1803 ano. 180G) , and that the general scheme
and. plan of his system was explicitly present to him from
that time onward. Ana this general scheme as well as the
fundamental point of view doN* not seem in any important
respect to have been altered at any subsequent period. We
are justified, therefore, in passing from the Phenomenology
at once to the construction of the Logic. We need not
pause to gather up the results hitherto attained or to in¬
dicate in what respects development in his view has taken
place. This will be batter dealt with after the discussion
of the Logic itself.
We propose, then, to show how from the nature and im¬
port of absolute knowledge the construction of the Logic
arose and was determined. And we shall try to exhibit this
first of all with reference to the general nature of the
JL$.6
content or the Logic; secondly, with regard to the method
pursued in the Logic; and. finally by reference to the parti¬
cular parts and steps' of the Logic.. . . , ' •••' ; V;
But to. begin with, it is necessary.'-"'to'. State'-as .clearly
as possible the relation in .which -the'Phenomenology 'stands .to
the Logic, so far at least as this has not already been
dealt with. We have considered from the point of view of
the Phenomenology the relation in which absolute knowledge
as a mode of mine stands to the other modes of the mind's
experience. We have now to consider from the point of
view of the Logic what relation the whole enquiry of the
Phenomenology bears to the purpose of the Logic, It is the
same problem regarded from two standpoints; in the one case
from that of the Phenomenology per se, in the other, from
that of the Logic per se. We must carefully guard ourselves
therefore, from trespassing on ground already covered.
Absolute Knowledge or Logic, then, is like every other
mode of knowledge of which mind is capable, in the first
instance a fact which exists in the experience of mind.
It is not itself unreal, it is an actual mode of concrete
X.X1
mind; not the only mode, but one which exists beside others.
It is one form of experience, and. appears as an existent
\ ■
fact in the history of mind.(1) This beent character,
its existential appearance is what is common both to Logic
as treated by the Phenomenology, and Logic as a 'fait
accompli* in the system. This aspect of the Logic we shall
see is of vital importance.
In the next, place, there is a more inner connexion
between Logic and Phenomenology. Th4 latter professes to
be the antechamber to the former, and the former "presup¬
poses" the latter.(2) The sense in which the Phenomenology
is to be regarded as the presupposition of the Logic is not
difficult to determine, if we bear in mind the nature of the
two sciences in themselves. The Phenomenology is the philo¬
sophical statement of the modes of experience which mind,
possesses; it takes-, thesemodes simply as modes and merely
as existent facts in experience, and criticises and sys-




of the highest mode of mind. The first science, therefore,
deals with this highest mode simply as a mode, the second
science with the content, with the truth that this mode
contains. Consequently the object matter of the two sciences
is not the same. Thus the content of the one cannot be the
logical presupposition of the content of the other . Rach
science is qua content sui generis. If this ware not so,
then the two sciences would be one and the same science, and
the first step in the logic would be the immediate outcome
of the last of the Phenomenology, whereas the notion of
science is only found towards the and of the Logic, and
the beginning of the Logic is determined by turning back to
the beginning of the Phenomenology (as we shall presently
see). The presupposition can only refer then to the form
of the science of Logic, to the character of the content
found there. This character, as we have seen, is the abso¬
lute unity of truth with certainty, of thought with reality,
of the notion (Begriff) with being {Peyn). Such a unity is
presupposed in the logic, it is not established there; the
Logic starts under the assumption and its whole procedure
&£ ')
depends on the assumption that the opposition of those elem¬
ents has been entirely removed. The very meaning oi' "pure
truth" requires and implies this: and the whole of the Logic
from first to last contains pure truth and that alone. If
then, it contained anything implying that opposition, it
would not contain what it professes to deal with. Thus
that initial presupposition of the character.of thecontent
of Logic cannot by the very nature of the Logic be estab¬
lished inside the Logic itself; but being granted and
allowing the Logic to start from it, and presuppose it not
merely at the beginning but all through the Logic the various
truths which possess this assumption,i.®., those truths in
which the above-named opposition had been entirely overcome,
can be systematically exhibited. But just because that
specific character of the content of Logic is (1) not self-
evident(2)j a philosophical truth,(3) is presupposed tay the
Logic, it requires to be justified, and philosophical!y
established. And this not merely for the sake of other
people,i.e., those who do not prima1 facie accept it, but
for the sake of the system itself, for the unity and com-
pleteness of the system, which just, because claiming to
exhibit absolute truth,roust show that it already and also
in some sense contains other truths as well. Now this
character of the content of .Logic it is which the Phenomeno¬
logy philosophically establishes and. does so in the manner
we have shown. It is, therefore, the presupposition of the
logic in the sense that it is the justification of what the
logic assumes at the start and throughout its enquiry; it
establishes the presupposition of the .logic. It is not
logically bound up with the Logic; the Logic indeed could
be prosecuted without any such justification of its point.
of vj-ew, and is, in fact, carried out without any reference
V)
to that presupposition, For this character of the content
''
of Logic cannot be described as. in any sense a logical as¬
sumption of the Logic. A logical assumption is made at the
outset, the first step depends on it and the rest follows
without any further reference to at. But in the Logic this
character belongs to and is possessed by every step and move¬
ment of the Logic, at the end as well as at the beginning.
There is no more justification for treating this character
as the logical assumption of the Logic, than lor calling
Z&l
extensity the logical assumption of space as dealt with in
Geometry, It is simply the character of that space for
.Geometry, What the Logic deals with first consists of such
elements as possess that quality of being "pure truth".
If there were no such elements, the science of Logic as
understood by Hegel, would be simply impossible. But that
there are such elements ia what the Phenomenology estab¬
lishes. V'hat those elements in extenso are, and what
their relations, is exhibited in the Logic, and it is in
this sense that the Phenomenology is the presupposition of
the Logic. It is not the logical presupposition in any
strict sense of this term; for the truth of the logic
as scien'ce does not depend on, is not guaranteed by the
fact established by the Phenomenology; the Logic guarantees
its own truth, is a self-closed science, depends for its
truth solely on itself. Nor is it the historical presuppo¬
sition of the Logic, in the sense that the Phenomenology
must necessarily have preceded the Logic in time; for each
science is in itself complete, and the order in which they
appear depends not on their content, but on the aims of
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their author personally. The Phenomenology is the philoso¬
phical presupposition or the Logic; it establishes as a
philosophical position the point^ of view from which the
Logic starts; and. the existence of the Logic as a science
depends upon that position. The Phenomenology ".justifies"
as a philosophical truth the character of that content with
which Logic deals; this justification can only be given in
view of, and by, reference no content and knowledge which
do not bear that character, and consists simply in showing
that such content as Logic deals with is the highest and truest
content- known by mind. The "justification", therefore, is
a "deduction."; the nature of the Logic is established through
the process of inner analysis ana development from other
forms of knowledge, and. by exhibiting Science as their
final truth .
There are other senses in which we may regard the
Phenomenology as the presupposition of the Logic. We may,
for instance, take it to be the process by which the indi¬
vidual is convinced of the standpoint of the Logic. In this
sense ; it is for the subject approaching the system the
first step to the understanding, of it.It.undoubtedly has this
function; but important as this subjective purpose is,it can¬
not be considered to exhaust the nature of the work; it is
determinative of its purpose, but not constitutive of its
content. The science is an objective scienceip a philosophi¬
cal "Science of Experience"(1), is necessary to the system,
and is the first part of the "System of Science" (2),* (jfict
again if it had only this subjective significance it would
be singular that it should leave off precisely where the
system .in extenso should begin; it hardly seems probable
that, though the subject is guided successfully through
■
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error and untruth, he will thereby be helped to the under¬
standing of the truth itself. We, therefore, confine our¬
selves to having indicated the essential relation in which
I
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the Phenomenology stands as a presupposition to the Logic.
But finally, we must state the relation which the
content, of the Logic bears to that of the Phenomenology.
Both cover the whole of reality, in the one case, «s the
content of actual experience, in the other as the content
of absolute truth; in the one case as temporal - spatial
(1) Phan.72.
(2) Logik.l'.8. The change made in the title later does
not seem in any way vital.
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reality, in the other * as absolute ultimate reality. Each
science is complete in itself ana is self-cietermined, i.e.,
determined, by the inner nature of its own content; ana yet
each goes over the same field. Mo sphere of reality, there¬
fore, lies outside either; But in that case each can be
regarded as containing the whole of Hegel's philosophy(i),
each contains the system as a whole in a different form.
And this paradoxical as it seems is unquestionably true;
though it is only partially true. For each, while contain¬
ing the whole system, is itself merely a part of that sys¬
tem. This arises from the difference in the immediate
object-matter in the two cases. On this difference, however
yvA'
we canjdwell further here without either repeating what has
been said oft anticipating what follows.
But though each science can be regarded as covering
the whole, system, this does not mean that the system has two
beginnings, nor again that there are two Systems. It is
one and. the same principle which is present in both sciences
in the one science (the Phenomenology) the principle appears
explicitly as a result at the end of the enquiry; in the
(1) Op. Phan.609,610. Logik I11.20,27.
other it is explicit at the beginning; in both case's it is
operative throughout. The difference of science, as we
have said, lias in the difference of immediate object-matter;
and the difference of beginning is determined by that object-
matter. There is, as Kegel insists, no absolutely initiatory
philosophical science, though in each philosophical science
as such we - must•begin at the absolute beginning for that
science.(1) While, therefore, in the Phenomenology ana the
Logic we begin in each case at the beginning, the system, as
such, begins absolutely with neither; each begins simply on
its own account. There are, indeed, differences in value
for the system between these two sciences; for the one
(Logic) states in ultimate form the complete ana absolute
truth contained in the System, while the other contains
the truth of .the System in the concrete forms of actual
experience, the essence of which, as we have seen, is itself
just the ultimate form as it appears in the Logic. But this
does not lessen the necessity for each science in itself.
(1) Gp. Briefe. Theil.I.354: "Enc;/«&'(Ausgabe r.) §.30.
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Is is nofr, therefore, the area of reality wovered by
each science, which makes them distinct, but the way in
which the reality is regarded in the two cases. Ana when
we ask what constitutes the distinction, there is only at
this stage, one answer to be given. Tn the Logic Mind, the
whole of whose■experience was passed in review in the Pheno-
/
menology, expresses the content of its experience in that
form which for mind, is ultimate and without reservation
absolute, irreducible, aelf-subsistent and simple. But
this form is just the notions the thoughts which constitute
its nature quS mind. Mind, per so, i.e., regarded abstractly
as mind, is not 'a. blank, nor is it a tabula rasa.. It. has a
determinate content, which is that by which mind is mind.
This content is thought or thoughts, the notions, And since
these were proved constitutive of those various forms of
experience, the reflection upon or with those notions is
bound to cover the same area of reality as the previous
science, and what it does to or with these forms of experi¬
ence is simply to lift them into their absolute ultimate
mind, constitutive form, express thorn, in short, in their
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absolute essentiality. There seems no other way in which
to express the difference between the content of the two
sciences. Why they (the forms of experience) should have
this ultimate essence, ana what this ultimate form does
to the concrete actual fcrm,y^are questions which are not
a^.<L vvwv <M-*k *^T w
answered in the System,
require to be answered.
But we have already anticipated that development of the
Logic out of this conception of Absolute Knowledge, which
we now proceed to state.
n
The primary ana fundamental fact in the Logic is its
content. Prom this and from the character which it possesses
everything else in the Logic (both the methou and as we shall^
the steps) is in the Last resort determined. It is neces¬
sary, therefore, to deal in the first place with the general
nature of this content.
It follows from the position which Absolute Knowledge
occupies in the Phenomenology that the content of the Logic
is to begin with, that of reason and of reason only. For
all the later moments of that enquiry were simply further
determinations of reason. Rut reason is not to be regarded
simply as a "function"of mind, among and alongside others,
e.g., perception, understanding. It is in a sense a "func¬
tion", it is the truest function, but it is more than func¬
tion. Reason as such is "essentially mind, and moreover, it
is the essence of mines, CLs reason first appears, there¬
fore, it is simply impliciter all that later appears as
explicit determinations of it. And since reason was proved
to be the essence and truth of the other preceding forms of
mind, all that specifically belongs to them will be preserved
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in and exhibited in the form and as the content of reason.
The nature of reason just consists in the identification
with itself of all that is present to it, all that it knows;
reason determines it explicitly as itself. But this means
that the only content of the Logic will be that which rea¬
son gives to itself. It will not come from without, it will
be self-determined, constituted by reason and for reason.
But this is simply to express in other words that reason,
the source of the Logic, is in the Logic explicitly self-
conscious. Or again, since reason is mind, and is true
mind, the Logic is the exposition by mind, of the
content of its true self, its essential nature; the Logic
is the self-consciousness of mind in its truth.
Further, it must not be supposed that this can imply
that the Logic is something in any sense external to mind
as an actual reality. for Logic is not merely the self-con¬
sciousness of reason (mind), b#t in Logic mind is most
truly, most completely self-conscious is, therefore, most
truly mind." Logic is in reality, the truest actual form in
which mind exists. Logic is not separate from mind, it is
Mo
literally and. without any reservation actual mind, - it
does not "belong to" mind, is not "the way mind works", it
is the mind's own essential reality. When miner is most
tr&ly itself, when it is most completely explicit;, most
fully self-conscious, conscious of its true self as its
self, it appears as the science of Logic. Logic is not
simply the true science, it is true mind; it is not simply
the absolute form of knowledge, it is the necessary and
final mode in which mind must exist. l£- is the necessary
result of the Phenomenology because reason is the truth
of mind, and Logic is the truth of reason. Logic is as
Hegel puts it, "the crown of the life of mind". This fact
is of supreme importance for the determination and. the
accurate appreciation of the nature of the Logic - "For
-thereby Logic becomes not a barren catalogue of forms; it is
a living reality; it is endowed with all the vitality of the
self-determining, self-moving, ceaseless activity of con¬
crete mi no. itself. The mere fact that Logic is self'-con-
cious, self-referrant . mind means that its content possesses
the actual life which is mind's essential and inalienable
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characteristic and that in virtue of that life .the exposi¬
tion in the Logic is possible,for the Logic, indeed, is the
very essence of that life itself.
But again, this self-consciousness of mind is not the
barren consciousness by the mind of its own Ego; the Logic
is not the repetition of the bare "go, the formal unity, the
abstract identity of mind with itself. This, though it
would of course be active self-consciousness, would never
yield, any content except one single content - the Ego as
such. Not only is this not. the true logical content, but
that content is not even the mere repetition in different
forms or by different expressions of that one formal Ego,
such different expressions being conceal ad. as having no
value and no meaning in themselves, but merely in so far as
they half conceal and half reveal the Ego, which all the
while is indifferent to them. This might perhaps be assumed
to be the case from the fact that the Logic is merely con¬
fined to the mind as such, is merely self-conscious mind;
for since mind does not go without for its content, the
content might be thought to be nothing but a formal self.
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Such a possibility is provided against by the next charac¬
teristic inherent in the nature of Absolute Knowledge.
It is the final moment in the position that reality is one
with mind, that all reality truly interpreted, is reasorn,
that the truth of reality is reason, that mind is the
ultimate essence, the one all-comprehending reality. The
self, therefore, which is conscious of itself in the Logic
is not, and cannot be in any way a 'formal self; it in its
unity embraces and is identifiea with the comprehensive
totality of the whole of reality. Reason does not merely
negate, it contains in itself all the preceding truths of
mind; its very nature is to show all aspects of reality to
be identical with itself; this, indeed, is just what to be
their truth means. Hence far from their being only one
formal content in the self which is conscious of itself, as
Logic, its content is rich with all multiplicity and variety
which reality as a whole contains. The fact that it is one
reason, one mind, which is conscious of itself throughout
all reality and the fact moreover, that each ultimate essence
of reality possesses in the Logic the form of mind itself
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(the notion) tio not destroy or render meaningless the
diversity of the world. Rather the whole significance of
the enquiry lies in establishing the reverse of this posi¬
tion, in giving value to that diversity, and. yet identifying
it in. its entirety with mind. Thus there is secured the
fullness and diversity of the content of. the Logic. Self-
consciousness of reason where stated explicitly must, give
infinite multiplicity of detail, endless difference in its
realisation, the self which is conscious of itself is
endowed with all the riches of reality, and reality contains
infinite diversity. Mind's self only attains the fullness
of its own life when it finds itself in ana one with all
the fullness of experience. The content of the Logic, there¬
fore, while merely the exposition of self-conscious mind in
its truth, must still be as manifold as the variety of
expertence.(1)
Once more, the identification of reality with reason,
with mind, means the same, in this case, as subsuming the
object under mind, determining mind as higher than the
(1) Anything else would be .either Scepticism, Solipsism, or
Idsnt i tSt s ys t em.
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object, as establishing that substance must, whom analyised,
lead to and necessarily i.e.,. logically pass into Subject.
All these expressions are essentially equivalent. How the
subject here meant must, at least at the final stages of
the enquiry, (Religion and Absolute Knowledge), be, as we
saw, the ultimate subject, the absolute as subject. We
are compelled to actopt the point of view of the absolute
in Religion, and Absolute Knowledge was merely the complete¬
ly final expression for the result established in religion.
Hence in absolute knowledge we have not a knowledge about
the absolute by the finite mind, nor a Knowledge which lies
external to arty subject finite or otherwise. It is the
self-consciousness of subject as such, of the absolute sub¬
ject itself. Logic is, therefore, not a possession of the
absolute; it is actual absolute mind actually conscious to
its self as subject of its own essence in the form of its
self. Logic as the completed organism of truth is just
absolute subject laics bare and exposed to its self as it
essentially is. That the Logic can be anything short of
this, we see to be impossible when we observe that it
realises and must realise in itself two supreme ends of the
Phenomenology. It is the. realisation of the ideal of Know¬
ledge; the opposition between certainty and truth, between
thought ana object, between mind and experience (reality) is
to be completely overcome in the Logic, and the ideal of
knowledge just consists in overcoming that opposition and.
establishing a positive actual identity between these else¬
where and otherwise opposed elements. Ana that realisation
can only take the form which we find in the Logic, where
the content of Knowledge is determined from and by the
nature of mind itself, - for here there is still knowledge,
both consciousness and an object (Self) present to it, and
yet the Knowledge is the highest perfect ideal, the elements
opposed being one and identical in content. And secondly,
at the same time, it is concerned with the highest Reality
of mind, the Reality of religion. It merely carries one
step, and the only remaining step further the experience of
religion. In this latter, mind occupies the sphere of the
Absolute, asserts its friarg*e with it, identifies itself
v
with it. If religion is a valid experience, the Logic,
which merely states explicitly and. in the form of the mind's
own self the content which is already present in religion,
namely, the content of absolute mind, absolute subject, -
then the Logic must inevitably be the self-consciousness of
absolute subject. The Logic, therefore, is the meeting place
of both those ends, ultimate knowledge, and ultimate Reality;
it is both at one and the same time. And it is important
to note that they must involve one another, that the attain¬
ment of the one is at the same time, the possession of the
other, - for this is secured by the establishing of the
more general position that reality is one with mind (reason).
Ultimate Knowledge would not be absolute unless it were the
actual expression of absolute Reality; and this again would
not be Absolute Subject unless it knew itself in. the form
of self, in absolute knowledge. Hence it comes about that
merely to attain the point of view of the ideal of Knowledge,
to have overcome the complete opposition between Knower and
Known, to have reached, in short, truly objective Knowledge
is ipso facto to know the Absolute as it knows itself(1).
(1) Gp. PhKn.570.f. Above.t0L>t
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Assuredly the Logic, is the thought and work of the individual
thmker, of Kegel personally and of tiisa who follow him,
i.e., of finite minds. But just because when such an indi¬
vidual deals with such knowledge as realises the highest
truth, namely, the knowledge where minci. is one with its
object (and that is certainly the ideal of truth), ail limi¬
tation of knowledge to finite consciousness has been re¬
moved, there seems no meaning whatever in suggesting that
the Logic is still knowledge which belongs to a finite
mind.(1) Finitude has by the assumption been eliminated;
the knowledge is therefore purely objective and qua truth
in no sense subjective(2) (s-xcept to the Absolute Subject).
For the Logic then to become what it claims to be, all that
is required is to take up the standpoint of Absolute objec¬
tive Knowledge. And this standpoint as we saw is that of
the notions which constitute- the essence of reality.
(1) The same holds good even of the order of exposition
pursued in the Logic; for this is necessarily determined
by the nature of the content as we shall see; and. with
the first step of the Logic Absolute Knowledge begins.
(2) Hegel's own way of putting this position is that
in such knowledge the individual knower: has merely./
fche function of""looking on", ( Zusehen).
Op. Phan.09.
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But if Logic is thus the Knowledge by the absolute
Subject of itself, the Logic must be at once Speculative
Philosophy, true Theology, and AbsolutoRevelation -$na
that it is so Hegel affirms in almost so many words; as
indeed to hold that the Logic has these aspects is merely
to regard, its truth now from the point of view of the thinker
now from that of the Absolute Subject. Speculative Know¬
ledge is the term used, all along by Hegel (and others of
his time) for the actual knowledge of the absolute; it is
natural, therefore, that it should be used as an alternative
for the Logic.(1) That the other terms are valid is evident
from his own statements. The Logic is "die Dstrs tel.lung
Clottes wie er in seinem ewigen viesen, vor tier Krschaffung
/
der Natur unci eines endlichen Geistes ist." (2) Such an
exposition is what a genuine theology at least has for its
object. And again when dealing with the various determina¬
tions in the course of the Logic he almost invariably indi¬
cates this theological reference, by regarding the notions




the Logic in its beginning ana in its sna.(l) Every moment
of the logic is an element in the whole absolute truth,
truth as it is for ana as determined by absolute subject,
whose content it is at every step in the exposition. That
finally the Logic is conceived of as Revelation is likewise
evident. This is not merely on the general ground that it
is the self-exposition, the self-expression of the absolute
subject; for that reason alone it would doubtless unquestion¬
ably deserve the name of Revelation, which just means the
actual showing forth by absolute mind, of itself as it
actually is. But Hegel's own explicit statement is that
the "true form of mind is just to be what is revealed or
manifest" ('Das Offenbare'), that this is its very notion(2);
-as it is as we have seen^simply the notion of mind, (which
is its essential substance) that the Logic makes explicit.
Mind in the Logic appears to its self in the form of self;
that is, is manifest, as immediately revealed to itself.
Nay more, so complete is the identity between.the Logic and
(1) Cp. Logik.III.327 ff.
(2) 0p.PhSn.569 ff.
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the idea of Revelation that Hegel states not only that
Logic is Revelation, but quite explicitly that Revealed
Religion itself is speculative Knowledge. His words are
"God. is only attainable in pare speculative Knowledge, ana is
only in that knowledge, and is only that Knowledge itself;
for He is Spirit, mind (der Geist) ana this speculative
knowledge is the Knowledge given in and possessed by re¬
vealed religion. The former knows Him as Thought, (or pure
Essence), and knows this Thought as Being and as Existence,
and this existence again as the negativity of its self,
consequently as self, as this and as universal self; but
that is just what revealed religion knows." (1). These words
completely bear out the claim to designate the Logic as
Revelation. We have merely to remark that the distinction
between the Logic and Revealed Religion which might seem
lost sight in the above statement is, as Hegel goes on to
show, and. as we have already stated, that in the latter this
knowledge of God is merely immediate, &s is in the form of
"Vorstellung"(2), in the former that Knowledge is completely
fl) Phan.571.
(2) Phan.594. .'4
and absolutely explicit, mediated and developed. Still,how-
ever, whan we insist on the supreme importance of this dis¬
tinct ion between the two, the "identity- of content" (1) and .
their essential affinity,even in general character(of being
self-revelation of the absolute Subject) remain none the less
pronounced and unambiguous. And this is of supreme importance
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as indicating the line j^cx development which Hegel' s thought
has followed, and the governing tendencies of his philosophy.
We pointed out at the start, the essentially religious mot if
which determines, his thought?, and here we find that in his
finished system not merely is religion one of the highest
modes of experience, but the very highest is itself a form
of revelation. The significance of this relation between
philosophy and religion for Hegel cannot, however, be con¬
sidered a$ this stage, and must be deferred till we reach
our conclusion. We have, merely to indicate here the theo-
logical character of the Logic, which itself, indeed, is
but a consequence to be drawn from the general nature of
the content, of the Logic. Absolute truth could only be
(1) Ibid.
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so if that;- truth were the Truth of Absolute Subject, and
the Absolute Subject of real Experience is the same for re-
w
vealed religion, as for Logic. In the former it is presented
as such; in the latter it is simply exposed, explicitly as
v+"the ground of all incomplete experience.
It is furthermore, the nature of the Logic that its
content as such should contain no fundamental opposition
with itself. Its content is simple, self-contained and
self-subsistent. There is in it nothing whatever of that
contrast .and opposition which affected the other modes of
mind ana forms of knowledge, the fundamental and
characteristic opposition or contrast founta in all others
was, as we say that between thought and being, between
notion and reality. And it was precisely this which had
been overcome in the Logic. Hence in the content of the
Logic, and in every moment anastage of it without exception
this opposition has vanished. .In the Logic, therefore,
thought ana being, subject ano. object are absolutely one
and identical. A thought has place in the Logic just be¬
cause of the absence of any such contrast within its nature.
z$7>
A notion just means that in which thought and being are one,
for the notion is the essence, and the essence of reality
is notion.(1) This result follows indeed necessarily from
the fact that mind contains all reality, that ultimate
Reality is Absolute Subject. But if in the Logic thought
and being are absolutely one, then, since in preceding
dogmatic philosophical systems ;'(e.g. ,. more especially of the
Wolffian School) the. difference between Logic and Meta-
physic just turned on the difference between thought and
being, Hegel's Logic is also and at the same time Metaphysic
and can be so named.(2) lor it covers both the content of
logic in the old sense, and also the content of thefae for-
wv
mar \etaphysie.(3) This latter content falls under the
well known heads, Ontology, Cosmology, Pneumatology, (Psycho¬
logy) and Theology. The subject-matter of these branches
of Metaphysic, as that was conceived by the schools in ques¬
tion, forms the greater part of Hegel's Logic, is dealt with




unc.er the title 'tOBjective Logic' (I). The content of the
former logic occupies the third part of his Logic, under
the title 'Subjective Logic'.(1) It is not the objects
dealt with by former logic and nets.physic that distinguishes
Hegel's Logic from those branches of philosophy, but the
way in which those objects are conceived.. It is this indeed
which is characteristic of Hegel's view, ana which induces
him to entitle his work Logic and not Hataphysie; and. the
choice of name is significant for the difference between
him and them, as well as for the light it throws on his
own position. While the above named sciences, Cosmology,
Psychology, Theology, treated their subject-matter as
substances with certain 'attributes' or "forces", or 'acti¬
vities', as substrata with predicates, without enquiring
into the meaning or legitimacy of these terms, Hegel's en¬
quiry just consists in stripping these notions naked and
examining them in their own simplicity and purity without
reference to the specific subject-matter of these sciences,
that is, without reference to'worlo., "soul or God. (2) In




the case of Ontology the notions are alraaay for the most
part abstract and 'purs', so that less outward alteration
is necessary. When, therefore, the conceptions are regarded
thus formally and abstractly as pure essences: in their
ultimate and absolute form, it is clear that the subject-
matter of such a science holds much more closely of Logic,
as logic was usually understood than of metaphysio as then
conceived, logic being indeed traditionally assigned to the
discussion of concepts, notions. Hence it is. that when
speaking of Kant's Logic, Hegel can regard Kant's'Trans¬
cendental Logic' as corresponding at least in part to his
own 'Objective Logic'(1). Thus whereas in former philosophy,
ana indeed in his own early system as we saw, Logic either
preceded or was subordinate to Hetaphysic, now Metaphysic
is absorbed into Logic and indistinguishable from it; a
result which however, is obviously brought about only by a
reint erprst at ion of the content of logic ana of Metaphysics.
In this metamorphosis of Metaphysic into Logic, Hegel con-




Now the importance of this identification of Thought
with being in the notions which are the contents of the Logic
lies in this, that it is the very nerve of tiie ' concret e-
ness' of that content which Hegel so much insists on, and
makes possible as well as necessary development from step
to step in the Logic. For it is in itself the principle of
diversity; it contains in itself differences. J?ach notion
is not merely a 1 thought' of the subject; it is that ana at
the same time and in the same sense objective, asbeent',,
a constitutive reality. But just in virtue of that double
v*.
,
reference a single moment it shares in the diversity
of concrete experience. For this diversity was found be-
fore; it appeared. the form of mode of mind, and mode of
object present to mind, each being more or less set over
against the other. This opposedness has been removed, but
the diversity on which it was based and which appeared
throughout all experience is not abolished but simply pre¬
served. in theninmost ultimate essence of all experience.
It still remains, therefore, in all *c~ S&ijSSJBBiS&eg Just
(1) Op.Logik.1.32,37; 52-4.
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because the notions are concrete, are constitutive of reality,
they contain necessarily what is alone concrete,: namely ex¬
perience. Ana experience containing variety ,
the notions cannot all have the same content, but must be
various as experience. The fact that the Logic is at the
same time metaphysie, therefore, bet ermines and necessitates
the detailed content of the Logic, determines that the being
which is one with thought shall be presented in all the
wealth and richness of its content. Because it is meta¬
physie the Logic must embrace all reality, express it in
its ultimate nature, because it is Logic this ultimate,
nature is thought. In this ultimate synthesis of what in
the other modes of mind and of Knowledge appeared as <og?po-
sites over against each other, in this absolute unity
of primal differences (for thought ana being are the primal
opposites inside experience) lies the clue to the complete¬
ness, to the detail and to the inward connexion of the
content of the Logic. Granted that experience xs one, and
its concrete content must be inwoven, inwardly related, part
(1) Cp.Logik.III.a9.
determining part directly and of itself (i.e., not because
of or through external agency of any kind); granted that-it
is diverse and the parts of experience must be maintained,
and that by themselves, in their distinctness from each other.
But if the Logic is Ketaphysic, if the fundamental de-
i§
termining principle is this absolute original "a priori"
synthesis contained in the notion, then we see (1) that the
■OAtU^ %Jj
^Logic must be kept distinct from reality as ordinarily under¬
stood; (2) that the development inside the Logic is self-
contained, is not properly speaking brought about, either
in regard to content or to process, by 'reference to experi¬
ence'; (o) that there is in its content no contrast between
subjective and objective. The first point is evident when
we note that reality in its ordinary sense means the details,
the multiplicity in temporo-spatial existence. The Logic,
however, contains notions pure thought;- unities of diverse
elements; the very meaning of a notion is that it should be
a unity of multiplicity. The Logic cannot, therefore, in
its content be the same as^reality(2) But if by reality is
(1) Cp.Logik.III.29.
(2) Propaedectt ik. § 1,2,4,5.
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understood not sense-reality, but true essential actuality,
C
then the Logic is just the exposition of that
Reality; for such reality is determined and self-determined
by its essence, the inner vital unity. And this unity as
unity and as essence (not as sensuously concrete) is what
the. Logic contains. (1)
The second point we have already' mentioned. It is
quite misleading to assert by way of interpretation of the
Logic, ana still more as by way.yof object ion; to its preten¬
tions and its purpose, that the Logic is constructed by a
©overt; unannounced but necessary and. implicit 'reference
to concrete experience'. Bo far as there is truth in this
view, it is much too general to be of any value either as
interpretation or as objection. For if it means that at
every step in the Logic .the writer is inside experience and
is dealing with the content of experience, then surely that
is self-evident; that is what the writer professes actually
to do, and far from being an objection it is Hegel's own
express purpose. If, however, it. means, as it ostensibly
(1) Log.1.47. "Das System der Logik ist des Reich der
Schatten. die Welt der einfachen Wesenheiten, von
allor S3jm\lichexi Concretion befreit."
does,that at each step the writer "in his own mind" appeals
to experience, that is, to the details of experience to
find out what he is to do, and merely picks up his notions
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out of experience pieces them together, his own thought
being thus regarded as something external to and apart from
the experience to which he appeals, then this is
complete misconception of the content of the Logic. The
whole argument of the Phenomenology is to establish that in
If*
the Logic this opposition is entirely overcome. And ■n.r: f'fflr
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bemg <«& objection it is based on a misunderstanding of
the very meaning of the notions with which the Logic deals.
In them we are already and thereby dealing with experience;
experience does not lie "outside thorn":; rather they .lie
inside experience, for they are the essences of experience.
It is truer, therefore, to say that experience implies the
Logic, than that the Logic implies experience. In short,
and this is what should be meant by this statement re^rding
the relation of the Logie to experience, in the Logic we do
not require to appeal to experience, because we are already
in it. The Logic, therefore, is constructed and safely
constructedip by reference to its own peculiar content alone;
the characteristic aeterminateness of each notion is what
makes the construction possible. All that we want inside
the Logic is just the notions: wherever we have these we
have the essential unities with which the Logic deals, with
which alone it works, to which alone it confines it atten¬
tion. Only so could, that inner necessity, characteristic
of the science of,Logic, be obtained. There is ho doubt *
whatever, that such a construction with and of. not ions alone
will not be outside experiencef "in the air", if only we
admit at the start, that these notions are not mere thoughts
but at once also essences of experience (and this has been
established in the Phenomenology), ana if we can actually
find these notions (and these we can find wherever we have
unities of multiplicity).
And finally the last point is clear after what has been
just said. In the content of the Logic there is no sub¬
jectivity as opposed to objectivity. The notions are not
subjective categories opposed to objective fact; all from
the beginning to the end of the Logic are at once subjective
ana objective, essence of reality, Y.re do not, therefore,
require to translate our subjective thoughts into terms of
reality, nor to talk of a "corresponaenej" between the two.
They are without qualification, the inner being of reality.
With the one we have the other. To hold otherwise is to go
back upon the positions which the Logic assumes to have
been removed, and of which it professes to contain the
ultimate truth and essence.
Now then, if we gather- together into a single sentence
all these separate aspects of the content of the Logic, we
shall see at once how the Logic as the organism of Truth
came into existence. For, given that reality is the totality
of experience,"-that the truth of all objects in experience
is their essence, that the essence of experience is reason,
that reason is mind's true self, that knowing itself in the
form of self is true self-knowledge, that so to know its
self is to know its constitutive, and constituting notions;
and given t-again, that the one absolute mind, the one absolute
subject which contains all Experience and is all Experience
(for experience is one) is in nature and substance the same
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as individual human inind, that the ultimate essence of each,
the self of each in the form of self is the same, is notion-
given all this and. the Logic as the systematic and expanded
exposition of the essential contents of the totality of ex¬
perience, the exposition of the ultimate and. multiple ex¬
perience-content of the Absolute Subject, by the simple
process of autonomous self-knowledge of mind, - rises bodily
before us. Such then is the content of the Logic. It
is the basal element in the science, that which determines
everything else that falls within its scope. So far, ev. -
however, we have dealt merely with the boay of the Logic,
and that generally. Its soul lies in the method by which
all the members are to be fitly joined together. To this,
therefore we must now pass.
The nature of the method of the Logic is to be found
in the nature of the content of the Logic; for, indeed, it
is simply an essential and fundamental element in that con¬
tent. ho method creates the content of the science which
it subserves; rather it is determined by that content and
the hino of connection of which it is capable. Its function
is to unite systematically the elements ana objects peculiar
to the science. Since then we found the content of the
Logic to be the necessary out come of the nature of absolute
knowledge, we should expect likewise to discover that the
method of the Logic has its source in that same mode of
experi one e.
The Phenomenology^ we saw, was a philosophical science
whose aim was to determine the truth of and in mind's
experience. It established this by showing that the one
mind present throughout all experience determined itself
in various modes which differed one from the other in the
degree with which they realised truth, i.e., the unity be¬
tween mind and its object, each mode being at the same
time a realisation of the actual content of mind. Thus the
last stags was not merely the complete truth of experience,
but also contained most explicitly the complete and essen¬
tial content of mind. How the method adopted to bring about
this result is immanent in the subject-matter itself; it is
mind which possesses each mode, determines each, and by
reference to its own content and nature alone moves from one
to another. In no case does minci go beyond itself; the
process i§. autonomous and self-directed from the start. And
moreover, in each mode mind does not come externally so to
say to the mode in which in a given case .it finds itself,
does not coma with the wealth of all its other experience
to shame the poverty af a given form of its experience.
Rather each mode is only shown to be poorer than the imme¬
diately succeeding mode. The entire principle of advance,
therefore, must be found active at each and every stage as
such. The method of constructing the science, in short,
must be an essential factor in the very nature of every
moment, in the science. But all that is found and is con¬
tained in each mode of experience, each moment of the en¬
quiry is simply a form a mode, a definite realisation of
mind, (consciousness). There is, therefore, no separation
whatever between the modes or experience and the principle
of connection of those modes; the method of relating them
into one whole and the specific content of each mode are
determinations of one ana the same reality. The content
of the science and the syst©realisation of the content are
both moments of the same fact. And that one fact is mind.
This, then, which is true of the whole process of the Phono
menology is likewise true of its last moment.
And, indeed, it is more evident in this case than in
that of the others. For in preceding modes of experience
there had always been the contrast between the truth of
the mode in question and the actual content of the mode;
hind, was out of agreement with its own essential .. '
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nature,a contrast,essential to the character of experienceA
as the completely concrete existence of mind, and by which
contrast the forward movement of the enquiry was, as we saw
determined. In Absolute Knowledge, however, that contrast
is removed from the content of this mode of mind, and in
it ft mind is completely and absolutely one with 'itself; mind
knows itself as minci and in the form of self. Here then the
method of systematically determining the content, and the
content itself are transparently and emphatically one ana
the same.
It must bs observed that the method is not confined
merely to experience as a whole; but is a determining element
in each mode of it; each mode can be further developed in
itself by that method. For, to repeat, it is one ana the
same mind which is present in all experience and. in each
mode of it, and determines each and all by the same process
because it (mind) is the same throughout all. Thus it is
then that the methoc employed to systematise the totality
of all minds' concrete experience is the method employed
to construct systematically the content of one mode - the
Logic. Hence, too, it is that in the Logic method and con-
cV
tent of the science are must be essentially moments of
one and the same fact, are indeed together just that fact
itself. For besides the content of the science, the notions,
and their prinoiple of ■ this ordered connection there is
absolutely nothing else in the Logic.
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Again we saw that when the analysis of a given form of
knowledge (mode of experience) brings to light the inner
truth of that knowledge, or truth which is other than that
actually possessed by the Knowledge itself, the presence of
this new truth as object to mind implies and brings about
a change of attitude on the part of mines, itself, a. new mode
of experience, in short.(1) But absolute knowledge has as
its content just the inmost ultimate essences, truths, of
all experience, of ai.l modes •-•of experience. Hence 'what in
the Phenomenology is a changing one attitude of mino.
to another, an alteration of the angle of reflection, (an
"Umkehrung ties Bewuss.tseins") must find its counterpart
in the Logic. It will correspond to the change from one
notion to another. The 'Umkehrung d©s Bewusstseins' is
just in fact the 'projection' which appears in actual con¬
crete experience, of the 'Ueberg.ang* , fche transition from
one notion to another in the Logic. For indeed the process




And finally, the method of the Phenomenology does not
consist in simply weaving together the various modes of
experience. This would, put them all on the same level. They
are indeed all equally modes of experience; and all modes
of experience are determined by the same method.; for mind
to which all experience appertains is one throughout all
experience. But all modes of mind have not the same content.
They differ in the degree of their truth,i.e., in the. com¬
pleteness of their realisation of the nature of mind, in
the extent to which in each the initial opposition between
mind and its object has been removed, in their approximation
to the absolute union and the identity between mind and
its object. (1) The modes of experience, therefore, are
connected not merely by belonging to our experience, but by
forming stages in the realisation of the truth of experience.
In other words the method of connection is not simply a
process of immanent implication of one mode with another,
but is a process determined throughout by an end - an end,
however, which lies not outside, but is itself immanent in
the process from the start. The method is that of Oevelop-
(l) These expressions, as we saw, mean the same.
went. Rut the content of' Absolute Knowledge is simply the
essential content of all experience; it embraces all experi-
ence, all reality, not merely|as a whole, but in its mani¬
fold variety. The various moc.es of experience contain ana
exhibit experience in its multiplicity, anu the content of
absolute knowledge is the essence of these modes. Its con-
if
tent, therefore will likewise consist of graded approxima¬
tions to a final end. The end in one case in complete
truth of' experience of knowledge, in the Logic it is the
absolutely true and perfect Reality, absolute notion of
Absolute Subject. Now this Subject contains all reality,
no phase,of experience lies outside its sphere. The essence
of each mode of experience because the essence, the ultimate,
of-that moae mast therefore belong to, be in fact, determined
by Absolute Subject itself. Were this not so the only
reality would be its own Reality as such, would, in short,
be mere unity, pure Ego, mere self-identity. Rut if it con¬
tains the diversity of all reality, then within the scope of
the self-knowledge of the absolute subject (the Logic) every
essence of reality must fall, for it is its own self in the
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form of self. But every such essence will be its concrete
self more or lass completely and explicitly. Were this not
the case, then every reality woulo. be equally the same,
equally indifferent to Absolute Subject; whereas we already
found in the Phenomenology that all modes of experience
differed in their content, .in their degree of truth. But
if those essences do exhibit more or less fully the self of
absolute Subject, then clearly from the point of view of
the process of self-knowledge there is only one systematic
way of uniting these notions, these essences, ana that is
by exhibiting them as a graaual development towards the un¬
folding of the complete self which is to be known. Hence
the method of the Logic like that of the Phenomenology is
necessarily and essentially that of development.
For these three primary and fundamental elements then,
(the essential union of method with content, the 'transition*
from onecontent to another, and the developmental character of
the process) the method of the Logic is directly indebted
to that made use of in the Phenomenology, Further than this,
however, the toethods of the, two are not connected; for each
science as we saw, is self-contained,the process in the
Logic is determined by its own subject-matter as such,
without reference to that of the Phenomenology, Still the
possession of these common elements is obviously sufficient
to identify the two methods as simply and solely one and
the same method (1) applied to subject-matters which taken
by themselves are different from each other, an identifica¬
tion which is the more necessary and apparent when we bear
in mind that the essential content of both sciences is the
same., the content of the Logic being merely the essence-of
experience. It is, indeed, this community of content which
makes possible and necessary identity of method.
Now this method is not confined solely to these two
philosophical sciences; the same method is made use of in
the other parts of Philosophy, the Philosophies of Mature
and of jMinu. (2) But if it, is necessary and essential to all\
the sciences and in the same sense essential, i.e., in all
we have that union of method with content of the science,




nature or the method per se if we eliminate the specific
character of the content of all these sciences. For since
the method is in the same sense common to all, ana since
•further in each and every one it permeates all the moments
of their content without regard to the specific differences
amongst those moments we can only get at the method per se
if we logically separate the method per se from this varied
content with which it is associated. But again, sine4 the
very nature of the method is that it is essential to, is
the very soul and moving force ef the content it is as clear
that the only reason thy such a method can operate in such
varied spheres is that the determining principle of all the
content is s from/! first to last the same. It must be in
virtue of that ground principle that the method is the same
in all those sciences, for the simple reason that the method
is regarded as in no wise separated from or external to the
content which it determines. But there is only one such
principle, on© such common all-determining reality in all
those sciences, and that reality is minu, self-conscious
reason, spirit (Geist). Since then, method and principle
jlji
are all that appear throughout these philosophical sciences,
and. since method and content are so intimately blended as
we have indicated, they must be two moments of the same
concrete fact, two .determinations of a single reality. The
conclusion, therefore, is irresistible that the method par¬
se is nothing other than self-consciousness qua process, the
essential and universal mode, manner or form in which that
living activity which constitutes the very nature of mind,
and makes it an endless self-initiating, self-determining
movement actually operates. There is absolutely nothing
else except mind which conforms to the nature of the method;
for it is mind alone that the content constructs itself,
systematises itself by a process immanent 4n ana constituting
that content itself. Only when the content of a science is
mind, is there no distinction between the content which forms
the body of the science, and the method !■, which is its
inmost soul.
Such, therefore, being the case, it is at once clear
that only in sciences whose content is fundamentally and
absolutely constituted by mind itself can it be possible to
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make use of a method, which is to be immanent in that content
itself, in which the method of const rue tin?: the sciences is
not in any way alien to the content, in which from the start
no gulf separates mind and object, in which the systematisa-
tion is in fact 'accomplished by the content itself'.(1)
But this being so, the. whole substance ana process, the
principle, form, and matter of Hegel's entire system becomes
at osice transparently luiainous. .r'or to maintain that
Reality is subject, that Reality is mind, is reason - con¬
stituted. just means that the entire content of reality
moulds itself into a system of reason, that the process of
constituting itself into such a system /is self-determining,
it lies in the very nature of its content that it should do
so, for its content is the living self-relating autonomous
activity of mind. And on the other hand, to hold that the
process by which the content constructs itself into system
.lies not outside the thing itself, but is immanent in it
is precisely the same as to hold that the reality is mind-
constituted, that Reality is Subject. Wherever we determine
the content of a science by that content itself, wherever
„(1) Logik.I.42.
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it is determined solely from it by itself, we ipso facto
there assert the other position that Reality is mind, is
Subject. (1) Hence, merely to attain to and. to claim the
possession of purely objective knowledge, knowledge which
is true 'whatever the individual subject thinks or does not
think', is precisely the same as to assert that the content
of the knowledge is self-determining, self-systematising,
and that is to say that reality is reason. In short, and
wo
in "fine, the method and the principle, (Reality Subject)
are inuissolubly bound up together. This method simply is
Absolute Idealism, and. Absolute Idealism has not and cannot
have any other method. The method means no more ana is
(1) Hence it is, we may note in passing, that in deal¬
ing with the various parts of Philosophy, Logic, Nature,
Mind, Law, Religion, etc,. Hegel does not impart into
the several discussions anything foreign to the special
object-matter itself. In dealing,e.g., with Nature,
ha does not introduce forms of thought peculiar to mind
as such, does not rnentalise nature, or spiritualise'
it. He makes the object-matter of nature as it stands,
with the character It actually possesses,'determined
itself with its own categories, by its own inherent
immanent principles, force, energy, mechanical action,
affinity, etc. And merely so to deal with it, merely
to make it determine itself, sufficiently by itself and
through its own terms'ana principles,'is what constitutes
the objective self-determining science ox nature, ana
is what gives it a place in his system of Philosophy,
makes it' a constitutive moment of his fundamental
principle. Just as conversely it is the determination
of the object-matter of 'nature' by that ultimate
principle which makes possible and necessary that
objective self-determining science of nature.
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no less than Absolute Idealism in actual operation, working
itself out in detail. It is the method which is the dis¬
tinguishing rhythm of absolute Idealism; it is this which
distinguishes it from all other forms of philosophy which
have historically appeared, which constitutes it in short,a
distinctive philosophical system(l). It is this too, which
distinguishes absolute science from all other forms'of
science whatsoever; for their difference from it will be
found just to lie in the fact that the content of these
sciences and their mode of systeinatisation do not have
have that inner ana essential unity characteristic of abso¬
lute Idealism; if they haa they woula and must 'ipso facto'
fall within its scope.
But it is not for. our purpose sufficient .merely to
state thus in its general and. ultimate form the nature of
the methoa of the Logic. Nor can wo oven rest content, with
having in addition shown its broad ana primary elements (i.e.,
those th»ee aspects above given) to be already implicated
in the Phenomenology, in virtue of that intimate union which
subsists between the content ef the Phenomenology and that
(1) Op. Phan.37 ff.
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of the Logic. Is must further show how, by what process,
the method actually operates in the characteristic form
peculiar to the Logic itself. We cannot gather this simply
by turning back to the procedure of the Phenomenology; .be¬
cause, as we saw, the procedure of the Logic is determined
solely by means of, ana by reference to, the characteristic
content of the Logic itself; the Logic is a self-Set ©mining,
self-contained science. Ana no irnr ediate light is furnished
by saying that the content of the Logic being the notions
of mind, or mind in its notion, the method, consists simply
in explicating this notion, in allowing this notion to obey
its own nature, to move, develop itself. .This is, as we .
have just said, the ultimate essence of the method; but
what we want to know now is how this explication, this
movement, this development actually proceeds ano. goes to
work; what -..are the essential pulses of its life, the
aceents of its rhythm. In giving these we are of course at
the same time stating the essential procedure of the method
throughout the whole system; for the content of the Logic
embraces the whole system. But while we are tiwn stating
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the essential elements in the system as a whole,we are also
and. are primarily dealing with the method as it is in the
Logic in particular. The method here appears in its most
abstract ana ultimate moments, because in the Logic we.have
the most abstract ana essential content or reality.
To begin with, the method is, as already said, the inner
activity impulse, force and movement of the notions of mind.}
Ana since these notions are the mind's own self in the form
of self, this activity is, as distinct from the notion it¬
self, the movement of reflection simply, self-referr.ent,,
self-determining;-*)This is the only force, activity inherent
in the notion as such. Ana such reflection may, since all
reflection is knowledge, by regarded as the process of self-
knowledge of the notion, for the process is inherent in the
notion itself. The method can in this way be considered
as simply the process of self-knowledge of mind per se,.mind
in its-notion. Now in every ojje of its notions, mind is
realised; each notion as. such is egoised, is endowed with,
is the expression of the nature of the Sgo, mina. This
(1) Cp.Logik.III.330,1.
nature is self-consciousness, self-reflection, Bach moment
of the Logic, therefore, being moment of the Sgb, exhibits
and. must contain all the moments of the method, the process
of self-reflection. The completion of this process in every
notion is just what egoising a notion meansj if a notion is
the ftgo it must realise all the moments of the process of
self-reflection, how the %go in every notion is concrete,
its several moments are actually present; it is not bare
abstraotness, bare identity; just because it is conscious
of self as self it has difference, it has content.(1) It
distinguishes its self from itself; ana distinction implies
division $ difference^ana difference implies moans content.
And again, it cannot be merely abstract formal self for the
reason that it unites in itself the other element to thought;
in the notions thought ana being are as we saw, one and
identical; the notions, art therefore, concrete because
the condition under which alone they could be formally
abstract has been removed. Hence that distinction of self-
frorn itself,'just mentioned is neither meaningless nor
illegitimate; it is both possible ana necessary because
(1) Phan.603.
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in the notions the sell' unites without extinguishing the
distinction of these two elements.
The self-rei'lectinf! of the notion (1), therefore, if
it is to be at once complete ana systematic consists simply
in laying bare and inwardly, thoroughly inter-relating the
moments contained in each notion, each pulse of the Ego.
Thosefi moments have already almost corns to light. The self is
to be identical; it is to be one and the same, self throughout
the whole content of the notion. Every notion is as such,
and by its very nature as universal; this is what is meant
by being essence ultimate absolute. And this universal
i i
nature is its own identical self, that by which it is and
remains what it is. The first step, therefore, is to take
the notion simply as it immediately is, and what it imme¬
diately, what it fundamentally is, what in the first instance,
the notions means, is universality. But this is no sooner
admitted than by the inner nature of the notion itself it
asserts likewise the differences, the particular elements
within itself. For there would be no meaning in an identi¬
cal self unless it had elements in which and through which
(1) Logik.Ill.329.ff.
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it could, appear as different; there would be no meaning of
universality in the notion unless it covered, permeated by
its universality elements, •which per se were <%£&&» parti¬
cular. And the differences do not, and by the very nature
of the notion, which is concrete, cannot lie eutsiae the
notion itself, are not picked up ana externally brought to
and opposed, against the first immediate universal. They
are determined by and from the universal, the identity
itself; itself asserts the presence of these elements. But
merely to assert these is to assert what is opposed to is
other than the firstj the first is universal, its own other
therefore, that which is at the opposite pole of thought is
particular. It is not a contrary opposition to the first;
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it is not simply the bars general opposition of a nul inm ft
to A, where the opposites have absolutely no relation to
each other except the fact that the one is entirely excluded
from the other. The opposition must be such that both terms
are concrete, both must have postitive content; for the mere
negation of a tern is never part of the content of any term.
In the opposition, therefore, the one opposed term has a
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content the very nature of which refers to, contains actual
points of contact with the other; the one opposite must in
(n.
itself imply the other; "T^se-what it is just by referring
to and distinguishing itself from that other. Its other is
just such as to be its own other, that which is necessary
to and is present in the determination of its own special
character, and from which it must distinguish itself
specifically in order to be what it is. If we examine the
matter closely, then we will see that this js precisely the
character of the opposition existing between thfese two
moments, the first, universal, and the second difference,
and that is all that opposition between these means. But
since it is the universal itself which contains this other,
the asserting of this other, the asserting of the particular
by the universal, means, seeing that the notion is self-
contained, does not pass out of itself, that the first
has turned itself into its opposite, it has become parti¬
cular. But thereby the first has negated itself; the second
moment which has come to view is the negative of the first,
it negates the first; the second is its (the first's)
negative. Since, howoven, this negative results from the
first, since it is the universal itself which passes into
this negative, and. again since it is the notion as such
which is operative in both first and second., this negative
is not, the annihilation of the first, the first is so to say
merely disbanded into the second, it is maintained b£ it,
thou,gtil not stated or asserted in it. If this were not so,
the notion itself woulo vanish, for mere difference, mere
particular is what it emphatically is not. The negative,
though negative of the first or rather because its own
negative contains the first itself.
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This sscona moment is necessarily^!) because that
is the diversity which the notion contains and without which
it would be merely an abstract formal universal, and (8)
because it is that by which the universal is universal st¬
all, and therefore (6) it merely asserts the explicit con¬
tent of the universal, and there was no other step left fur-
that universal except merely to assert that by which it is
what it is. Either it must assert this as content or be
and remain a formal universal.
But now the notion is expressed as mare difference,
mere diversity. So stated, however, it quite obviously
is not subsist out, For the notion is not mere diversity,
and the notion as mere difference is in contradiction to
itself. The contradiction aoes not consist in setting the
universal, which the notion is in the first moment, over
against the difference which it is in the second. This
certainly would be and can be regarded, as a contradiction
of the nature of the notion, which is to be concretely both.
But the point on which the next moment turns, the nerve.of
the next moment, that which makes this second moment go
further in spite of and because of itself, does not lie in
setting the universal over against this difference.(1) For
(1) the movement must be self-determined at every step, i.e.,
by each moment per so, whereas that process of determining
it would be purely external to the content of the second;
(2) all that that process could establish would be that
the second as such is inadequate to the complete nature of
the notion, is inconsistent with it. But this is irrelevant
(1) This is a common misunderstanding of the nature of
the method.
and due to a misunderstanuing. For as we saw, the second
is the notion itself, just as much as the first is not in¬
consistent with the notion. The notion is qua contexit com¬
pletely present in the second, just as it is completely
present in the first. And indeed, even more so, for the
second contains the first. (-5) herely to point out that
the second' must complete itself by the universal, if it
would be the entire not/ion, would not tell us in what way
this completion is to be brought about, what direction to
take in order to bring it about. This whole conception of
the process is, in short, purely external ana inadequate to
the nature of the method.
There is only one way in which the next moment can be
supplied and that is by the nature of the second itself.
This second is the notion as difference, as diverse. But
as mere difference, as absolute difference, it is different
not merely from something else, it is different from itself;
difference as such is difference completely; it is to itself
different. To put it otherwise this negative because'nega¬
tive of a positive which it itself cot it a ins is negative of
its own self. For the notion does not and cannot go outside
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itself, it is seLf-containea; and since the negative express
es this notion, contains all its content, when regarded as
merely negative, the content of which it is the negative
is the negative itself. Or again, the second is the notion
as simply the other as otherwise*: but since that to which
it is other, is inside itself, it is its own other. Thus
we conclude that the next moment must be the negative of
the first negative. Whereas then in the first step forward
the movement consisted in the asserting by the universal
itself or the difference which it contained ana implied,
the second step is due to the unity, the universal, the
identity implied in the difference itself, if it is to be
difference at all. The 'negation of the negative' simply
means the bringing into light again of the universal. For
there is nothing else which is negative of difference, ex-
cept the universal, the unity, tha identity. It was into
its other that the first universal passed; each is therefore
other to the other, each is negative of the other. Con¬
sequently when the first negative is itself negated, it can
only be by its otner, the universal. -1 h o -nog-at i o n ■ o f the-
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The negation of the negative is thus the assertion of the
universal. But this assertion is a reassert ion; for the
universal as such had already been asserted at the at,art.
And since the notion is the same notion all through, the
universal is the same universal in both cases. She differ¬
ence between the two is not their universality but their
content. In the first universal we had nothing but the
irnmediats character of the notion as such; what it is when
we first take it as a notion; the mere assertion of the uni¬
versality-, negating nothing itself, but negated in the asser¬
tion of its own other. The last universal, however, is the
negative of ana therefore contains in itself and as itself
the other of the universal per se, that which the universal
per se would have to assert in order to be universal. The
last universal is qua universal the return to the first,
S
but qua negative of the second negative, containing in itselJ
that which forced the first into the second. The last
step » therefore, is a reassert ion of the absolute character
of the notion, the universal, with the full content of that
notion itself, that by which the notion is notion and the
^*1
universal a universal. It contains explicitly in it soli'
all the moments of the notion, for it contains both the
preceding, and these are the only two poles of the notion.
This return then just because it is a return to the beginning
is the last moment of the notion. There is no further nega¬
tion possible. With it the moments of the notion are ex¬
hausted. It is the notion as notion, as concrete totality.
It is the complete truth of the notion, or shortly ana
generally the complete absolute truth at once the reality
of the notion, ana the notion itself.
These three moments, therefore, the first universal,
its negative, and. the negative of this second, exhaustively
and explicitly exhibit ana express the self-knowledge of
the notion. They exhaust the pulses of its self-conscious¬
ness. To be conscious of its self as self, to be conscious
I
of the distinction the division of self from itself implied
in being self-conscious, ano. finally to be conscious of
self in and by this distinction, merely*leaves no other
moment of knowledge open to it; no other pulse of reflection
upon itself. And we see that the process of knowledge from
boginning to en« is determined not by external reflection,
but by the notion itself. The notion is egoised; determines
itself from itself; is present as self throughout the move¬
ment ; its own inner activity, the activity which it has in
virtue of beinp self-conscious controls ana moulds it at
every step. It is this which makes it assert itself in these
various moments. It is because the notion is egoiseh, is
endowed with is made of self-consciousness, that the deter-
i
ruination of itself at each step is. possible; the determina¬
tion is seIf-actermination. It is the same force which at
once separates its moments ana brings them together; for
they are the moments of the same self which because they
are its moment is conscious of itself in each and in all.
The whole significance of the movement lies in this fact.
For thereby we see that each moment is and must be positive,
an affirmation of self. And this presence of a positive in
a negative is the inner principle of the whole movement.
A negative is not bare negation, and exclusion; to be-negative
it must be and contain what it is negative to, its positive.
A1.1 tha t n ega tive here means i s includes
and implies its own positive. It is determinate negative;
negation wit; a content, negative of a determinate content
which is and must be positive. And it is positive for the
reason thai, it is the same self of the notion which deter¬
mines itself now as positive (universal) and now as negative
of this universal end. negative of it because proceeding from
/
it ano. count apposed to it. It is, further, because of the
positive content of thia negation that the process of nega¬
tion has a limit. The negation of and in a notion does not
go on endlessly. It is solely by negation that the process
in any given notion continues, but it is by negation that
it in likewise brought to a. close. And it is brought to a
close precisely when that which is the positive in the nega¬
tive is so brought out by this process of negation itself,
that negation is no longer possible, i.e., when there is no
further moment in the notion. This terminus to the pro¬
cess in a given notion ir indicated and confirmed by the re¬
turn to the starting-point. If the process is to continue
at all further it must be by reference to (not the notion
considered, but ) another notion; and this we shall see
XV-
i'mmeuiately is what takes place. The only other way the
process cowId continue would be by mere negation, more ex¬
clusion and annihilation. But this is inadmissible by the
nature of the negative itself which determines the process.
This principle of negation which we have just sought
to explain, may bo regarded as the 'nerve of the whole method.
It is for this reason it is called Dialectic. It has, as
we. see, a definite signification. It is not negative in
general nor any sort of negation. It is negation of a cer¬
tain sort. Doubtless all ot! er kinds of negation have this
as their ground ana. source. Put the negation here under¬
stood. must be carefully distinguished from them. Negation
here is the relation which subsists between that which has
a certain significance, and that which it essentially implies,
through which it is v/hat it is , but from which it must be
distinguished, in order to have that significance. It is
therefore only such a relation as ho lots within a concrete
r
self-contained and self-det#rmined whole; this alone pos¬
sesses such a nature as to admit of its content being deter¬
mined in that manner. And this whole must be organic to
itself, possess a self which is determined into elements
antithetic to and therefore implying each other. It must,
in short, 00 such ? concrete whole as, in fact, the notion
ana the egoised mode of self-consciousnes, must necessarily
be. The antithetic moments above raven universal and parti¬
cular, unity^identity and difference are the type and the
universal form of what negation means; for these, in fact,
are the ultimate antitheses, the absolute negativities into
which the self, v/hicn constitutes every notion from first
to last, necessarily falls. They are the -primary distinct
pulses of the life ana movement of every notion; end they
are the ground of-whatsoever antithesis and negativity any
given notion may assert. For each possess these fundamental
constitutive elements, the elements by which alone, indeed,
the notion, is a notion at. all. For the rest, theijp oiffer-
( ^rr*~ ®wt-
eneesy(j5.re those of content alone. (1)
Tt is the character of the negation which determines
the inner necessity, the absolute living connectedness of
the whole process as a process. We see at ones the intimacy
of the union between the parts when we bear in mind that it
(1) Cp. Phan.2'1,
lies in the nature of the process that there is ana can be
only one iterative to a given position, and this negative
must inevitably lie in that position itsell. It would, not
be the negative of that, position unless it were the negative
which that position demands; and that position can only m
demand one negative for it has only one self-determining
self. A notion has in itself one significance and that alone.
Hence the immanent character of the process. Hence the
completeness oi the system. Hence its all-inclusiveness.
It is just in this negativity that the true secret and mean¬
ing of reason lies; as it is only by this negativity that
reason could determine itself into system.(1) The negative
is, in short, the one and the only possible lever of absolute
Idealism. Only by means of it: can idealism be established
as at once absolutely complete ana absolutely immanently
necessary.
But we have not yet exhausted the entire significance
of the method by thus stating its ultimate and final moments.
We have seen that the process starts from the universal which
in the first place, the notion immediately is, i.e., which
(1) Op. Logik. I. V. 4-1-4.
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it is when taken as it stands; when viewed simply as notion,
it is in itself primarily a universal. This is the neces¬
sary ano. only starting-point i'or the process, because it is
the. ground-fact in the nature of the notion. Ancl from this
universal, this identity, this positive, this immediate,
the method proceeds by difference, negation, mediation to
its completed result, the reestablishing of the identity,
the positive, the immediate. But all these stages in this
process of self-knowledge of the notion the same value for
A,
the notion or for its knowledge of itself, are not at
the end of the process just where we were at the beginning.
This would indeed stamp the whole process as futile and
inane; we should in such a case be no worse off at the be¬
ginning than the end. 3ach moment is indeed determined by
the notion itself; each is a realisation, a mode of it.
But each does not realise it, reveal it, exhibit it to the
same extent, in an equal oagree of fullness. For since the
process is one of self-know1edge, self-determination of
what is from the start necessarily a concrete fact (a notion,
a pulse, a realisation of mind, of self-consciousness) the
process just because a\ process of what is in itself a con¬
crete whole must exhibit different degrees of approximatidm
toware, s the complete exposition of that whole. If it fid
not do so there would, not be a single whole at all or else
-i,, in process whatever; there would be only an abstract formal
unity, and the process mere passage, indeed mere repetition
of the same unity. ind these degrees of fullness in the
realisation of the notion riean^ nothing more than degrees
of its truth. Just because one step contains the preceding
it is nearer to realising the notion, nearer to its truth.,
i.e. , its full ••agreement between itself ana its content (1)
(its universal and that by and through which it is a uni-
versal). Ti ran it is that the negative (the second moment)
is'higher'than' the first; it contains the first, and there¬
fore because itself a moment and because containing another
moment., it is ipso facto truer than the first, hence it is
that though the whole process as a process of self-knowledge
is directed and determined at every step by negativity, the
negativity at each step has not the same value, has not the
same truth. All the stages are equally negative moments,
(1) Op. Logik. Ill. 2,7. ff
but all t&e negative moments are not equal. The process,
in short, is the same but the result is not.
Y/hile then the first negative is determined in the same
way as the seeoncs, the second, has a much higher significance
for the truth than the first, just because in it a higher
truth, indeed, the highest truth of the notion is establish¬
ed. In the first negative1 a higher truth is contained than
in the initial moment, but because it maintains the notion
simply as negative without equally exposing its essential
positive, the first negative is incomplete even as a negative
•44,ye* It mediates and contains the first step, but does
not mediate, itself. The second negative removes this defect
and completely establishes the negativity of the notion,
the absolute self-mediation, self-negation by self-position,
by itself and through itself, explicitly realised. These
negatives Hegel distinguishes as 'formal negativity* and
'absolute negativity'.(1) It is absolute negativity which
is of such supreme importance. By it anu by it alone is
the supreme truth of the notion established. It is the
inner principle and soul of that notion; its inmost life;
(1) Logik.III.343.
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by that it is established truth, and. by that it estab¬
lishes its truth. It is the supreme principle of all specu¬
lative truth; the inner activity of all the life of Sfina.
For by it all opposition is absolutely subleteti, all differ¬
ence absolutely removed, as isolated diversity; for it is
the absolute opposition of all opposition, the absolute
difference of all difference.
At the and. of the process, then, we are not where we
were at the beginning. By the last negative the full and.
complete reality of the notion has been expressed; its corn-
plate truth is laid bare. fach moment contains the preced¬
ing , the last, therefore, contains all the notion without
omission of anything; in it we have the notion explicit
completely realised. The immediate, the universal, there¬
to
fore,J which we return obviously cannot be the same as that
from which we started. The second universal holds explicitly
in itself all the moments to which the first universal was
as such opposed. The difference, therefore, between them
is not far to seek. The first immediate universal was
nothing more than universal as such, the notion was taken
if?
in its first intention, in its first potency: the universal
is thus abstract, indeterminate. The second, universal con¬
tains all the moments of the notion without exception,
itself included; it is determinate, possesses explicitly a
i
certain content. It is the content of the result which dis¬
tinguishes it from the first, universal. The immediacy,
therefore, which the result possesses is only in form trie
same as the starting point. The result is indeed immediate
only in its form, only immediate because the mediation
necessary to arrive at the result has beon removed by the
exhaustion of the negativity of which the notion is capable.
The immediacy of the result is absolutely determinate, the
universal carries all the content of the notion with it.
And this is only brought about by the process of the method;
or, in other words, the content of the universal in the re¬
sult, the dotarmlnainsss preserved by its immediacy is not
abstract or indeterminate nor is it arbitrarily picked up,
it is derived, proved, deduced, necessarily evolved.
JOC
This conception of the content of this self-knowledge
of the notion is of supreme significance for the Logic.
For it is by means of and in virtue of thin content that
System is made possible, that systematic totality is obtains
by the method,
I. For in the first place, once we have established the
result of the process in a given notion, ana uiscoverea tha
its content,its det amilnet enes« is the truth the realisation
of the moment with which the proeesJ began.,'.v 2 thereby at one
docla.ce that the bet.inni.ri • itself, was incomslate, and that
the beginning itself, therefore,is imperfect,untrue. But in
so corny,we set the acterminaten.es $ of the result over
against the beginning, ant thereby asf ert that the beginning
is itself determinate. T-.i<;,however, means that the begin¬
ning itself mediated: for all daterminateness implies
(|W
negat' ijand therefore ma*iation. The beginning,therefore,
is itself deriveo deduced or i -eclat ad product. Its cteter-
ininateness demands, deduction^ as much as the aeter-
minateness of the resulting content; for onLy by
eucxf a process is it a necessary beginning. It matters not
that the d.et erminat eneso of the bag inn in.. (the universal)
is different f roii that of resuit, the content of the
notion; this difference aons not effect the method by which
the aetorminateness .is and must be derived ana deduced.
And so to aeauce the begirutin;;,' does not imply that the method
takes a new "•urn; any more than it is true that the method
as such lies outside or is external to the beginning, im¬
posed upon it, and only becomes the methoc proper in the
active explicit self-relation 'which characterises the re¬
sult. It is the same method all through the process; and
remains the some when it deduces the deterrainateness of
beginning as it was.when it deduced the result from the
starting-point. The deduction of the determine!enesa of
the beginning is therefore both necessary and possible.
For the aeterminat-aness of the result is actually mediation
of the notion with self, it contains the whole notion, all
its moments. The last moment, therefore-, establishes com¬
plete mediation as essential to the notion. But this sim¬
ply means that every moment is mediated, and therefore the
beginning for the reason that it is a moment. But again it
is by means of and by way of deterroinateness that this whole
3f
process of mediation is carried through; the last step,
therefore, is likewise determinate. Fince however, this
mediation of thy beginning is a process backwaras, it has
its result in the removal the sablation of determinateness
( 1
from which it starts. Hut this means that the determinate-
ness at which it arrives is indeterminateness. Ana it is
this iridetominateness which was ana is the character of
the beginning. The. -whole process of deducing the character
A
of the beginning, in short, merely the application of
the same method to the content found and deduced in the re¬
sult of the first process. Just because this is the con¬
crete whole actual not ion, (sma\ which necessarily means in
this its final moment mediation so it. is possible and neces¬
sary to deduce all the elements of its content, of which
elements the beginning is one. The last moment of the first
process is the whole content of the notion and contains all
the preceding moments. Put for that reason the other
moments are contained and are mediated in it. To express
this mediation is the purpose of the reverse process of the
method. It is not working over again what was done before,
nor is it necessary for the truth already established in the
result of the first process that this reverse process should
be gone through, in order thereby, so to say, to ait the
truth obtained. That truth is necessary as the outcome of
the method til ready applied. This reverse process is simply
the stating explicitly the fact that the last moment of
the notion contains mediated in and through it.self all
its moments. There is no other way it can contain them, ana
no other meaning in containing them except just that it
mediates each ana -all through itself and therefore mediates
the beginning. If it bid not do so it would be an abstract
untrue moment, like the others it professes to have overcome.
The reverse process is necessary therefore, in order really
to secure ana preserve what has been obtained, ana in order
ta prove , deduc e, derive necessitat o every o:et erminat e
moment of that content.. And the reverse process is possible
because the content obtained in the first result is not
when obtained deserted by the method • which derives it;
it remains by the very nature of the method inhabited,
dominated by the method itself, and thus makes the mediation
of the beginning possible-.
In the second, place, in virtue or the content obtained
in the result of the process of the notion we have not
merely the backward movement of the process [?.lreauy de¬
scribed, we have also a forward movement, a Movement beyond
the f;iven notion. For that result, as we saw, overcame all
the negation in the notion and reasserted immediacy, the
universality with which we began. Hut this immediacy, al¬
beit , the entire content, of the notion, is qua immediacy a
new beginning. We have once more an immediate content, as
at first, ano immediacy - is just what constitutos a beginning
for the method. And this content passes by the same process
as that hitherto used on to another content. What is
mediated result in one notion is immediate beginning for
another; what is end here is at ebnee beginning for a further
process, which leads to the establishment, the deduction of
another content, another notion. -low it, is by this process
from content to content that the system of the Logic as a
system is obtained. This passage, this transition (1) from
content to content, from notion to notion is made possible
(1) This passage, this transition, is the counterpart in
Logic of the Umkehring of consciousness which appears
in" the "Phd'n"
I
by the fact that it is the en© reason, the one mi no. which
determines every notion, which, constitutes it, wnieh makes ^
U If*! ttri. lAMvrfSwdwv, ^
it the concrete reality it fc(:^4- ano is mado necessary
^
I
by the fact that as determination of the one reason as mo-
moments of one self-consciousness they must bo organically
connected with each other, they must form a "system of
reason." (2) What in particular any content, any notion
shall, lead to depends on the content in question. That
they can be connected, is evident from the fact that it is
one and the same method which governs mind as a whole and
mind in its specific determinations,.the various notions;
for these notions are mind, are pulses of its own being,
are its egoised content,. The same process, therefore, by
which the moments of a given notion are determined, its
self-knowledge completely determined, must be used in the
self-knowledge of mind as a whole, mind in its entire con¬
crete unity. Hence the process from content to content,
|
notion to notion, by which the System of the Logic is con-
,j
|
struct©d is simply the process of determining the moments
of mind as organic unity. What in the case of a given
fl) Logik.I.33.(2) Legik. 1.35. C*t)
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notion are momentc of that; notion, in the case of mind
as a whole are moments of mind, its content, the notions.
In the former case we' have a particular not ion; in the
latter the ground fundamental notion, the notion of notion,
the notion of mind itself, not a extermination of mind, but
mind as mind.. The process of self-knowledge of mind as
mind, notion of notion pis the same as that of a particular
notion; the moments of mind in. the former case, the notions,
correspond to the moments of the notion (the element ) in
the latter case. For it is one and the same mino which
determines both, and the process', of self-knowledge is the
same in both. One notion, one content leads to another,
forces itself into another for precisely the sane reason,
and by precisely the same method that one moment, of a notion
moves into another.
It is not difficult after what has been said to -see
what the character of this process must be. The result
contains the beginning, and the process is from content to
content, each succeeding content holding within itself the
preceding, the preceding,preserving itself in the succeeding,
in its other. The beginning, therefore, at every step is
enriched by the determinuueneas of the result towards which .
it moves, and every new step contains ever*, pulse of content
which has preceded it. Every step is therefore richer than
the preceding. The process is from abstract to concrete.
But this means not merely that the content extends in area
in amount, does not mean merely that each result implies a
new increment of content. It means more. Since every re¬
sult contains all the preceding stages, each result for
that reason is inward to itself, mediates itself through
%
itself. To hold in tM-c result all the preceoing means
o
simply this reflection -into self, inner through self-media¬
tion. Every enrichment of the content, every new determina-
t ion of the not ion is, just bacause a daten-tinat ion frun
and, by the notion itself, (i.e., ft determination by the inner
necessity of the notion), a reflexion of the notion into
itself. Only by so doing can it at once retain ail the
preceding and mould the new determination out of whet it
possesses. Every step is'so far complete in itself, that
it is one notion, one self-mediating universal; it coos not
fall into pieces; it is a simple organic unity. Every
further determination of this notion must therefore be by
a process of inward!sing, by reflection into self; there
is no other way it can be obtained, conformably with the
inner necessity which is to hold the whole together. The
concrete, therefore, is not simply an externalisation, a
going beyona itself, a further determination, but an inwardi
sing, a going into self, an inner determination. It is not
simply a process in extension, but in intension; a progress
in extenr.ity, and at the same time in intensity. The pulse
of the method of mi no. is at once diastole and systole.
The growth in completeness, is not that of a plant which
merely grows outward, but that of spirit, of mino, at once
all-pervading, and self-containing. Thus "has Reichste ist
das cone ret est e una Subject iv(i)ste, una das sich in die
cinfachate Tiefe Zurucknehpende das f'achtigste und Ueber-
greifendste. Pie hochsts Zugescharfteste Spitas ist dme
reire Person! ickkofB^ ..". (1)
The method, we see then, faces two ways, starting from
each new beginning it goes forward to the new result, back¬
ward to the old beginning, for it is an ever recurring
(1) Logik.III.349.
p ro c es s in t -ao a i r e c t i on s {1) Aaa thi s o oub 1 e rnov em ent
taken place at every slop and constitutes that step itself,
is absolute necessary to it as a step. They are at the
same time not two processes; they are one and the same pro¬
cess. Prim& facie it so ems a different process to go
back from a result to mediate it a beginning, and to go
forward to extend its content. But the one process is
implied in the other, is explicit in it. In order to go
forward we must go backward, for only thus can we get a
new cist erminat ion, and only thereby do we. carry all the
preceding with its into the now result; and in order to go
backward we must go or have gone forward for only thereby
doos mediation of the beginning become both possible and
necessary. The movement of the method is therefore neither
a pendulum movement nor a. simp ley1movement, but, like the
content which it dominates, is SGlf-cornp.let.ing, circular.
This metaphor is, however, not aaequate to illustrate it
completely; and indeed it in perhaps- not possible to find
(1) It is, therefore, not to be identified with the
infinite regress or infinite progress; in the latter
the two ends never meet: in the abeve the movement
would be impossible unless they always did.
yto
any metaphor which will accurately represent it. "-'or it is
the highest, the richest the most ultimate moveir.ent of the
highest absolute Real it y.j There are two p o sr. i bl e Misunder¬
standings of this process which it is Advisable to obviate.
( 1 ) That the "return to the beginning" aoec not mean to the
absolute beginning ss such of- the System. Therj is only
one such beginning, as we shall presently see. but each
step is ipso facto a beg inn in,-'; not an absolute beginning
for the System, but. a relative beginning for the new advance.
The first beginning is at onee the absolute beginning of
the System, and the relative beginning for the result which
iimeaiately proceeds from ir. in pert.icular. Svery other
beginning in also relative in view of its result, that
result for -which it specifically is a beginning. overy
beginning to the proc see, nit the exception of that of
the --hole 'system, is relative. "very notion has a beginning,
its immediacy is just its beginning. The process of the
notion completes itself by returning to this; in completing
itself it must ipso facto return to this, for it, contains
it mediately. Just this return to its beginning rounds it
off to. the completeness of a notion to a unitary pulse of
3 t*
mind. And just the immediacy to which it returns constitutes
c
it)new beginning. Tnere is, therefore, no need and
indeed no meaning in going back to the absolute beginning
at every step. The return is only to the proximate beginning.
If this were not so, the absolute beginning as such would
be re-mediated at every ste-pp Eut that would, if it were
different in each case, mean that, its own necessity was not
absolutely established; and this would refute the whole
process of the method. Indeed the suggestion is obviously
absurd. Each .new beginning explicitly contains within
itself all the previous content; that is the actual content
of that beginning and. it is only to this beginning that the
new result needs or can return.
(2) It must not be supposed that the beginning in any
case is determined from the result, gets its content from
the result, and so anticipates its result. This is not the
case. The beginning needs no more and has no more explicit¬
ly or by anticipation than what it actually possesses. For
its immediacy it is sufficient to possess simply the uni¬
versality, (1) v/hich is its characteristic; that is its
(1) Logik.III.349.
only ana ecru lot,; dot emanation. True in a sense^it is pro¬
visional: but in the process of s^lf-knyv/leage itself it is
known as imperfect and in that sense provisional. For the
process goes from it as a beginning, knows it as a beginning
ano tnarei'org as lr.rritrf 301. But none the Is s it is also
Jcnov/n and fixed as necessary, to that process itself is nacus
sary' to the complete self-knowledge of the notion; for only
•by negating immediacy is the complete truth, the entire
reality of the notion obtained.
Fnch then, stated abstractly, is the process of the
method of 'the Logic. That process only takes place in and.
through the content, the steps of the Logic. The Indication
of those, the • remaining: problem we have still to consider.
V>? have tried, however, to show that the nature of the pro-
cows, the principle of the iiethon lies in that very movement
of self-consciousness, of concrete mind, which is common
both to the Pheriorieriology ana the Logic, ana which indeed
is the process by which the Phenomenology itself has already
been constructed into a *Science of Bxparience". Hind is
the ground, fact of the Logic; the process of self-knowledge,
3B
self-consciousness!, as a process, is the spring of its
method. Just that duality in unity, that double activity
of a single function, which constiLutes the very being of
mind, of self-consciousness, is the nerve of the whole
p rocess.
Put from the statement we have given of the fee thou, it
will be evident that the process is by no means simple but
complex; it has various aspects ana can narctly be accurately
character!sou by any single name. Regarded as a |;whole, i.e.,
as embracing both beginning; and end, the process is best
described as that of development. A development implies an
end. The end here is "concretanoss". This means, however,
no more ana no less than completeness in the exposition of
the content of that Reality which the Logic has to exhibit,
namely, absolute subject, Absolute hind. This Reality con¬
tains all experience, its notions are the ultimates of all
experience; aria it is a single complete whole. The more
then of its content that is expressed the concreter is that
content, the closer does it approximate to the exhibition
of that single Reality. And this concretoness is obtained
bfk
by seli'-knowlsage; and the more this advances the more uoes
it contain or the content of this Reality; it must carry
with it in its process all the content of the knowledge
already gained, The increase in self-knowledge .just means
that this increase^ carries with it all the content of its
previous knowledge; and because this content is the content
of that Reality, Absolute Miho, this increase is an increase
in the area of its content, in its embodiment; the content
is 'thickened', is nearer the organic whole which constitutes
that single Reality. Since this process is essentially one
of self-knowledge, and self-knowledge of an absolute Reality,
this end "conereteness" can be indifferently identified with
t ruth, o r w i t h P. sa 1 i t y.
The "concreteness" uoes not mean, as is so often sup¬
posed, an identification or infusion with a "matter" which
is lacking from the abstract. If this were so, and if, as
is objected, by those who hold this view, this matter is
incorporated from without as the.process goes along, the
process would be, indeed, as they maintain, delusive, arbi¬
trary and. illogical. But as a matter of fact the process
ytr
to eoncreteness rails inside the same sphere as that to
which the abstract itself belongs. The concrete notion is
a notion in the same sense and for the same reason that the
abstract notion is a notion. The notions cannot possibly
and do not require to fuse with or araw in a matter1
ab extra, in order to become 'concrete', for *concreteness'
doss not mean ana is not explained by any reference to a
'matter' which lies outside the notions as such. The
notions have 'and must have content of their own to start
with, in order to be notions. And the 'concreteness' is
concerned with this content. They are moments of the one
Absolute Hind, and have the concreteness which it possesses
and no other. The process from abstract to concrete here
considered falls entirely and solely inside the System of
Logic itself, ana is uuo to that, ana is confined to that
alone. The importance of this will become evident when we
have later to refer to the Philosophy of Nature.
V'hile the process is as a whole best described as
Development we must qualify this in two ways.
srt
i. First, development here does not mean or imply that
only the ana is significant, that with the attainment of
the end and the preceding vanishes, that thus with the
establishment: of the last notion all those that preceded it
and went to fashion it are east ?ss£r. oblivion ana abandoned
as valueless. The development is not like the evolution of
a world, or of the human race, or even of a political move¬
ment , Hfrr where the steps that marked the process to'its goal
remain behind as mere vestiges of bygone activity, as fos¬
silised deposits, at rowing the highway and indicating the
(/V-
course it has travelled but sharing.ana moulding in no way
l\
the actual pulsing life of its final product. Rather it is
like a finely constructed piece of music with a simple
dominant motif, every part of which reveals to the artiste
the plan of the whole, yej/^ontributss (itself' to form that
whole, all the parts none the .Less possessing a value
in themselves by exhibiting in ever increasing perfection
the governing idea of the whole. The development consists
in short, in reasserting at every step all that has boon
obtained, in gathering together at every stage all our
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wealth for each new investmeat: in the mines of truth, in
laying up for ourselves treasure in heaven ana utilising it
oUt
to workJfurther in the present. We need not at each invest¬
ment recount and transfer our actual solid wealth; a promise
a***.
to pay on demand will completely our purpose. That
we have obtained is registered at each step in the * immediacy'
of each new beginning. Would we know actually what each
notion fully means, i.e.. contains, we have but to refer to
what had procBaed it, that out of which it, has arisen; this
is so to eay the exposition of its content; in a sense in-
dead, this is actually its exposition. ' Every pulse of what
has preceded is necessary to a given notion, constitutes
determines that notion; and every moment of it has a place
of its own, has a value of its own, aH place ana a value
which have bean determined, in the movement which preceded
the establishment of the notion whose moment and content
they are. Without all of these indeed it would not be
higher, mora concrete. Every notion is true, is & truth,
thotigh not, complete truth. Thus the final notion gathers
into itself all that has preceded, the whole Logic is its
exposition; it is, in short, the notion of absolute lit no.
expressed as a single thought, it is the notion of Beionce,
(mind self-knowing) is the notion of absolute truth, the
notion of the Logic itself. (1) But of this later..
Hence, we may not-.; in passing, the attempt to determine
the relation of the movement of the process of the Logic to
time or to movement in time is in the nature of the case
an impossible undertaking. Such a problorn has no meaning;
that'it seams a problem is simply due to a misunderstanding
of the meaning of the conception of development which is
found in the Logic. It is essential to the time process
that bygones should actually be bygones. But the whole
process of the Logic consists in actually and necessarily
preserving and maintaining what precedes at each successive
step that is reached; these cannot possibly be left out or
neglected when a given, stage is reached, any stage which
has already appeared,
ii. In the second place, development in the Logic has the
peculiar characteristic that the end rather appears as a
result attained, than a factor moulding the process itself.
(1) Cp. Logik.111.32V,8,
The end is not thrown over against tha stage which is reached
and is not opposed to the beginning with which we start in
order to netermine and direct, it; as is the case, e.g. ,
in the development by an ideal in the ethical or aesthetic
sense. Father the process is determined from within by the
stage or moment itsell. Each moment is not more determinate
that is actually necessary to constitute it a moment, ana
it possesses of itself to the next immediately necessary
moment.(i) The mere fact of a beginning ana the need for
passing beyond it is, of course,.an aemission that there is
some *beyono which detominer.. it as a beginning, and as in¬
complete. But the point is that it is not this final end,
final concrete which as such moulds the step which must
follow the moment with which we start, but the Immanent
reference of that, moment to its own utimeoiate other, its
own. negative.
Rut again if we look at the process not as a whole,
but in its pulses, its moments, there are various ways in
which the movement can be regarded ana named. If we have
(1) Op. togik. III. 353-1.
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in view the essential function, of negativity which plays
such a part in it, the method may be conveniently described
as Dialectic.(1) The process of the self-knowledge of the
notion consists in thinking contradictions, i.e., unifying
contradict ions. To think ana harmonica contradictions.is
the essential function ana ha fare of reason,for thesecontra-
dictions are both made and solved by reason!2). But dia¬
lectic because characteristically negative does not really
exhaust the meaning of the method. For (i) the beginning
is, as such, not negative ana yet is determined by the pro¬
cess; (ii) every negative is, as such, necessarily positive,
contains, a positive ana ends in a positive, so that the
process can in one way be regarded as movement from one
positive content to another; (in) the process as a whole
is a development which as described is essentially positive.
Dialectic, in short, merely indicates the immanent reference
of one content of reason to another, its limitation by that
other, ana so the absence of se.Lf-contained.ness ana isola¬
tion in any one content If once more, we look at the
1) Op.Logik.I.7.4Off Logik.III.336.
2) Cp. Logik.I.7: IT I.342.
process of dealing with the content of any given moment we
can describe it as a conjoint ano simultaneous use of analy¬
sis and synthesis. It is analysis in so far as it finds
the succeeding moment in the preceding, evolves the former
from the content of the latter; it. is synthesis in so far
as it finds that other moment in the preceding itself and.
so unites what it separates, the other of a given moment
is its own other, is united necessarily with it (2) This
analytic-synthetic function of the method is perhaps best
considered merely an analysis of the function of Dialectic
it solf.
Or again the process may be regarded as a continuous
application of the principle of the .'Syllogism(3) , The
whole functional activity of minu, as self-knowing duality
in unity, may be viewed as a concrete syllogism. %n the
process ,o.f the method the first premiss would be the immediate
web¬
reference of the immediate which we begin to its other.
This premiss can be looked at as analytic (bearing in mind
that it is not merely analytic). The second premiss would
(1) TiOgik.III.S36.
(2) Logik.III.343.
(3) Fence the method is "Deductive" and can be named
"Deduction".
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be the reference of the nw&tive to itself; which, {with the
like reservation) we can name synthetic. The conclusion
is the return and reunion with the beginning. Or again,
with reference to the content proper, the first premiss is
the extension of the notion beyond itself. The seconu its
reflection into self, the third the concrete union of those
two. {1)
Finally, the pulr.es of the movement can be taken as
forming an incessant repetition of a Triplicity.(2) This is
a predominant character!site of its nature. We start with
the immediate, .pass to mediation, return to the imr.eu.iate;
we have positive,•negative, una positive again; similarly
identity, difference, identity. Thin triplicity is charac¬
teristic of the Syllogism likewise and is connected with that
function. Still this triplicity which characterises the
movement' is no more than a characteristic; it is external to
movement as such is merely an external characteristic. The
process could quite fairly be regarded as a Quaaruplicity.(3)
•(1) Logik.TII.343.
f 2) Gp. Phen. 38. L%ik.III. 344.
(3) Logik.III.344.
'For we have first the inifeediate with which wa begin,
secondly, the first negative, thirdly, the second
negative, ano. fourthly, the final positive return to the
immediate. Too much stress therefore, cannot be laid
on the merely external aspect of triplicity which the
movement may, nevertheless, reasonably be considered to
boar.
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The method which se have just described is the organ,
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the instrument, the soul of three system of Reason, the
Logic. It determines it completely in its beginning, its
foiudle and its end, ana every step in tne same f*ay and for
the same reason. We have already shown the source and
nature of tne general content, the body of the Logic; and
we nave now learnt the source and character of the method,
the soul of the system. All that remains to us now-, in
order to complete our exposition of the origin of this,'
hegei's final and complete Logic,is to show now the memberq,
the parts of the system grew out of and were determined by
the nature of those two primal factors in the system, the
content and the method. We need not exhibit this'for every
part - to do so were to re-state the whole science, and
moreover if we consider any parts of the system, we shall
indicate by implication how the other parts are to be
aeait with and determined. This results from the character
of content and method already stated. It will therefore be
quite sufficient for our purpose if we show how the more
prominent parts arose and are related, if we deal,in short,
witn the main divisions or moment a of the Logic. All the
otiiers fall under them, and the connexion between them is
an instance of the way all other moments are connected.
But in addition it will be important ,and even necessary,
to consider more particularly how the beginning of the
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Logic is obtained and what it means, and also what is the
significance of the conclusion of the Logic. The last two
points are important in view of the difficulties they con¬
tain, their place in the system ana the interpretations
which have given them. Our last discussion then falls
under three heads, (1) to deal with the main divisions of
the system, (2) to consider the beginning of the system,
(3.) its conclusion-..
At the outset we must make two general observations.
It must be borne in mind that the working out of the system
of the Logic is regarded, by ''Kegel as in no relevant sense
a subjective process. For the content as we have learned
is at once subjective and objective, it is in itself and
absolutely true, however therefore we regard the process
as it goes on in tiie subject knowing or constructing the
system, any reference to the individual knower which would
imply a limitation in the truth or objectivity of the re¬
sult,must by tiie nature of the case be ruthlessly excluded;
if it were admitted it would take- us back to those forms of
knowledge ("finite"knowledge, as Hegel terms them) which
we are assumed in the Logic to have passed entirely beyond.
All that the individual Knower does, is, just as in the
case of tiie process of the Phenomenology, merely to "look
on"(1) and let the .content construct itself. And even if
(i) Phan 69.
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we take account of the'strenuous activity of the thinker,
who undertakes the terrible toil of thought required in
the Logic, the same result holds. For here, too, his
thought must be regarded as solely concerned with absolute
truth, truth wnose content is at once objective and. sub¬
jective. Whether therefore the mind which knows the pro¬
cess be regarded as passively reflecting, merely a specta¬
tor , or as actively operative, the result is the same; in
both cases we have truth without any limitation or qualifi¬
cation. whatsoever. Hence it is indifferent to Hegel whether
the knowing of the truth be described as 'looking on', or
'constructing'; the former term seems to be used when he
has regard to the objectivity of the truth, the latter
when he considers the subjectivity of the same truth,
which is in all cases both subjective and objective.
Secondly, it must not be supposed that Hegel began at
the beginning without knowing the end to which he was pro¬
ceeding. This is logically impossible, it is indeed in
itself absurd (1).- - - -
As we have discovered the source of both content and
metnod of the Logic in the Phenomenology, so too, we again
turn to it for light on the main divisions, the chief
moments of the System. And this is not difficult to dis¬
cover (2). We saw that absolute knowledge is not merely
(1) Gp. Log. 1.49. Rosenkranz Leben, p.273.
(2) Plu'n. 596, ff.
the truest mod.© of Knowledge, but has for its content all
the content of experience; its object is experience in its
essentiality. Moreover, absolute Knowledge is the Know¬
ledge of the one absolute Subject. In that Knowledge, and
by the fact that experience arrives at that form, substance
is completely absolutely Subject. The object known, by this
Subject is itself; and this self is the implicit totality
of all experience, it contains in organic unity the ground
notions of reality, the inner essences of those modes of
mind which make up experience. Its one and only object is
its self, which is the one and only Reality. Now experi¬
ence has as a whole ,one object, absolute reality itself.
It is one universal mind which is determined by means.of
the various modes of experience, and it is one universal
object to which it is related throughout experience and in
relation to which it takes up thgse different attitudes
constituting 'experience. But this one reality which is
known in detail by experience "sub specie temporis", is the
same reality which is known "sub specie aeternitatis in
its totality as the one Reality and by the one Subject
whose Self it is. Consequently the primary determining
moments of the object as known in experience are in their
essence the moments of the Self of this absolute Subject
which knows its own essence in the form of self. What the
Subject does in absolute knowledge is just to know the
moments of that object which is the ground'reality of all
experience as moments of its self, and in the form of its
self. Kow the primary and fundamental moments of the
object when known in experience have already appeared W
time after time at the various stages of the Phenomenology.
for instance, when the object was set entirely against con¬
sciousness in the first stage ("consciousness") the moments
of the .object were immediate in being or existence, its
determinate existence for itself ana therefore for another,
vin its essence, (each corresponding respectively to a
specific mode of consciousness). Similarly at each stage those
three moments are discovered, the moments indeed have not
the same content in each case; they have however the same
character. They exhibit the three forms in which the ob¬
ject must and can appear in order to be exhaustively deter¬
mined by any given mode of mind, at any given stage of
Knowledge. There is first the object, as it simply is for
consciousness, as it simply is in order to be object at all,
its existence immediately and without any further qualifi¬
cation, its "that-ness"; secondly, there is the object in
all its specific content and determinateness; and finally,
the true and complete actuality of the object. There is no
further moment in it; and every one of these is necessary
and distinct. We shall find that these general moments are
present in every general mode in which mind has experience,
in consciousness, self-consciousness, reason, etc. Now,
precisely the same potencies of the object are necessary
when the mode of mind is that of absolute Knowledge. And
J*1
this for precisely the same reason tnat they were necessary
in the previous moae-s of mina. For in every mode we have
the one mind operative, and operating uniformly in each
case, hence the Self of the absolute Subject which is
object to itself in absolute Knowledge lias three fundament¬
al and primary determinations, potencies, moments of reali¬
sation. This self is the one and only object to tne abso¬
lute Subject and the knowledge of that object, and can be com¬
pletely exhausted in and by tnose three forms of its
reality. What the self has to do in absolute knowledge is
to know itself in those three moments, ana know those three
moments as itself" (1).
But to discover what these three actually are we can¬
not appeal directly to the Phenomenonolpgy; all that we
learn from its argument is that there are and can only be
three primary modes, and that these moments have certain
characteristics. The specific nature of the moments of the
object in absolute knowledge must be determined by means
of the special content of that knowledge itself. Now that
content, as we have found, .is the notion of Reality (the
Self, hind, Subject) in the form of Its notion, its Self,
(Mind). It is the notion as at once subject and object,
at once thought and reality,the.ultimate and absolute union
of thought and reality, i.e., truth in the form of truth.
(1) Cp. Phan. 603. Propaedentik, p.95.
This is the content, this is, stated in its ultimate and
abstract nature, the object in absolute knowledge. How the
peculiar feature of this object is that we can determine at
once, simply from a consideration of the notion itself,
what are its fundamental moments. For that notion does
not require to wait for ueterminations coining from without,
as was the ease in the previous modes of Knowledge; its
determination and all its content lie and must lie wrapped
up in itself simply as it stands. For that object is at
once object and subject; - in it content and thought are
united, are transparent to each other, knowledge and object
are identical. All its determinations therefore must come
from within itself; there is no possibility of finding them
elsewhere and no meaning in seeking for them outside itself.
It is evident then what these moments must be (1). The
notion in absolute knowledge is the concrete unity of know¬
ledge and reality, of thought and being; these do not stand
over against each other as in previous modes of knowledge,
being is in it simply pure essence of reality, notion, and
notion is simply true being. But though they exist in this
unity, they still maintain their distinctness; they are
inseparably one; but this difference is not obliterated,
though each does not, as in the previous modes of knowledge,
maintain itself apart from the other. Now it is just .in
this fact of the concrete living unity of those two,
(1) Log. I. 49 ff.
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hitherto counterfused elements, that the various moments
ol the object in absolute knowledge are to be found. The
unity of these elements is here the ground fact. The
development, the explanation, of this unity will bring out
those different elements- Eaca is the whole unity, and
different from the other; each is the whole notion itself,
for that notion is concrete, and not analysable into separ¬
ate elements; if it were we should again be adopting the
point of view of the previous stages of knowledge. Since
then this notion is the one content of this absolute know¬
ledge, and is the truth of the opposition between the ele¬
ments in knowledge, (thought, and reality, subject and
object, etc.,) what were polar opposites previously are
here simply forms of one and the same concrete unity, each
of which is the entire notion. Tiius trie notion is on the
one hand beent notion, notion as being notion implicit,
notion in itself; and on the other, it is notion as notion
notion, in the form of notion, notion explicit, notion for
itself; in each case the whole notion. But further, while
these two. moments are each the whole notion, the notion
in its unity; it is equally necessary to insist on the
distinctness the difference of these moments, for the
notion is unity of their differences. But as differences
of and insiae one and the same unity they cannot as dif¬
ferent each be considered, separately; the only way they
car. be dealt with as different is when considered together
that is, immediately related to each other as standing
simply in one relation inside this single concrete unity
constituting them. There is only one form which this re¬
lation can, from the nature of the case, take, that of
mediation of the one through and in the other; for the
notion is mind, self,-knowledge » self-reflection, and each
moment is transparent to the other.
Now these three determinations of the single concrete
notion constitute. £ mark. <rf the three general divisions
into which absolute knowledge (the Logic) falls. -And the
character of each determines the designation appropriate in
each case. The notion as beent gives us the Logic of the
notion of Being, the Logic of Being, or if we make use of
the term usually employed to designate the reference to
being^iyyUl&fcjl as distinct from thought, we may call it the
Objective Logic, Logic of the object, of objectivity. The
notion as notion gives us the Logic of txie notion as such
or, to point the contrast to objective, we may call it ap¬
propriately the Subjective Logic, i.e., Logic of the Subject
of subjectivity. Between these two lies the Logic of the
relation of the differences in the notion. The mediation
of the one through the other is not reciprocal, for the two
are not on the same level of" completeness in the explicit
realisation of the notion; the notion qu& be£nt does not
exhibit trie notion so fully as the notion when it is ex¬




the other, a passing "from the immediacy and externality.
which characterises being into the inwardness and exuoged-
neas which characterises the notion as such. The Logic of
the notion as such presupposes the mediating process; it
could not be explicit and completely self-determinate un¬
less this had taken place. This process of mediation may
be described as the system of the Reflected Determinations
of the notion,, oi determinations which have meaning only
in and by reference 10 one another, the system of contrasted
counterposed antithetic opposites which the notion contains.
Or if we view it as the mediation of being into notion as
sucii the process of inwardising of tne notion to itself,
of reflecting its outward being into its inner essence, we
should, call it the logic of the notion as Essence, the
logic of Essence, a term which suggests both the process
of contrasting of opposites peculiar to this division of
the Logic, and the inner purpose of that process. Strictly-
speaking this division falls under neither of the other
two, or rather belongs in part to both. But since it is
preferable to retain tue term subjective'logic exclusively
for the Logic of the notion as such, because we have here
more particularly the subject as Subject, it is more con- •
venient to subsume the Logic of Essence under Objective
Logic.
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It is thus that there are three fundamental divisions
of the discussion of the Logic, while the work itself falls
into two parts. The full meaning and content of these fund-
uamental moments in the System are not by any means given
in the brief and summary description above stated. All that
we have done is to show how these general moments are de¬
termined. Nor must it be supposed that these three contain
the other moments of the Logic in tne sense that the former
are determined apart from the process of the Logic itself,
and subsume the others under them. Rathe•<* the significance
ol being, of fessence ana of notion is determined inside
the Logic itself; take their place in the System us other
moments do. All that we have to note is that being, es¬
sence ana notion are the primary distinguishing elements in
the discussion as a whole and that these elements are
simply the several moments of that notion which is the
ground fact in absolute knowledge, in Logic.
It is evident that these moments in the discussion are
determined in no other way than by means of the content
ana method of the Logic as these have already been defined,
for that notion is nothing other than the self of absolute
Subject in the form of self; as mind, as true self-conscious
ness its content is duality in unity, diversity in identity,
and because self-knowing its process is just that of mind
itself as living movement, as actively relating itself to
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itsell'. And out of these two factors, its self (content)
and its knowing (method), those fundamental moments of the
smole'System of self-determination, and self-knowledge,
willcii is absolute knowledge, is the Logic as science of
the /'bsclute Subject, necessarily proceed. Just as in the
ease oi any pode of mind which appeared in the Pnenomen-
ology (consciousness,reason,etc.) we had three pulses in
which that mode appeared and completely realised itself, so
in absolute knowledge, which is likewise a mode of minci,
the same three stages are necessary and sufficient to ex¬
haust its.content. And for precisely the same reason and
in the same way is this triplicity 'brought about in every
case, in the case of the "untrue" modes of knowledge as-
well as in the absolutely true mode - for the reason namely
that each and ail are realisations of mind. In this single
fact lies the key to every hail, chamber ana closet of
Hegel's System; it is the primary bar in the Whole composi¬
tion, the one germ of the entire organism. His system
can be summarily described as nothing other than the ap¬
preciation and exposition of the meaning of that one fact.
it is clear from the way in which the various divi¬
sions of the Logic are described that too much stress need
not be laid on the mere terminology used to designate them.
And indeed, while this division of the content of the Logic
is itself necessary, the terms applied to them vary in
Hegel's own statements. In the Propaedentik (1) he divide®
(1) »v. XVIII. Propaed. p.93.
the Logic into the treatment (1) of the categories, (2) of
the determinations of reflection, (3) of the notions. Yet
this implies no variation from his fundamental meaning, for
the category is just the notion in its first intention, in
its first immediacy, in the first moment in which reason
is one with its object, is certain of its self alone (1).
Again, he even makes the term category synonymous with the
whole 'Objective Logic' (2), or further, the notion as such
is not merely the 'Subjective Logic', but the notion as
notion contains both subjectivity and. objectivity (3) . This
last we shall explain shortly. Or finally, he speaks of
the first 'two moments Seing and iCssen.ee, as if they were
not moments of the one notion at all (4). Yet in none of
these cases heed we suppose that he has departed in any
way from his essential meaning. The changes are sometimes
simply variations, sometimes due to looseness of expression,
particularly in the Propaedentik, where we might expect
such looseness, sometimes they are merely used to give
emphasis to his statement, as in the last quoted instance.
It is significant in this reference to note that
though the whole Logic is the work of reason in its truth,
absolute knowledge, yet he speaks as if certain parts of
(i) Op. Phan,177.
(2} IVe rk e XVIII,p.123.




it corresponded to or were even dealt with by modes of mind
apd which contain that opposition between mind and object
which it was the'very purpose of absolute knowledge to
have overcome. Thus the first part of the content of the
"notion as notion" is described as "the sphere of the mrn-a
understanding"(1); while the last (third) part of that con¬
tent , the concluding notion of the system, the Idea, is
spoken of as appropriated by 'the sphere of Reason'(2).
We seem similarly warranted in suggesting, and indeed we
have an explicit statement to the effect (3), that the
first two divisions of the content of the Logic, Being, and
Essence, belong respectively to (that is, are the notions
of and in) the spheres of immediate (sense) knowledge and
perception as dealt with in the Phenomenology. Though
there is no doubt that there is and,'for reasons already
given,must be this general relation, or general parallelism
between the content and course of the Logic and those of
the Phenomenology, which entitle Hegel to allot spheres in
the above manner to Understanding and Reason, etc. , and
justify him in the other two cases as well, and though it
is unquestionable that the actual explicit content of the
Logic was readily suggested to Hegel from the consideration
of the course of the Phenomenology, still we must not lay
too great stress on such a parallelism. It is partly
(1) Log. III. 32.
(2) ibid, 33.
(3) Op. Phan. 595, and especially Log.III. 18.
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misleading, partly inaccurate. It is the former because
the Logic is the product of reason without qualification
and deals solely with notions of reason and has its course
determined by the nature of the notions as such. It is
the latter because, as hegel explicitly indicates in
another passage (1) , Understandi rig is not confined to 'the
first division of the 'Notion as notion * ; rathe r it is the
general function of the determinateness in all the content
of reason, that by which deteminateness position, posi-
tivity in the content of reason takes effect. it is in
short a specific pulse or moae of reason itself, and not
an activity for or apart from and independently acting upon
it. The explanation in fact ana justification for the
assignation of parts of the system to Understanding, or
Reason lie in this that reason as complete,concrete, abso¬
lute mind contains and must contain the truth of all the
various modes of experience, the lowest as well as the
highest; and moreover, it must maintain the truth of each
mode in that degree or moment of truth which it possesses.
This indeed is all that 'preserving' its truth means. Hone
the less. those moment-, each and all, are determined as
moments of reason, as its own and by itself. It is then
these two features of its activity which make it possible
at once for4 the content of the Logic to be solely that of
reason and still in certain of its parts assignable to
(1) Log. 1.7.
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modes or moments of experience other than that of reason
alone. These other modes (understanding as distinct from
reason) are contained in, subsumed under, moments of reason
ana their truth is truth of reason alone, but because their
truth the truth furnished in experience by them, it can by
itself be regarded even in the Logic as still assignable to
these distinctive modes. Thus it is that it is possible
to speak of one part as belonging to understanding, another
to reason, though all the Logic is in fact determined by
reason alone. Reason furnishes the content of all the
modes of minu, itself among others., itself being thereby
distinguished from others. It is not that understanding
per se itself functions in the Logic and produces or moulds
those notions which are assigned to it; it is. understanding
as moment in and of reason, as determined, permeated by it
alone that is meant. It is easy to see that the 'sphere
of reason' must be the last which appears in the Logic, for
in it reason which determines the Logic ab initio reaches
its completes! content in the last stages, and that com¬
plete content is nothing other than its own complete self.
And this fact conversely throws light on what the final
stage actually means and can only mean - namely, as we
shall presently show the whole Logic in its totality. Pro¬
perly interpreted then there is no contradiction or ob¬
scurity in assigning certain parts of the Logic to Under¬
standing and Reason respectively.
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It is unnecessary to deal further with the three chief
moments of the Logic than has already been done in the
statement of their origin, nature and connection above
given. To exhibit their connection more fully would re¬
quire a statement of their entire content, and to furnish
this woula mean a re-statement of the whole Logic. Suf¬
fice it then taut they are the primary moments of that
notion of mind which is the beginning and the end of the
Logic and contains "■nrnfffnairntiir notion of mind all the
moments of which, the Logic is merely the exposition, for
tne moments of that notion as such are simply the primary
moments of the Logic, hind is the truth of reality, and
its (mind's) own notion contains the fundamental determina¬
tions of reality. And there seems little doubt that these
moments as above stated wev,e for Kegel the first beginnings
of the construction of the Logic; they were together the
\
germ from which the larger organism of the Logic as we now
have it started. They formed the ground plan, the governing
idea of the whole. And further, their nature and connec¬
tion were the pattern and clue to the construction of the
rest of the Logic. For in each the notion mind, self-
knowing , is present; for each is a notion, an egoised
realisation of mind. Just therefore as the notion of
mind itself which starts and lays the ground of the Logic
must,in order to realise (know) itself completely appear
Ih!
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to, posit, manifest itself in three pulses, stages or
moments, so again each moment of that ultimate notion must
itself define, determine itself in a similar manner and
for precisely the same reason. Jience each must have three
determinations. The question that required solution in
each case was what are- these determinations? The diffi¬
culty it should be observed was not trie general character
of these determinations) this was already known. for the
method by which they were realised was the same for the
whole as for the part., and with the nature of the method
he was long since familiar (1), ana of its universal neces¬
sity and applicability throughout the whole range of his
system■or as he held of any system of.philosophy he was
likewise long since absolutely convinced. 'What remained
to him therefore was the strenuous labour of determining
tus actual content of the Logic, of inwardly and by logical
necessity uniting content to content, notion to notion.
It, would however be utterly absurd to suppose that he
had to construct both the material as well as the instru¬
ment of his investigation. This would indeed make liege 1
the creator of the world. He was neither creator nor even
inventor;- he was no more than discoverer. But a discovery
presupposes what is already there waiting to be discovered.
It is entirely to misunderstand the whole meaning of tne
(1) The Phan. being an example of it.
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Logic, and the essential spirit of Hegel's work to regard
his Logic as a web spun solely and simply on the loom of
his own mind; and still more so if ids whole procedure
be regarded, as an attempt to substitute omniscience for
nls want of science, as if he would make up for ignorance
ol' the actual world with its throbbing activity by becoming
a past master in the knowledge of a world with which we
have no concern. His Logic is the outgrowth and, for
Hegel, the culmination of his knowledge* of science and
scientific principles and results. It presupposed in his
case, not merely a wicte and prolonged acquaintance with
the various aspects of experience, with philosophy and
history in its various forms, but a systematic study of
the various discrete natural sciences; and on his view to
a complete appreciation of the Logic such knowledge as he
Himself possessed before constructing it is indispensable(1),
Only so does it have 'body'. It was only after a ripe
knowledge of what in experience had already become the
common property of the educated world that his Logic was
constructed. Experience therefore in the widest sense (in¬
cluding science as ordinarily understood) furnished the
raw material out of which he shaped the Logic (2). But if
this is so it is clear that the concepts, the notions with
waieh he has to deal already lie at his hand. Experience
(1) Op. Log. I. 42 ff. (W. 41).
(2) Cp. Log. I. 10.11. ff:•"Philosophy requires no special
terminology", ibla, 12: "The objects of Logic and their
expressions are the common stock of knowledge." ibid,13.
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had already in the history of mankind shaped itself by,
had informed itself by means of the ground notions which
were its ultimate truths and these notions had come to
utterance in the form of language, and were thus bequeathed
as universal property to the mind of educated civilised
man. Hegel simply avails himself of the wealth
of deepened experience which he inherited from the past.
What he had to do with it was to organise it by a principle
of inner necessity. Thus it is that we find the Logic eon-
tains the notions of experience with which men are already
long familiar. It is the connection, the setting, the sys¬
tematic union of them which is Hegel's work; nothing more.
In regard to the detailed construction, of his final
System of Logic it is significant that from the first
forms in which it is presented,to the last there, is little
important change to record. The Logic of the "Propaedentik"
which contains.the first explicit exposition of it, has on
the whole the same shape, order.and content as the Larger
Logic, and the Logic of the Encyclopaedia. The 'Propaeden¬
tik' is not so full, nor so complete, nor so inwardly sys¬
tematise^ as in the other cases. But this difference, as
already indicated, can be explained by the purpose for
which,, and the individuals for whom, the Logic as contained
there, was designed. It need not imply any essential dif¬
ference from the others or any incompleteness in the
20
author's conceptions at the period when the Logic of the
'Prop&edeMjtik' was written. Besides this, this Logic
as we now have it is the collection of notes of Hegel's
Lectures delivered from time to time, from prabably 1808,
{the period when he entered the Gymnasium at Nurnberg) to
1812. or even later, till 1816 -the year when he left for
Keiaelberg. We have therefore here his latest thoughts on
the Logic as well as the earliest, those which lie held when
the first volume of the Larger Logic appeared 1812, and
those which he held while he was actually elaborating the
Logic. And the editor of these notes has assigned no
specific dates to any specific parts'; we are therefore un¬
able to affirm that there are any actual and essential
deviations from the final Logic, or waere these may occur.
On the whole the probability is that there could not well
be any; for it is highly improbable that Kegel would com¬
mit unfinished declarations to his pupils; and again, since
the lectures to them and the actual elaboration of the
Logic were going on simultaneously, the natural inference
ft
would be that the' Logic as,we now have, preceded the Logic
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of the 'Propaedetttik', the latter being the modified and
attenuated form in which Hegel sought.to introduce his
pupils to his Logic; the latter being, in short, extracted
from the real systematically constructed Logic. Any devia¬
tions in expression or terminology, and there are such,
found in the Logic of the Propaedentik can be explained in
a similar -way. We will not therefore consider further the
statement of the Logic found in the PropaedebLtik, but will now
pass fro,i the exposition of the fundamental moments of the
Logic to show shortly how the actual beginning of the
Logic was maae.
The process of determining the beginning of the Logic,
important as it no doubt is, seems none the less in itself
very simple. At the outset we see that the beginning must
be found in the first fundamental moment of the notion,
namely, the notion simply in its immediacy as it is in
itself, the notion as being:. The point to discover is
with what in this notion must we start, in order completely
to determine being itself. What is the first absolute
truth of being, and so of the Logic as a whole? Now the
Logic is to contain the whole truth of science, and of
reality. The begining to the Logic must therefore not be
sought for outside the Logic itself. And again, it must
not as logical beginning be determined from or by means of
any other content inside the Logic; if it did so the begin¬
ning would clearly require to be sought In. the later con¬
tent, a procedure which would involve a vo-rt^ow irpo-repoV.
But further, since the process consists in establishing
deducing content, since the development just consists in
the exposition of content, the beginning which is to ex¬
clude all such content by the nature of the process, must
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be either without any content at all or with the minimum of
content, the point where there is content just before van¬
ishing altogether.
Now the meaning of content as this is found in the
Logic is that mediation is required in order to establish
it. But it is logically impossible for that to be first
mediated which is the starting point of all further media¬
tion. The content which it does have therefore, and unless
it have in some sense content it cannot be a truth, must be
other than mediated content, it must be non-mediated or
immediate. And since it is to be absolutely the first, it
\
must be absolutely immediate, not a particular immediate,
distinct from others, but the one immediate. But the one
immediate is simply abstract immediacy as such. And im¬
mediacy without any further qualification is nothing more
nor less than mere being, being pure and simple, bare ab¬
stract being-ness. The first determination of the absolute
is merely that it i_s; what it first posits as Absolute is
its being; what we first find when we approach it is just
that, without further qualification, it is. Its bare being
is its first
We may reach-this in another, perhaps more direct way,
W
thus.- The Logic is the 'notion of Science', the pure know¬
ledge which is the result arrived at in the 'Phenomenology'
Pure knowledge as: we have, learned is the absolute unity of
object and of mind, of being known and thought knowing, of
| J^ -2 L/'X
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'certainty' and 'truth*. Just because from the outset to
the completion 'pure knowledge is entirely self-contained,
cannot pass beyond itself for anything, its beginning must
lie immanent in the very idea of pure knowledge itself. Nou
the unity spoken of is absolute, unqualified; all reference
to an other, to what is different and likewise to mediation
(for difference implies mediation) must be in that know¬
ledge completely removed. But if so what we have is an
entire absence of difference. Since, however, knowledge
implies difference, mediation, this complete absence of
difference means that Knowledge itself ceases to be an
element in it; this mere undifferentiated unity ceases to
be Knowledge at all. It is merely an immediate, mere im¬
mediacy. But not immediacy as contrasted with mediation;
what we must' have at the absolute beginning is absolute
immediacy, i.e., without any such contrast, immediacy in its
ultimate form. Ana this is nothing otxier than mere being,
being without any qualification, without implication of
difference at all. In it therefore nothing is presupposed,
for no content determines .it; no mediation is present in it,
because there is nothing in it to be mediated. If it pre¬
supposed anything it would ipso facto not be mere imme¬
diacy, mere being* The Logic therefore begins at the
absolute beginning, at the point which presupposes nothing
beside itself. Such a beginning was the only one possible
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and was absolutely necessary for a science which claims
to hold within itself the complete system of absolute
truth.
But from two sides this absoluteness, this absence of
any presupposition in the beginning has to be guarded, or
at any rate qualified. For we have in the first place to
make such a beginning consistent with Hegel's cardinal
position so strongly emphasised, that there is nothing
thinkable which does not contain at once midlateness and
(!)
immediacy, that these two are inseparable. Where- is the
mediation of the beginning of the Logic? Hegel replies
that its mediation lies in the 'Phenomenology'. It is
there 'shown' 'proved', established that pure Knowledge
is the truth of all relation of mind to' object; i.e., pure
knowledge is there mediated. In the Logic this mediation
is presupposed., is accepted as finished. Pure Being, with
which the Logic starts, is simply pure Knowledge in its im¬
mediacy. Hence the beginning of the Logic, like everything
else, is at immediate and mediated. That the media¬
tion falls inside another sphere than the Logic (viz. in¬
side the Phenomenology) is irrelevant to,does not affect the
fact that the beginning is mediated. For the mediation is
none the less true, none the less scientifically (Philoso¬
phically) established; and. ail that required to be shown
was merely that this pure immediacy, the first actual moment
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of pure Knowledge was not merely immediate but was also,
as everything "in heaven, nature and mind" must be, mediated
The beginning is a beginning for the Logic, for it is made
in and by 'pure Knot-ledge, ana that it is the necessary and
absolute beginning is determined by the Logic. But in that
pure Knowledge is itself mediated, (i.e. , deduced, estab¬
lished as a necessary truth, proved and thereby united with
truths outside itself) the absolute beginning of pure
Knowledge, pure Knowledge in its simplest immediacy, is not
a mere independent arbitrary assertion, but likewise an
established mediated truth.
But in the second place we must qualify the character
of the immediacy of the beginning by its relation to the
procedure and content of the Logic as a whole. Here again
it is seen to be not merely immediate, but also necessarily
mediated. And this from two considerations, the nature of
the process pursued in the Logic and the nature of the
result arrived at. It lies in the nature of the process
that tne development from the beginning should take place
by a further determination of that beginning itself. The
transition to tne next moment, like every succeeding tran¬
sition, does not mean that the preceding moment is entirely
negated and abandoned. The first still remains in the
second, is immanent in it. But by' remaining thus as the
basis in and throughout the further moments of the Logic,
the beginning itself becomes a moment in the further
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developed content, i.e., it is mediated. And this media¬
tion just consists in removing what in the beginning: was
onesided, namely, its maintaining itself qua beginning as
sell-subsistent while ail the time its very meaning as
beginning for science implied its connection with the
other content. J?rom this point of view the further develop¬
ment oi the content of the science is necessarily the
mediation oi the otherwise purely immediate beginning.
Again, the very meaning of the "result" necessitates
mediation of the starting point. The result is by the
nature of the process the most true, the original truth,
the beginning itself therefore depends on it, is indeed
produced by it; that result is its ultimate absolute
ground. It is the complete concrete truth for which that
beginning is a beginning at all, and from which * to be a
beginning' has a meaning. The beginning is not a somewhat
per se, it is the start for and of a somewhat, which det¬
ermines the beginning as its own, and not as a somewhat
in general, not a beginning in general. The immediacy "of
the beginning is for this reason mediated.
It is true that both the above means of mediating the
beginning are simply two sides of the same fact. In the
former case we can regard and do regard tins beginning as
the ground and the result the dependent and derived element;
in the latter the result is the ground and the beginning
derived and in this way a mediated result. In both cases
the Immediate beginning is mediated. But this twofold
view of that mediation is not at all a double mediation of
the beginning; it simply follows from the nature of the
method by which the science of the Logic is constructed
that that mediation can be looked at in tivo ways.- The
movement, as we saw, proceeds in cycles and goes from cycle
to cycle of truth. That is, the essential primary and most
vital fact in the whole sciencej Hot the character or the
beginning, nor the fact that the beginning is mediated;
these are only important as consequences of that method.
The whole science represents a cycle, for the science is
self-knowledge of Absolute Subject by itself. From this
which is the primary nature of the science and its method,
the immediacy and mediation of the beginning .are determined.
Thus we see that what has and constitutes the begin¬
ning cannot rest content there, for its beginning is its
self as undeveloped, without content, ana only by its fur- •
ther development from that starting-point does it fully knew
itself, only after its knowledge has been completely develop¬
ed is its content thoroughly mediated. The further devel¬
opment is necessary for the same reason that the beginning
is necessary only so is the science established, every
element proved, deduced. And again, because of the neces¬
sity of each moment, because each moment is mediated,proved
to be necessary and true, the beginning no less than every
succeeding moment is in no sense arbitrary. It is built
into the science by the s&xne process as any other part.
?'»t
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The whole process lies in the inner union of content with
content; it is the nature of the content itself which de¬
termines the movement. s!ach moment is determined, as
necessary, ana its character determined by the content of
the science; and the reason for each moment must lie in
that content. The nature of the beginning, and the reason
for the beginning with which the science does start must,
likewise lie in the content of the science of -pure Knowledge
And mere being is simply pure Knowledge in its indeterminate
immediate unity. That pure Knowledge should necessarily have
mere being as its first moment, lies in the nature, the
meaning of pure Knowledge itself. This mere being is the
first content of pure Knowledge. And in virtue of its
indeterminateness, its utter abstractedness, this which
is the absolutely immediate is at the same time absolutely
mediated. It is mere being, nothing further; all deter-
minateness must, because it is beginning, be entirely
excluded. Jt would not be the beginning unless it were
taken thus in its mere immediacy; and as so taken it must
be mediated, abstracted and abstract.
This then is the one and only beginning to the science
The beginning is therefore absolute for that science; i.e.,
it could have no other beginning. But the beginning is
obviously not absolute per se, it is related to, relative
to,mediated by other content. It is not self-subsistent
per se; it is the beginning for a body of truth and so
i*'
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orHanio to and connected with the whole. And no other
bey inning: was possible to a system of absolute truth.
There is nothing else which could have served the purpose.
Tor the nature of that system demands that the beginning
Should be (a) absolute (b) without presvpposition. (c) a
necessary moment in pure knowledge (a) positive factual (1)
if we take any other content we shall find it will not
satisfy those conditions. If the content should, have any
concretene s s it c ou 1 d r. o t aatisfy • (a) and (b) ; an d if it
nave no concretensss whatever it is simply mere being, if
the content be a particular fact but taken quite abstractly,
quite formally , e.g.., the Ago, or the notion of the Ago,
then tiiis is not an absolute beginning, it is merely ab¬
stract , and is a particular being. Should we again start
with wnat is. given by mere intellectual '.uschauung, then
either its content is concrete or merely immediate. If it
is the latter it satisfies (a) (b) and (d), but not (c);
for intellectual Ausehauuhg shows none of its content as
necessary, as proved as mediated, but merely asserted.
If it is the latter then it does not satisfy (b) and pro¬
vides no means of guaranteeing the necessity of the various
elements of this concrete fact from which it starts. No
other beginning in short, not even the conception of mere
beginning itself (2), will satisfy the demands of Absolute
Knowledge.




We come now to our last point, the meaning of the
final result of the Logic - the Absolute Idea. We give an
interpretation of this because of its bearing on the other
parts of the System, Philosophies of Nature and of Mind,
partly because it seems to have been generally misunder¬
stood and partly because it illustrates and in a manner
sums up our interpretation of the plan and content of the
Logic. Our statement need only be very brief.
The moments of the Logic are determinations by the
absolute Subject of its own self, its own content, are
realisations, manifestations of the Absolute. To be mo¬
ments of the one absolute notion is to be pulses of abso-
\
lute truth. But throughout the Logic the one Absolute
mind is not merely exhibiting its content, but progressive^
realising, determining its own complete absolute self.
This we saw was a vital element in the whole process. Now
in the course of this self-knowledge the first two funda¬
mental moments of its notion Being ana Essence gradually
lead the one into the other and the final truth of Essence
is shown to be Substance and its correlate accident. This
again when developed into its complete significance is seen
to be Reciprocity. But Reciprocity as explicit reference
to and implication in each other of elements opposed to
each other but still belonging to the same sphere, the same
immanent identity leads inevitably to the notion as notion
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in which that identity is made absolutely explicit and tiie
opposed elements in consequence do not merely imply each
other, but are explicitly moments of the same one fact, the
Identity within which they stood opposed.
The significance of the transition from Reciprocity to
the Motion lies in this that in it the notion passes from
being Substance ana. becomes Subject; the absolute is shown
to be, is proved to be not merely substance but also and
at the same time more truly Subjectf It corresponds in a
general way to the identification or union of object with
subject established in the Phenomenology when Reason was
reached. Or again, it can be regarded as the proof inside
the system of absolute truth of the stand-point and prin¬
ciple of absolute Idealism. It is this transition which to
Kegel is of supreme moment; it is this which contains the
kernel of .his system; in the establishing of this lies his
own claim .to possess a distinctive philosophical position.
It heralds in the sphere of the notion, in the system of
pure Reason,'the Logic, the positive advance which Kegel
makes on the system of Spinoza, or on all systems which like
his have substance as their ultimate principle (1).
By this transition then the absolute ceases to be
substance, ceases to be determinable by the notion as Being
or as Essence and is established as subject as a self, as a
notion qua notion. The discussion of the notion as notion
therefore is the third and final' part of the Logic. From
(1) Log. Ill. 10 ff.
the very nature of the system it follows that the preceding
moments Being and Essence are not simply negated but have
become and are preserved as moments of the notion as such.
They cease to be moments of the absolute on their own ac¬
count and become determining factors, phases or functions
in the absolute as explicitly notion. They therefore do
not have in the notion as such the character which they'
have as self-subsistent and independent; they are merged
in this which is their unity, their foundation, tneir
identity and their truth, and they' cannot be when posited
as explicit elements in that identity what they are or have
been when taken as simply moments in the process by which
the notion is established, deduced, proved. Still this
does not mean either that we have to examine and state them
over again in the light of this their truth or that the
notion as such has no nature or content of its own apart
from that supplied by or coming from Being'and Essence.
Both of these interpretations of the result arrived at are
easily seen to be false after the exposition of the method
already given. Being and Essence still retain the content,
the truth which they have, show themselves to have, and
more or other truth than this they cannot have, for that
exposition exhausted their inner ultimate nature. And
again the notion as such has determinations specifically
its own; otherwise it would not be a distinctive moment at
all. What the above statement means is merely that in the
3<1
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notion we have explicitly before us the ground, principle
the inner reality which determines, what Being and Essence
are, on which they ultimately depend for their content,
which is their 'ratio essencli' , their active ground, the
a.
one source of their common life. Ail that they are there¬
fore remains still, but since the notion is thus their
truth, what they are is now regarded as proceeding from,
as attributable to, as active moments of the notion. The
notion contains all that they have shown themselves to be
in bringing it (the notion itself) to the light as their
explicit truth. And now the notion as such proceeds to
furnish and determine its own pulses, the functions which,
qua distinct moment of the absolute, it actually possesses.
The notion then cannot in any way be regarded as
mere.iy abstract and formal. It is the Absolute in its
truest form, as Subject; it contains all preceding content
which absolute Knowledge has exhibited; and it is, like
every other moment of the Logic, absolute truth, at once
thought and reality. On no ground whatever therefore can
^ it be considered a mere form without contact, objectivity,
reality, as if the latter had to be brought to it in order-
to free it from its formality. By., its very nature, as well
as by the nature of the Logic as such, the notion already
contains reality, the reality which it has as being at once
si.ibjective and objective, as being a moment of the absolute
as such. Now the peculiar reality which it does have is
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that of the Subject as such. In it the absolute is demon¬
strated to be Subject, the notion as such is the Absolute
as Subject. The notion is then nothing other than the pure
form of JSgo, Mind, Reason', Self-consciousness (1). The
moments of the notion are those of the Ago itself. The
notion as notion is simply the ultimate form and reality
of mind.
hot that in the mere notion we have trie concrete actual
figo as we find it, say in the Phenomenology; nor again in
the mere notion as such, have we the complete truth of mind.
For the notion is not mind qu£" existent as is the case in
the Phenomenology; it is its inner ultimate truth, not its
actual existence in time and concrete experience. And
again trie notion as such must be further developed in order
explicitly to exhibit its full content. Now the first step
in this latter process is to show what the notion is in
itself, in its inner moments, ilegel describes this part
as the notion in its subjectivity. It must not, however
be confounded with the subjectivity which characterises
'finite knowledge'. The notion as such is both subjective
ana objective like any other moment of absolute truth, were
it not it would not fall inside the- Logic at all. What the
term here means is the absolute notion in its inwardness,
in its inner undeveloped self, the notion in itself. It
is the subjectivity, the to-itself-ness, of the notion, not
the notion as a subjective fact of our minds. The complete
(i) Gp. Logic III 13.14.
&
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realisation of this phase of the notion leads to the com¬
plete realisation of.the notion of its complete exposition,
which, in contrast to the first phase, is called the ob¬
jectivity of the notion; the notion in its rcalisedness.
The term 'Objectivity* must be similarly explained as in
the- case of 'Subjectivity'.
All the time be it remembered we are dealing &ith the
absolute Subject; it is the absolute Reality which is now
subjectivity and now objectivity of the notion. The final
stage is obtained by the union' of those two moments. Such
a unity is called the Idea, the notion at once subjective
(to itself) and. objective (outwardised,realised). This is
•the final union of notion with its reality. The reality is
not brought in ab extra; it is the reality implied and con¬
tained from the beginning. It is the reality which a notion
has as truth (as union of thought ana reality). While then
this reality to which it arrives is deduced, derived out of
the notion itself (1.) it is not a reality external to the
I
notion, all it means in fact is the complete exposition of
the content of the notion, the notion becomes concrete to
itself. The reality is not that of temporal or sensuous
existence, not the reality of a particular 'matter' re¬
garded as external to the notion. There is no attempt to
deduce existence in time and space out of the notion. All
(1) Log. I'll 24 ff.
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the reality deduced by this process is a reality which is
already contained implicitly in the notion from the start,
and indeed in the whole Logic. The content of the Logic,
as we saw, is not external to reality, it is inside reality,
inside experience; for it is the essence, the truth of ex¬
perience. rivery element of content in the Logic is at once
subjective and objective, at once thought and reality.
There cannot therefore at the end of the Logic be any ex¬
clusion of reality from the notion. And the deduction.of
the reality of the notion cannot be conceived as a deduc¬
tion of a reality which from the start was never inside of,
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never was an iaruuu<? in the content of the Logic as such.
The1Logic professedly excluded the multiplicity of sense-
reality; what it was to be concerned with was the inner
essence, the ultimate grounds of reality. It therefore
\
deals with the inner content of sense-reality (whose truth
is Being), but not with sense-reality in its manifold
existence. Hence it is entirely beside the mark either to
seek for such reality in what is deduced from the notion,
or to regard the procedure as smuggling in reality from
without. The reality deduced by the notion, is that which
it 1ms as the ground and essence of the absolute; that and
none other.
This realisation of the notion as Idea is simply mind
at once conscious of self, and distinguishing itself from
itself is conscious of itself in that distinction. And
/
the complete expression of this, the form in which this is
realised most perfectly and fully i's where the notion is to
itself in the form of itself, in the form of notion. Here
we have the final truth of the notion, here indeed we have
the absolute truth. This stage hegel calls the Absolute
Idea. This Idea is not the idea of the absolute as if it
inhered in, belonged to, were a description of the Abso¬
lut . It is nothing other than the absolute itself in its
truest, perfect form. It is absolute Subject, absolute
Mind, in the form of mind, conscious of its self in the
form of self. It is not simply perfect truth, it is also
at the same time perfect absolute Personality (1). The
preceding .ideas then of the True and of the Good were not
regarded as mere ideas, as what had no reality. They were
regarded as determinate moments of the reality of the
notion (2). It is the very meaning of the 'Idea' to be
real, to have nothing opposed to itself except itself. But
if so then the absolute Idea, which is the concrete union
of both the ideas of the True and of Good, can be nothing
but the absolute Subject in its completeness as absolute en
as subject, as containing ail content, as finding itself
in all content, without imperfection, incompleteness or
limitation, eternally one with itself. It is Personality
(1) Log. III. 327/8.
(2) The essences, the notions of the spheres which in the




in its absolute realisation, at once subjective to itself
ana objective to itself, and that without process, but
simply as absolute continuous self-identity.
In the absolute Idea we have simply the truth, the
absolute Subject, mind, in its own essential element, i.e.,
in its inmost truth, in its pure notion. We have notion
at once and completely transparent to itself as notion.
This Idea is not so much in itself a content of the abso¬
lute, as that form in which the absolute is truly itself.
This absolute Idea does not furnish any determinateness
to this its notion; does not in fact give a determinate
notion at all. It is a purely universal, the absolutely
universal form of the truth of the absolute, that form in
which it must be in. order to be absolute truth at all. If
we insist on regarding this Idea as none the less a content,
we must guard our statement by pointing out that thus con¬
tent is merely and solely universal, is not determinate,as
in the case of the content of the other notions of the Logic
its being absolute form, mere notion, is in short its only
content, its complete nature. But because it is th\s in
itself barren of determinateness, it is impossible to
develop the Logic further. The Logic only moves from con¬
tent to content, from determinateness to determinateness.
Since, however, this Idea gathers up ail the preceding, its
content, its determinateness, lies in what has preceded.
All the content of the Logic.is the determining content of
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the Idea. And indeed it is evident that this Idea does not
as such exhibit because it does not require content. Be¬
cause it is to contain all that precedes, and because this
is the entire truth of the absolute, the final Idea cannot
but be mere universal form of that truth, without any dis-
/
tinctive content of its own; if it had the content of the
absolute would not be exhausted. It is the mere abstract
universal form of that Reality which is the all containing
ground and all determining principle of the whole course
of the Logic. This it is that what is discussed under ab-
i
solute Idea is not content as such, but merely this uni¬
versal form which constitutes that Idea; and this form is
the method by which the content is determined, by which the
Idea proceeds.
Here then we have the absolute truth about the abso¬
lute; here we have truth in the form in which it is abso¬
lute. It lies in the nature of the case that this absolute
Idea is not a functional enssorSubject which is but does not
manifest itself. Its very being consists in its revelation
of itself as what it is in itself. And this.revelation
is its content, viz. the whole Logic itself. This absolute
Personality is therefore not a somewhat beyond our reach,
an existent per se and apart. Absolute Personality and
Absolute Truth, absolute Subject and absolute self-knowledgp
are one and the same concrete fact. In the absolute Idea
then we have the absolute Subject merely in its final form.
3 4 £>
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Its content has been given in the process which led. up to
it. In it we have the truth in the form and knowing itself
as the true. In the Absolute Idea we have Absolute Subject
knowing itself, the true, the notion in the form of the
true, in the form of itself, the notion* But again it is
the truth which contains within itself all the preceding
content of the Logic. The content which it possesses is
therefore the content of the Logic.
the content of the Logic must therefore be the content
d'f this self-knowledge, of this truth in the form of truth,
which makes up the meaning of Absolute Idea. But if so
then the conclusion is evident, that the Logic is nothing
other than the exhibition and manifestation in extenso of
the Absolute Idea. The Absolute Idea is simply the Logic
itself; the Logic is nothing but the self exposition of the
Absolute idea. It does not stand by itself merely as a
name for the absolute. It must also necessarily contain
all that precedes. And since it is the final moment, since
it cannot possibly determine itself further, (for it is
tlxe complete notion of the Absolute) all its content, all
its determination must be found alone in what preceded it.
Previous notions not merely gathered into themselves what
went before but led on to other truths. The final truth
just because final has nothing to do but gather into itself
what preceded. It is not something by itself apart from
:.A-f
what led up to it; indeed it can hardly be said by itself
to mean anything at all; the two are indissolubly united.
What it is is simply what it contains and means; and this
is the whole Logic. The absolute Idea is just the Idea
of absolute knowledge- of absolute truth, arid the exposi¬
tion of this is the logic. And if we bear in mind that
Knowledge in such a case does not mean something in our
heads, or again something apart from reality, but exposi¬
tion of absolute mind itself in the form (self) of mind, we
shall readily see how tne term Absolute Idea can be the
designation at once of supreme Personality, absolute
Reality and of absolute truth.
This conclusion, which it would be futile to labour
further, agrees entirely with the meaning and purpose of
the Logic. From first to last we were dealing with the
content of the Absolute; each moment was moment of the
Absolute; and the whole is nothing other than that content
in its entirety. And the Logic was to contain every truth
of the absolute, the truth of itself Absolute Knowledge^ as
such (included. It was to cover all experience and here we
find that what was highest mode of experience, highest
reality of mind (absolute Knowledge) is highest truth
attainable; and that as the highest experience was just the
Logic, so the highest truth of the Logic is just the idea
of the Logic itself. The Logic was the whole of Hegel's
5
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System and that in its ultimate form, for it .vas the
exposition of the ground of all experience; arid here we
find that the Absolute Idea is named 'the only object and
content of Philosophy' (1); and the Logic is- 'its self-
movement ' .
(!) Log. III. 328.
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Before passing from this Hegel's final Logic we must
state the relation in which it stands to the Philosophy of
Nature and that of .Mlrtd. Much ambiguity has gathered round
this question: Kegel's own expressions, while they indicate
that he was not unaware of the problem involved, equally
show that the question was not of supreme moment to him, ot¬
to the thoroughness and completeness of his System. Had
it been as vital to his system as has been supposed there
seems little reason to doubt that a mind of Hegel's order
with its boundless appreciation of the value and the de¬
mands of rigorous systematic connexion in all. that claims
to be science, would not have been contented to leave the
relation between Logic, Nature and Mind, so loose and
external and even casual in statement as we actually find
it to be. What indications of relation he has given make
it clear that their connexion is merely architectonic in
character, not that of organic system.
To begin with, the relation is not that of an inward
logical methodical 'transition' from Logic to Nature ana
thence to mind. This is plain from the nature of the case
and from Kegel's own statements on the point. For it is of
the very nature of the Logic (i) to be a complete closed
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ana self-closed science (2) to embrace with its scope the
entire area of reality, of experience, (3) to contain the
richest ana highest notions of experience, as well as the
lowest and poorest. Now on any one of these grounds it
could not possibly require or leave room for a 'transition'
from Logic to Nature, in the same way in which there is
transition from one notion to another in the-Logic or from
one part to another in 'Nature' or 'Mind', and no other
form of transition is legitimate or possible if inner sys¬
tematic connexion is to be established. The first charac¬
teristic makes transition impossible because if the science
of Logic is already complete, as with the "Idea" it em¬
phatically is, then there is no motive, no inner necessity
no inner incompleteness of content making essential a
movement to bring about the desired completeness. And
moreover, even if the Logic were not completed with the
'Idea', assuredly the required completion could not be
brought about by 'Nature', which is eo ipso distinct in
content from the Logic. That completion could only be
established in and by means of an element homogeneous with
that of the other content of the Logic, namely, that pure
notions, absolute essentialities, ultimate reality - any¬
thing else would destroy the very character of the Logic
itself.
The second, ground again is equally fatal to 'transi¬
tion', because if the Logic does, as it has been shown to
claim to do, cover the whole field of reality, just as in
a different way the Phenomenology did, then it is evident
that the content of Nature must by the end of the Logic
already have fallen inside the Logic itself in that form
and element peculiar to the Logic, namely the content of
Nature in its essentiality, its ultimate notions. And
this indeed we find to be the case (1). The fundamental
conceptions employed in Philosophy of Sature, Quantity,
Mass, Causality, Mechanism, etc.-, all have .their place in
the System of abstract absolute truth which is the Logic.•
But if this is so then to say that Logic must complete it¬
self by passing to Nature is clearly absurd. If the Logic
already contains the .essences of Nature, it already has all
of Mature necessary for its purpose, and ail that Nature cm
ultimately give.
And what is true of Nature is 'mutatis mutandis' true
of Mind (1). All its ground notions are likewise contained
inside the Logic; Knowledge, Purpose, Goodness, etc.
Finally the third factor makes 'transition' impos¬
sible, because if transition existed at ail it would be
from Logic to Nature and thence to Mind. But if Nature
(1) Cp. Log. III. 27. diese concreten 'Vissenschaften haben
das Log is che oder Begriff zurr inneren Bildner und be-
h&lten (ihn) wie sie es Sum Vorbildner hatten.
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is to be the first stage in the completion of Logic then
certainly the very meaning of the method requires that
nature should contain all that is in the Logic and some¬
thing 'higher'. As a matter of fact, however, Nature does
not contain all that is in the Logic itself; it does not
contain, e.g., the 'Ideas of Knowledge' or of 'Goodness'.
And it assuredly does not contain anything whatever that is
higher than what is found in the Logic. On the contrary,
it is quite unequal to the highest notion of the Logic.
While, again, the transition from the last notion of the
Logic to the first content of Nature is really not an
'advance' in any sense whatever. The contents of both are
simply heterogeneous.-
All the reasons, therefore, from the nature of the
Logic per se, make directly against any supposition of
'transition' from one to the other.
But, further, Hegel's own statements (1) establish
this same contention quite conclusively, he there says ex¬
plicitly that the relation of the 'Idea' (i.e., the Logic
in its totality (2)} to Nature is 'not that of an actual
process, and transition, as in the ease when the subjective
notion (in the Logic) passes in its totality into object¬
ivity.' 'for the pure Idea there is no further immediate
determination which is not just as much posited fin it and
by it) and is notion'. Tnese words require no and
(1) Log. III. last paragraph. &&& W\E *
(2) Log. Ill, Hi- At-
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ought by themselves to preclude completely the conception
of 'transition' out of or beyond the Logic itself. It is
evident from them that Nature is r>ot supposed or intended
to give a concreteness to the Idea which it does not pos¬
sess and. yet which might be necessary to it for its com¬
pleteness. No doubt it is of the essence of the movement
of the method that the content in the Logic should become
more concrete as it goes forward; and no doubt again Nature
is more concrete than the Logic. But the essential point
is that all the eoncreteness and 'reality* necessary or
possible for the notions, they have already obtained in the
course of the Logic itself, that the concreteness they
possess is a eoncreteness conformable with their own nature
v/nicn is to be essentiality, pure notion, and that hence
the concreteness which Nature itself possesses is irrele¬
vant to them as essences, and therefore does not constitute
Nature into & methodically determined advance on the Logic.
What then is the relation between Logic, Nature and
Mind? Since there is no transition from the last stage of
the one to the first of another, and'since no other kind
of connexion can establish absolute continuous systematic
connexion or is permissible for that purpose, it is clear
that such connexion us they do possess must be brought
about in some other way and for some other purpose than
that of;rigorous system. Let us bear in mind three import¬
ant facts" (ij That the connection, such as it is, is con-
ceived according to Hegel as referring solely to the
whole totality, the notion of each (Logic, Nature and
Mind) taken as notion simply; the connection is between the
'Idea', the notion of Nature, and the Notion of Mind,
without further reference (2) That the question of the
relation of Logic to Nature and Mind is parallel, indeed
similar to that of the relation of Phenomenology of Mind to
Logic, in both it is a relation of concrete existence to
pure notion. (3J That Hegel throughout the whole of his
development had been endeavouring at once to treat these
three as correlated, and independent sciences, and yet
to show how the content of each, • the object dealt with by-
each was related to the others. The problem of this con¬
nexion was not new. All along these sciences of Logic
Nature and Mind had been regarded as independent in the
first instance. Their subject matters were primarily
distinct from one another, and for that 'reason required
separate treatment, lie did not start with one and from
that proceed to 'evolve' the others, and indeed he assigned
them different values at different stages of his develop¬
ment , and thus, while treating each as self-dependent, re¬
garded their relation differently. So it comes about at
the end of his development that the connexion between them
is not the prime concern; each science stands by itself in
the first place and is important for its own sake; the con¬
nexion between is a subordinate question, and as it were
an afterthought.
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Prom the above three facts mentioned we can see fi)
that the connection between the Logic as a whole, the idea
ef the Logic, (The Idea proper) and the notion of Nature,
the idea of Mature as a whole and of Mind need not be the
same, and cannot a priori be asserted to be the same as
that between any elements in each of the sciences taken
separately. (2) that just as there was no transition from
Phenomenology to Logic, no passage from existence and act¬
ual experience to pure notion, but rather existence (Dasein)
and pure notion were each capable of independent treat¬
ment and were each simply dealt with as different kinds of
material for philosophy, which could not create its material
but had merely to accept it, so there need bo no transi¬
tion from pure thought to concrete', actual existence (Dasein)
in the form of Nature or of Mind. For indeed, as Hegel
admits ^ the reality which belongs to Nature and Mind is
'certainly concreter' than that possessed by the notion
(Logic), which however though more 'formal' than the other,
is concrete all the same. (3) that the three sciences,
like their subject-matters, having been regarded from first
to last as independent, and treated independently of each
other, with sole reference to the specific matter of each
and without importation of content or principles of one for
the determination or modification of the content of the
other, the establishment of a connection between them is
(1) Log. III.26/27.
of merely architectonic interest and importance, and cannot
affect the peculiar procedure and content of each science
I by itself. And it is, we may not&in passing, because of
this self-dependence of each science, and the indifference
to its connection with the others that it is illegitimate
to consider Nature and Mind as 'applications' of the Logic,
in the sense that they are the result of consciously apply¬
ing the method and content of the Logic to their material.
The Logic is of course as we saw the fundamental constitu¬
tive essence of their content, just as it is likewise of
the content of the Phenomenology. And for this reason we
can say we have in Nature and Mind- 'in concrete* what we
have in the Logic in pure abstraction, and in this sense
it is legitimate to call the sciences of Nature and Mind,
as liegel himself does (1), 'applied science'-.' but all
that this means is that Nature and Mind" themselves function
and work according to the notions contained in the Logic
not that we can discover simply by making use of the con¬
tent of the Logic itself, how they actually do work.
The key to such connection between Logic, Nature and
Mind, as is established, is to be found in the fundamental
fact common to all of them. This is the fact that they are
all aspects of the one absolute reality taken in its
totality; and that absolute is Mind* It is because of this
that connection is either possible or necessary. Each
(1) W.XVIII, 148.
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expresses the Absolute in a specific manner, Logic as pure
Idea (for this, as we saw, is not mere formality, but is
the Absolute Notion of Absolute hind itself) , Nature as
externality,, and Mind as concrete unity of the inwardness
of the former and the 'outwardness of the latter. This
would seem to suggest that we have in these three the
methodically connected moments of the one Absolute Mind
taken in its totality as the Absolute. But it is useless
to attempt to disguise from ourselves that this cannot be
actually the case. For in addition to the objections al¬
ready urged we may point out further (1) that the Logic
aces not go over totally into Nature; it holds too much
back to allow us to regard trie latter as containing the
former absolutely. (2j that further what is called the out-
wardising of the Idea 'in the pure externality in Space
and time1 which characterises Nature does not carry with
it the peculiar content of the Logic, and is itself not
an accurate description of Nature per se, for surely Mind,
consciousness, likewise exists in the externality of time.
(3) Concrete mind does not contain all Logic and all Nature
as its moments, but is rather their complement. No doubt
it was difficulties of this description, and other reasons
such as we have brought forward which induced Hegel not to
use the same method of connecting Logic, Nature and Mind
as a whole which he had employed in connecting their
several parts. They were all found as ready-to-hand
material of philosophy, and their connection is not that of
an inner systematic unity, but that of external metapnori-
cal half-mystical, hair-theological suggested unity, fiach
is by itself accurately enough namea, and named as they
were adopted to begin with, e.g., as their specific matters
required. But their connection is merely pointed at, as
that of a bridge not of an essential bond. The Logic in
its pure freedom 'lets itself out' from its inward freedom
to the other freedom of free externality in Nature. It
feels an 'impulse' to pass beyond itself (1). It is the
'creator' of Nature (2). All this may be valid as a pic¬
torial representation of one of the profound secrets of
the universe; but it cannot honestly be considered, and
can hardly have been regarded by Hegel, as serious state¬
ment of a scientific truth. Similar metaphors are applied
to the connection of Nature and Mind, into which however
we iiave no need to enter in detail.
The conclusion therefore is plain. These several
sciences were each pursued severally and independently as
their matter required, and as this was found presented in
experience; and the validity of the systematic connection
in each ease stands by itself without any immediate re¬
ference to a connection with the other sciences. The con¬
nection between them is brought about externally; for the
(1) Log, III ad fin.
(2) Log. III. 26.-
specific reality belonging to each is not the reality be¬
longing to the other and does not produce it out of itself;
their specific reality is simply found and remains separate
from that of the others; the meaning and relations of tue
specific reality (conc.rete.ness) of each does not seem to
have been ever an object of enquiry for Hegel. But this
absence of inner connection of the three does not affect
the inner connection of each science by itself, nor tiie
validity of the one method for each science. For object¬
ivity of science is just as we saw Absolute Idealism.
It is not in place here to offer any criticism; our
purpose has been not to estimate Hegel's position, but to
throw light upon the position he held by showing how he
came to adopt it. We have now completed the history of
Hegel's Logic from its earliest stages up to its final form
All that remains for us now to do is to indicate the points
and nature of'the advance of the last period over the pre¬
ceding ana gather up the general results of the whole en¬
quiry. But first of all we must say a word regarding the
later stages of the history of Hegel's Logic. With the
publication of Hegel's Larger Logic in 1816, his final
position had been established and completely expounded.
But with every new edition of the Logic, and particularly
of. tiie various editions of the "encyclopaedia", changes
were made in the body of the work, and some have argued
from this that if these changes did not mark any radical
v*
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alter&tion in Hegel's fundamental ^point of view and method
of the Logic at any rate they show that the method cannot
be regarded to have the infallibility and absoluteness
Hegel claimed for it in the Larger Logic. That these
changes indicated no change whatever in Hegel's conception
of the matter ana method of Logic may be taken to be quite
certain. They are alterations in detail made partly for
paeciogogie reasons, (in the case of various editions, of
the 'fincyclopaedie' Logic, where.much is omitted and much
compressed), partly for the sake of clearness, fullness and
expiicitness. The main bock of the Logic, its ground plan
remains in every respect the same. But that the changes
showed an incompleteness in the scope of absolute knowledge.
or an inadequacy in the method, and were a concrete refuta¬
tion of the claims of the Logic, implies a total misconcep¬
tion both of the principle of the science and of Hegel's
estimate of his own work. It is surely open to hold that
the notions of Reality are the ultimate content of the
Absolute, and the knowledge of them furnishes absolute-
Knowledge, without requiring that any system of such Know¬
ledge should be beyond the reach of modification or im¬
provement. Absolute Knowledge, absolute truth refers only
to the content not to the degree of completeness with whicn
that content has been systematised, and any disagreement
with the principle and nature of the former, on grounds
which are relevant solely to the latter, is due to a pal-
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pable confusion. And moreover, Hegel himself did not claim
that he hact worked out his system as completely as was
possible or might be desired;, and was very far from being
conscious of omniscience. Both in the first volume of the
Logic which appeared in 1812 and in the last (1816), he
expressly apologises for the imperfection of the work which
ne offers to the public, and claims, in view of the unusual
obstacles in the way of a reformation of Logic, their in¬
dulgence for its short-comings (1). The Logic, iie suggests
'is capable of more perfection antl elaboration in detail,
though the method is in spite of the incompleteness of the
system the only true one .it can follow'. And all his later
modifications or .emendations must be interpreted in the
light of this conception of his own task.
This consideration holds good also, we may note in
passing, of the position assigned to the Phenomenology in
the 'Encyclopaodie'. The position it has in the 'Philosophy
of Mind' does not indicate that Iiegel had changed his views
regarding either the value to his system of the Phenomenolo¬
gy , or its place in it, as has been supposed. For as a
matter of fact, he regarded it in the same way and discuss¬
ed it in a similar fashion, coordinating it with psychology.,
long before the 'encyclopaedia' of 1817 was written.
During his P.ectorate in Nurnberg he lectured on both Psy¬
chology and Phenomenology, and while we can readily see
that the Phenomenology of the Propaedentik and that of the
(1) Log. I. 6,41, 42. Log.III. 3, 4.
'Encyclop&eaie ' of 1(317 are the same, we are informed by
Rosenkranz that the Psychology of the same period is pre¬
cisely the same as that which appeared in the 'Philosophy
of Mind' of 1817 (1).
The advance which Hegel makes on his preceding posi¬
tions will now be seen to consist essentially in (i) the
accurate determination of a philosophical method,(2) the
establishment of the supremacy, the absoluteness of mind.
By the former 'reflexion' and 'Anschauung'' of the previous
6*)
period were fused into a single function or process, and
with that fusion all the obscurities, the distinctions con¬
sequent upon their separation, namely of reason from under¬
standing, of logic from metaphysics of the identity from
its differences (flnitudes) fell away at one stroke. The
identity is not to be merely 'Angeschaut', but to be ex¬
pounded explicitly, developed. The absolute is not to be
'the night in which all cows are black', but by the liquid
light of a transfusing dialectic is to be the inexhausti¬
ble plenitude and riches of the noon-day of Mature, History
and all Experience.
By the latter again the conception of Development is
established completely; the 'indifferent unity' of Mind and
Object is removed, and the ideas and ideals of human
(1) v. Preface to Propaedentik. W. XV]II.15, also W.XVII^
337.8.362. _ _ . . _ 0
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experience; are determined, as tne grounds and determining
content of all reality, without at the same time doing less
than justice to the 'substantiality' and 'self-de enaence'
of pature and objectivity.
On these two fundamental changes everything else de¬
pends; the transformation of the conception of Logic; the
identification of the absolute with all Experience, leaving
it no life of its own. apart from what it there contains and
reveals, an identification of which that impossibility
above described,of passing out of one sphere of its reali¬
sation, the Logic, directly•and immaneutly to another,
Nattlrt, is simply the result and counterpart; finally the
self-con tain ear-ess and independence of eacii of the philo¬
sophical sciences, as indeed of ail sciences using the
one method, each science being but a fragment Q) of the
content of the one Reality which in it.'-- totality is com¬
pletely expounded, 'in abstract©' in its essence, in the
Logic.
(1) Log. Ill ad fin. \lZ'H' ^ ^
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If w6 look back over the whole history we have passed"
in review, we shall find, one factor which has been promi¬
nent .ana dominant throughout it from beginning to and - tit:
conception of the intimate connection between philosophy
ana religion. We pointed out at the start that the aims
and 'content of these were directly and closely associated
in Hegel's view; and the course of his development has been
a continuous substantiation of our contention that for
liegel they are rooted in the same fact, and issue in the
seme result, the union of man with the Absolute. Hegel
aid not, as we saw, recognise at the outset the essential
identity of import between philosophy and religion, but in
any case the fact that he approached philosophy 1'rorn the
side of religion shaped his interest and determined his
conception of philosophy and kept the two in immediate,
intimate connection from first to last. At first philosophy
was a mere appendage or support to religion; then religion
was trie 'completion' of philosophy; next it was a sort of
obscure philosophy; finally it held 'in concrete' and sus¬
tained in tne form of representation, and feeling what
philosophy exhibited in the form of the notion, in its es-
sential truth, philosophy being thus higher than religion.
The fundamental object of and in both is the Absolute, and
the conception formed of the nature and principle of
Reality determined at once philosophy and religion. In
tne first stage we have, as .we saw, a deistic interpretation
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afterwards the monism of a neutral substance and final1*
the' idealistic monism of reason, of mind. With such a con¬
ception as this lest it was inevitable tnat the difference
between philosophy and religion should be one of form only
or oven merely one of degree of explicitnoss, that the
highest form of religion should be revealed religion (reli¬
gion whose content is hind) and. that philosophy should
simply carry into its truth, into the true form of mind,
what revealed religion only asserted de facto, iiis Logic
is nothing more nor less than the next and completing step
to the claims assumed in actual revealed religion. If.the
latter is justified in asserting then the human is one with
the currin, that the Absolute is land, then and for the same
reasons the Logic is justified in claiming to be absolute
•knowledge, fur this contains merely the ultimate notions of
mina. A hion ism of Spirit in religion has as its confirma¬
tion , completion and counterpart, a monism of thought in
ivietaphysic; Pantheism in religion becomes pa.ulogis® in
philosophy. Hegel's whole theoretical activity therefore
can be regarded as a reconciliation of philosophy and reli¬
gion. Religion ana philosophy are shown to be not two op¬
posed b; t merely two different attitudes towards the same
object. The one is as necessary as the other ana fulfils
the same function in different ways. It is because of this
identity of purpose and object-matter that religion does
not form part of the content of the Logic (I). There is
(1) Log. Ill, 326.
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no idea corresponding to religion in the Logic for having
the same object as that of the Logic it is impossible that
it should occur there. Philosophy is simply another way
(the highest way) of presenting*, exhibiting, tne one abso¬
lute Reality; religion presents in a way peculiar to it¬
self (1). hence Logic, cannot contain modes or ways of
exhibiting the Absolute which have a 'similar purpose to
that which determines itself. Throughout Hegel's whole
development then the conception of the purpose, content and
value of religion plays a very prominent part; it supplies
a continuous influence, the significance of which is evi¬
dent enough in the result, and the continual importance- of
which it must have had for Hegel personally and privately
in the conception and the work inJ out of his system it is
huraly possible, to exaggerate.
It will also be clear that throughout his entire his¬
tory the or.c underlying dogma and principle is the ulti¬
mate reality of hind (deist). from this position he never
wavered, not even under the Rchellingian influence. And
we may say it is the key to his whole development. It .is
not proved as we should prove a position, by going outside
it and establishing it by a process from elementary and
easily admitted premisses where every one has common ground.
Hence arises for Hegel the peculiar conception of the proof
(1) So also does Art.
or which it is susceptible. the process just suggested
we could prove it at the start and from that go forward.
But Hegel's process of proving it is by revealing it at the
close of the System which has implicitly depended on it
for content ana method all along. This we saw .was the
case in the Phenomenology which is the complete exoteric
proof of the principle he adopts. Cut his whole philosophy-
can in his view be regarded as the prolonged and continuous
establishment of his fundamental position. Indeed we may
say that .the System is nothing but his ground-principle in
extenso, in the fullness of its content.
This process of proof he must early have seen; for we
find him remarking in his Bote-book in Jena that "the
principle of a system of philosophy is its -result" (.1). Ana
such a contention it need hardly be pointed out not only
differentiates Hegel from Ficht'e and Jacob! and Scheliing,
but in the last resort constitutes Hegel's claim and title
to a unique place in the history of human thought. For
from such a conception of proof all that is peculiar in
Hegel's system is determined. By it hind is established
as 'higher titan Mature', as the Absolute; by it the values
of forms of Knowledge and systems of truth are determined;
by it finally his own system is established as the truth
because the 'outcome of the history of human thought. In
(1) Ros. Leber.. 545/6.
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snort tais notion of the nature of proof is tixe nerve of
his■developmental method. And his view of proof combined
with his view of the essential character* of mind, which
%
because mind is necessarily transparent, clear, self-
revealing, self-expressing, (a character which again was
' self-evident' to him, and only required 'sirewing' ) - these
contain in germ his whole explicit system. Hence the Logic,
which is merely the clearest expression, the simplest ut¬
terance of the 'pure' abstract content of absolute Lind
in its entirety, whose character is just to be self-reflect¬
ing, self-evidencing. Hence it is at once Logic, ft-etaphysie
Ontology, cosmology, theology and criticism.'
Thus the ground fact of the System begun as & dogma,
was maintained as a contention, was then asserted on ob¬
jective grounds (ethical, etc.) to be the 'highest truth',
tills assertion fixed the .character of the proof capable and
necessary for establishing the position'and finally the
position was exhibited as at once the highest truth and
conclusion of the whole system, - Absolute is Subject .
Hence Hegel's idea of philosophy, his principle of
philosophy and his method are all intimately and india-
solubly connected. That the Absolute is hind, determines
method, plan and content. Because all the'content of mind
is its own, no reality Is lost or annihilated in the system,
because wind is absolute, truth and reality have degrees
and can be connectedly arranged in a developed system; and
because each element has its finite place, its full truth
is only seen in the whole to which it belongs, and not
when taken fey itself; because finite it is permeated, with
the life of the whole; whole and part are indissolubly
i.nitea. • Tnus, while the kernel of Spinozism is contained
in the words 'oiuiis determin&tis est negatio,' that of
Absolute luealisni is simply the counterstroke, 'oninis
R&gatio est determinatio'.
